Other sources of knowledge referred to in Carakasaṃhitā

Analogy (aupamya), presumption (arthāpatti), and tradition (aitihya) and probability (saṃbhava) are the other sources of knowledge described in the Carakasaṃhitā. One of the most important things to be noted in this connection is that Caraka does not consider them as means of examination.

Analogy (aupamya)

Analogy is that which brings about cognition based on the similarity of one object with the other. For instance, the disease daṇḍaka (a disease characterized by the rigidity of muscles) is similar to of daṇḍa.^[1] The usual name used in Darśanas for aupamya is upamāna. The Naiyāyikas,^[2] the Mīmāṃsakas,^[3] and the Vedāntins^[4] , who accept upamāna as an independent source of valid knowledge, have defined it as the knowledge of a thing through its similarity to another thing previously well-known. The Sāṃkhyas do not accept upamāna as a distinct source of knowledge. In the view of Sāṃkhyas, upamāna is a case of perception.^[5] The Vaiśeṣikas include upamāna in inference since it comes under verbal testimony.^[6]

Presumption (arthaprāpti)

Presumption (arthaprāpti)^[7] means to grasp a thing or a fact on the basis of another thing or fact. Caraka defines it as the knowledge of a thing or fact implied by another thing or fact expressed by an assertion.^[8] For instance, when a person asserts that a given disease cannot be cured by nourishing therapy, it evidently implies that the disease is curable by emaciating therapy. For the Naiyāyikas, presumption is not different from inference.^[9] The Vaiśeṣikas also include presumption in inference. For them, the presumptive cognition of a thing based on a fact of perception is a case of “inference per contraries”, and that based on verbal cognition is a case of “inference per inference”.^[10] The Mīmāmsakas describe it as thus: When some general valid knowledge is in conflict with a special one, the cognition of the non-conflicting element is accepted as presumption.^[11] For instance, from the conflicting knowledge that a person is alive with the knowledge of his absence from his house, it is assumed that the person is outside.

Tradition (aitihya)

Tradition stands for long standing beliefs in other Indian systems of philosophy.^[12] At the same time tradition (aitihya) including the Vedas is included in verbal testimony.^[13]

Probability (saṃbhava)

Probability is being defined as the cognition of that from which something originates.^[14] For example, the six dhātus constitute the originating cause of foetus in the womb. What is intended is that the thing originated is already present in the source. Thus, probability is nothing but only a manifested form. Here, in the present example the embryo is present in the six dhātus.^[15]

In the philosophical systems saṃbhava is seen to have been given a more refined definition. There it is treated in the nature of inclusion. Thus saṃbhava consists in cognizing the existence of a thing from that of another thing in which it is included. For instance, the cognition of the measure of an āḍhaka from that of droṇa of which it is one fourth part. Here, in a sense, the former gives rise to the cognition of the latter and so Akṣapāda includes it in inference.^[16]

It is an accepted fact that epistemology is the main concern of philosophy and not science. Most particularly, it is not customary to a practical science like the science of medicine to deal with the methods of knowing, thinking, and expressing. But, it is quite contrary to this conception that we see in Carakasaṃhitā a detailed account of almost all the sources of knowledge that are being discussed in the classical darśanic realm. This is not the only thing. The uniqueness of Carakasaṃhitā, in this matter, lies in the fact that it is the earliest book which codifies almost all different sources of knowledge dealt with in various philosophical systems. ceṣṭa and anupalabdhi are the only two pramāṇas which are not found discussed in the Carakasaṃhitā. Another important thing is the recognition of yukti as a separate source of knowledge. Probably, it is the only book that deals with such a source of knowledge revealing the idea of logic of probability. From this, we can conclude that the Carakasaṃhitā is not only a compendium limited to the discussion of maintenance of positive health and cure but extends its attention to theoretical thinking. Caraka had great concern for deriving a proper methodology for theoretical formulations. Carakasaṃhitā has played a significant role in the formative stage of the history of epistemological and logical reflection in India.

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

atha aupamyaṃ nāma yadanyonyasya sādṛśyamadhikṛtya prakāśanaṃ; yathā daṇdena daṇdakasya, CS, Vimāna - sthāna, VIII. 42.

[2]:

prasiddhasādharmyāt sādhyasādhanamupamānaṃ. Nyāyasūtra., I. i. 6; also see Nyāya-Bhāṣya of Vātsyāyana. on Ibid., p. 27;

[3]:

dṛśyamānārthasadṛśyāt smaryamāṇārthagocaraṃ asanṇikṛṣṭasādṛśyajñānaṃ hyupamitirmatā. Mānameyodaya of Nārāyaṇa., p. 110.

[4]:

sādṛśyapramākaraṇaṃupamānaṃ, Vedāntaparibhāṣa of Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra., p. 83.

[5]:

For details see Vācaspatimiśra, on Sāṃkhyakārikā. 5, Sāṃkhyatattvakaumudī of Vācaspati Miśra., p. 66

[6]:

āptenāprasiddhasya gavayasya gavā gavayapratipādanādupamānamāptavacanameva, Praśastapādabhāṣya., p. 530.

[7]:

Instead of arthaprāpti the term arthāpatti is used in all philosophical systems.

[8]:

arthaprāptirnāma yatraikenārthenoktenāparasyārthasyānuktasyāpi siddhiḥ; CS,Vimāna - sthāna, VIII. 48.

[9]:

Nyāyasūtra., II. ii. 2; vakyārthasaṃpratyayenānabhihitārthasya pratyanīkabhavād grahaṇaṃ arthāpattiranumānameva, Nyāya-Bhāṣya of Vātsyāyana., p. 166.

[10]:

darśanārthādarthāpattirvirodhyeva, śravaṇādanumitānumānaṃ. Praśastapādabhāṣya., p. 534.

[11]:

anyathānupapatyā yadupapādakakalpanaṃ tadarthāpattirityevaṃ lakṣaṇaṃ bhāṣyabhāṣitaṃ. Mānameyodaya of Nārāyaṇa., p. 120.

[12]:

HIPS, Vol. II, p.377.

[13]:

“aitihyaṃ nāmāptopadeśo vedādiḥ”. CS,Vimāna - sthāna, VIII.41.

[14]:

yo yataḥ saṃbhavati sa tasya saṃbhavaḥ, Ibid., 48.

[15]:

See Cakrapāṇi on ibid.

[16]:

Nyāya-Bhāṣya of Vātsyāyana., p.166.