Evil and Karma in 'Contemporary Indian Philosophy'

Evil and Karma in ‘Contemporary

Indian Philosophy’

Two philosophers who have contributed to the volume on Contemporary Indian Philosophy, and whose opinions deserve the attention of serious students of philosophy, have held two views on the subject. Dr. Dasgupta thinks that Indian Philosophy is surrounded by four unproved dogmas, among which the law of Karma is one. Prof. Wadia says that he got "a satisfactory answer" to the problem of evil "only from the Karma theory of the Hindus." This paper is written partly in the hope of receiving light on this question: whether Karma is one or the other of the views quoted; or, whether some part of it is a ‘dogma,’ and some other part of it ‘a satisfactory answer.’ Is there any logical basis for the theory of Karma? Are there any other beliefs consistent or inconsistent with this?–These are the questions that I propose to discuss.

I

That evil exists is a fact. I do not think anyone will deny or even doubt that evil in the form of physical suffering and moral injustice exists, whatever difference of opinion there might be about its explanation. It is not enough to think that these alone are evil. Absence of goodness or virtue is also an evil. Either it is true that virtuous people suffer pain, and this is an evil; or, that there are no virtuous people, and this is also an evil. In trying to explain evil, what we are trying, to do is to make it consistent with certain other facts or beliefs, such as the goodness of God, and even His existence. If there is an explanation possible, it will also be an answer to the question, "What is the cause or origin of evil?" And any explanation must satisfy the purely logical demand for coherence. Belief in Karma is identical with our belief in the reign of Law, and this has its foundation in the conception of, or belief in, the order and rationality of the universe.

I would claim for the theory or law of Karma a formal property that is claimed for purely physical and logical laws: the assertion of ‘hypothetical’ necessity of the form "If A then B." It is quite consistent with this to suppose that there is no absolute necessity that the antecedent of the proposition "If a then B" should exist. If there were no antecedent, there would be no consequent. I submit that belief in Karma is an application to conduct of this kind of necessity.

The proposition "If A then B" might mean only the empirical fact of causality: the sort of relation which we have known, at least in some instances, to obtain between two events, of which one event preceded the other in time and was known as cause and the later event as its effect. And where in a particular instance the theory of Karma was accepted as a valid explanation, it would mean no more than that a certain event, in the sphere of conduct, present now, could be explained by another event which was past etc. That belief in the theory of Karma takes, in the minds of most people, this kind of explanation, will not be denied. It will not be far from the truth to say that in less critical minds it is associated with fatalism. It is evident, however, that this is only part of the truth. It is dogmatic to suppose that there is only one kind of explanation: from the past to the present. If belief in Karma meant only this, then it is easily rejected on general grounds. It is not certain that all events could be brought under the purely mechanical determination of the past to the present. And if this were the only kind of explanation possible, but failed to explain some facts, our faith in the order and rationality of the universe would be uprooted. But, it is evident, belief in Karma must be consistent with this fundamental postulate, even where it did not mean the empirical and contingent relation of cause and effect. So far as I can see, this is possible by the admission that Karma does not mean only the relation of cause and effect, but the principle of sufficient reason in the realm of conduct. We are not aware of causes of events in every case, nor is it proved that every event should have a cause; but it is a necessity that an event must have sufficient reason for its occurrence. Nothing that I have said is inconsistent with the kind of necessity that, I think, belief in Karma implies. If there is evil, then, there is a sufficient reason for its existence.

What are the implications of belief in Karma? I think there are two implications: if we believe in Karma, we believe (a) in the reality of moral freedom; and, (b) in the reign of law in conduct: These implications are present in the popular statement, "Man is the author of his fate." Now, it seems to me quite certain that none of these implications could be called ‘dogmas.’ On the contrary, there are good reasons for considering that these are ‘a satisfactory answer’ to the problem of evil. For, without moral freedom, morality would be impossible; without belief in the reign of law, the conception of the universe as a cosmos is impossible.

Certain deductions could be made from all that I have said, and these deductions are the following: (a) The existence of evil i is ‘hypothetical,’ There is a cause or a sufficient reason for its existence; in the absence of that cause evil will disappear. (b) It is logically possible that a world could exist, without evil existing in it as a part.

I think belief in Karma implies belief in the two sets of conditions stated. So long as our belief in Karma means the assumptions of these general sets of conditions, no one will seriously doubt their validity, For, any explanation of the problem of evil that has the least claim to plausibility must consider these, and assume, more or less, similar hypotheses.

II

But there are other parts of the doctrine which appear to me to be in the nature of ‘dogmas,’ Belief in Karma means, as popularly stated, "Man is the author of his fate." I think we ought to state this in a stronger form: we ought to say that each existent (or soul) is the author and the only author of its fate, and no one else. This would remove responsibility for the existence of evil from God. No other being could have any influence, moral or metaphysical, in shaping the destiny of any existent except itself.

