4.4k. Unknowable Becomes Knowable

Although the subject of the ultimate realities is unknowable and unimaginable, through authentic scriptures, one can understand the nature and form of the ultimate realities. Moreover, only scriptures are showing the way to have their śākśātkāra.

Svāminārāyaṇa beautifully puts it in the Vacanāmṛta:

“Having contemplated in this way, one can realize everything that is described in the scriptures. After that, all remaining atheist feelings within one’s jīva are resolved, and the jīva becomes extremely powerful. Besides, one develops a firm conviction that whatever is stated in the scriptures is true.” (Vacanāmṛta Amdāvād 1, p.572)

Interestingly, here, we must stop to face a controversy raised by Bhadreśadāsa in his all-encompassing commentary of (Brahmasūtras 1/1/3).

The sūtra itself- Śastrayonitvāt’ states that scripture is that by which one can know ‘Brahman,’ which has already been identified as the subject of the Sūtrakāra’s inquiry (Brahmasūtras 1/1/1) and minimally referred to as the cause of the world’s origination, sustenance, and dissolution (Brahmasūtras 1/1/2).

“atra sandehaḥ | yathoktayorakṣarabrahmaparabrahmaṇojijñāsyayoḥ pramāṇamasti na veti | kiṃ prāptam | na kimapi pramāṇamiti | katham | na tāvad bāhyapratyakṣaprasaro bahirindriyā'grāhyatvāt | nāpyābhyantaraṃ pratyakṣaṃ, svātmasvajñānādītaravasturūpatvāt | nāpyanumānaṃ, tasya pratyakṣopajīvyatvānniyatasāhacaryaviśiṣṭaliṅgādyabhāvāt | nāpi śabdastathāvidhaśabdābhāvādityaprāmāṇikatvānnādriyata iti prāpte tatra pramāṇamavadhārayati śāstrayonitvād iti | śāstrameva bhavati tatra pramukhapramāṇamityarthaḥ |” (Brahmasūtra 1/1/3, p.18)

“Here is doubt, is there any pramāṇa to reveal the form of inquired Brahman and Parabrahman? The opposition says that ultimate realities cannot be known with any pramāṇa. We know that the external indriayas are used in perception, which fall short because the ultimate realities are not subject to know by external human senses; it is not perceivable through internal indriyas. Moreover, inference falls short to grasp them because of its dependency on perception. Not even the scriptural words can entail them due to their own mix and different nature. In answer to these questions, that scriptures are the prominent pramāṇa in order to know the ultimate realities.”

Let us explain it in detail.

The objection takes this form: Upaniśadik statements such as

“From where speech returns... having not attained it.”

“This Self, the immortal indweller, is the unseen seer, the unheard listener…”^[1]

“And that which is invisible, ungraspable...”^[2] etc.

Confirm that Parabrahman is beyond the subject of speech and sound; he cannot be described nor can he be heard. He is therefore unknowable by scriptures. Which, after all, are nothing but ‘a pile of words’.^[3] To this, the Bhāṣyakāra answers that these are the ramblings of those who have not grasped the true import of the scriptures and solely have faith in the imagined proficiency of their flawed reasoning. Statements such as the above serve simply to avow the unlimited nature of Parabrahman and the limited scope of human means. Indeed, it is by these very scriptures that this is established.^[4] How can those same scriptures, which you, too, cite, then become invalid? If you argue, on the basis of these statements, that Parabrahman is not the subject of verbal testimony, then what will you make of other statements in those same set of scriptures, which describe him as knowable through scriptures?

Such statements contain the following:

“That Self extolled in the Upaniṣad...” (Brhadāraṇyaka-upaniṣad 3/9/26)

“I alone am to be known by all of the Vedas.” (Bhagavad-Gītā 15/15)

They assure that, even with all their typical confines and inadequacies, words, when divinely spoken or inspired, can invaluably serve as a reliable source of knowledge about Parabrahman. As always, though, we must also accept that this revelation, even though adequate, is never exhaustive. The Bhāṣyakāra’ s debate at this sūtra (Brahmasūtra-1/1/3, pp.18-19) is interested in indicating the logical fallacies of the perspective that inferential reasoning is a valid means of knowing Brahman. In the process, he advances some of the same characteristics of the Svāminārāyaṇa system as in the previous adhikaraṇas. The Bhāṣyakāra first states that the knowledge of Akṣarabrahman is only attained through scripture, and cites a total of nineteen Upaniśadik verses and two verses from the Bhagavad Gītā in defense of that. The pūrvapakṣa (opponent) concedes the point but then argues that Parabrahman can indeed be resolved through inference.

The Bhāṣyakāra then commences an extensive rejection of this perspective that is far more technical than its predecessors. A full engagement with this rejection presupposes considerable knowledge of Navya Nyāya—the system of logic as it developed in the second millennium—and its precise, systematic analysis categories. The debate exhibits Bhāṣyakāra’ s significant coaching and sophistication. There is one other field of the Bhāṣyakāra’ s position in which his commentary sets itself apart from the previous ones. In discussing the primacy of scriptural testimony in knowing about Brahman, the Bhāṣyakāra again centers the role of the Brahmasvarūpa Guru in arbitrating and preaching this scripture, based on the same scriptural texts cited in his commentary.

The Prasthānatrayī literature on this relevant topic is in large quantity. It has disclosed the rise of the significance of verbal testimony as a powerful means of knowledge. Such as ‘Śastradiṣṭyā tupadeśo vāmadevavat (1/1/31) The instruction (given by Indra about himself) (is possible) through insight based on scripture, as in the case of Vamadeva. ‘Śrutestu śabdamulavat’ (2/1/28)-But (this is not so) on account of scriptural passages and on account of (Brahman) resting on scripture (only). ‘Sarve Veda...’(Katha-upaniṣad 2/15) That goal which all the Vedas glorify, which all austerities proclaim, desiring which (people) practice brahmacarya (a life of continence and service), that goal I tell you briefly—it is Akṣarabrahman. ‘Yah śāstravidhim utsṛjya’ (Bhagavad-Gītā 16/23) One who acts under the influence of their desires, disobeying scriptures, neither attains perfection nor happiness nor the supreme goal.

Therefore, let the scripture be your guide in determining what should be done and what should not be done. One should perform duty using scriptures as a guide. (Bhagavad-Gītā 16/24) There are some supplementary factors that help the textual sentence to understand its meaning. Only that blend of words is called a sentence when four factors are taken care of. They are expectancy (ākāṃkṣā), consistency (yogyatā), contiguity (āsatti), and knowledge of the purport (tātparya jñānam). Understanding all this facilitates us to understand why verbal testimony is an independent means of knowledge very different from inference etc.^[5]

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

Brhadāraṇyaka-upaniṣad 3/7/23

[2]:

Mundaka-upaniṣad 1/1/6

[3]:

'yato vāco nivartante' (tai. 21/ 4/,2( 1/ 9/, ‘tadvā etadakṣaraṃ gāryadṛṣṭaṃ draṣṭuśrutam' (bṛ. 3( 11/ 8/, ‘eṣa ta ātmā'ntaryāmyimṛtāeṃ śrotā' (bṛ. 3( 23/ 7/, ‘yattadadreśyamagrāhyam' (mu. 1 / 1/ 6(

[4]:

‘taṃ tvaupaniṣadaṃ puruṣam.bṛ)3(26/ 9/, ‘sarve vedā yatpadamāmananti' (kaṭha. 2( 15/,‘vedaiśca sarvairahameva vedyaḥ' (gī. 15( 15/

[5]:

SSS, p.166