In Indian philosophical literature, however, belief in the law of Karma is very closely associated with another belief, transmigration of souls. It is claimed that belief in transmigration satisfies man’s "logical as well as moral consciousness."¹ Before we could admit this we have to be fairly certain about something else that is very important. It seems to me that the two beliefs, Karma and transmigration, are logically independent even if they are very closely associated. It is not inconsistent to believe in the theory of Karma and yet not believe in transmigration. For, it is quite conceivable–and there is nothing self-contradictory in this–that a soul had existed, temporarily in a body, for the duration of what we call ‘life,’ and yet was not again associated with another body. We can see that that life would yet be governed by the law of Karma. And, unless it was the case that there was a balance of pleasure or pain left over, that needed the duration of another life and association with another body to enjoy the pleasure or suffer the pain, it is not evident that there is any logical necessity for the soul to transmigrate. This would again imply two conditions:

(a) It would have to be proved, or believed in with a reasonable degree of probability, that a soul could enjoy pleasure and suffer pain, as reward and as retribution, only by being associated with another body.

And, secondly, (b) there should be a very great degree of probability, if not proof, or it must be a postulate, that the soul survived the death of its physical body. Between belief in Karma and belief in transmigration, immortality of soul is there as an implicit premise.

Now, how is this introduced? I do not think belief in the theory or law of Karma entails belief in immortality of soul; because, it is clear, at least to me, that a soul could be governed by the law of Karma in the duration of its association with a body, and yet had no such association after the event called ‘death.’ Such association would be a contingent fact. Nor could it be argued that transmigration entails immortality; rather, it is quite the other way round. Immortality may or may not imply transmigration. And unless it was true that the soul survived the death of its physical body, there would be no ground for believing in transmigration. Immortality of soul and its transmigration are logically independent. Belief in transmigration implies belief in immortality; but, belief in immortality does not necessarily imply transmigration. I am inclined to think, therefore, that immortality of soul would have to be proved on independent grounds. Belief in the theory of Karma does not prove that the soul is immortal, and unless this was proved it is inconsistent to base transmigration on acceptance of the theory of Karma.

III

Although I have raised these objections–and these are the sort that would be raised–I do not claim to have disproved the theory of Karma. I would yet think that the theory of Karma is a contribution to speculative philosophy. If it borders on the mystical, it is because neither philosophy nor religion can long dissociate themselves from mysticism. Belief in Karma, perhaps, makes the least possible assumptions and begs the fewest possible questions. I would prefer belief in Karma to the belief in the theory of vicarious punishment and vicarious atonement, or the belief that a soul was created whenever it entered into an association with a body; and that after the dissolution it had to wait, indifferently, till doomsday. Although the conclusion that I drew was only negative, yet it is important, because it clears a possible confusion. We may accept belief in Karma, but we cannot make it prove more than what it could prove. It does not prove immortality; and unless this was proved, Karma does not lead to belief in transmigration. We should have to accept immortality as an independent postulate, or try to prove it by arguments. It is my opinion, however, that immortality could be proved by arguments that are as satisfactory and clear, or at least as plausible as any. Then, the joint assertion of the two beliefs, Karma and immortality, would imply the assertion, I think, not of a necessary truth, but of a contingent truth, transmigration. It is possible to conceive of an instance where the soul was associated with a body, and after the dissolution, survived the death of that body, and yet did not transmigrate. I think that in discussions on Karma, we ought to say explicitly, and for the sake of clearness, that Karma does not entail immortality; that this is an independent premise.

But we have to admit, I think, that transmigration is a logical consequence of certain other beliefs which we seem to entertain. In that sense, and only in that sense, do I think that it satisfies man’s "logical and moral consciousness" and this admission is not inconsistent with what I said previously: that belief in Karma and in immortality leads to a contingent truth or fact, transmigration. Now, it seems to me, that beliefs which logically lead to belief in transmigration are the following, and, only the following: (a) belief in immortality, (b) belief in a soul being governed by the law of Karma during its existence in a body; (c) belief that a soul could suffer, or enjoy or appear to suffer or enjoy, its pain and pleasure as retribution and as reward, only by existing in a body; and, (d) the belief that there was a balance of pain or pleasure left over, that needed the association with another body.

I will make brief comments on these. I have already said, perhaps rashly, that immortality could be proved on independent grounds. And I would prove it by arguments based on the unreality of time. Most people would accept it, I suppose, as a postulate. I cannot enter into a discussion on it in this paper. About belief in Karma, I have endeavoured to prove that it has a logical basis: that it satisfies the purely logical demand for coherence. Now, if there is any doubt at all, it would be about the last two beliefs. I think there is enough evidence in psychology to show that all our pleasure-pain, or pleasure-unpleasure, feelings have organic origin. But, I think, the mere notions of pain and pleasure as retribution and as reward, is a very small part of the belief in Karma. Transmigration, if it is a fact, would be indeed trivial if it meant just the enjoyment and suffering of past Karma. If transmigration is to satisfy man’s "logical and moral consciousness," it would on the exalted assumption that re-birth was necessary for every existent in order to realise its nature, which is the essence of perfection. In the lives of some very rare souls, it is possible, perhaps, to realise this in the duration of one and only association with a body. There is nothing logically impossible in this. But it is self-evidently not the case with a great many. If I would believe in transmigration at all, I would do so not as the enjoying or suffering of what I have done in my past life, although this might be the case, but as a condition for the progressive realisation of each existent of its inner nature, which is such that, in the language of Leibniz, it "mirrors the nature of God."

Although these beliefs are, as I said, in the nature of ‘dogmas,’ yet, I would regard these as ‘a satisfactory answer.’ And I do not know if there are any beliefs that would not be more dogmatic than these; or explained with the greatest plausibility, or, if you like, coherence, the persistent problems of human existence.

1 Outlines of Indian Philosophy By M. Hiriyanna. P. 80.