Cārvāka refutation of inference examined

The Cārvāka may contend as follows. It has been said that nonapprehension simply does not prove the nonexistence of a thing. By nonapprehension is proved the non existence of only such a thing which is capable of being apprehended, but is not actually apprehended.

The Cārvāka argues that it is not necessary to add any qualification, it is sufficient to say that simple nonapprehension proves nonexistence. Whatever is not perceived does not exist. God is never perceived by anybody and hence God does not exist. It may be objected that if this position is accepted then there will be no pramāṇa called inference. The Cārvāka answers that there is no harm, because inference has no validity, it cannot be accepted as a pramāṇa. As against this it may further be objected that the Cārvāka position will involve difficulties. It is actually observed that inference has validity. People depend on inference, engage in activities and their activities are found to be successful. For example, a person infers fire from smoke in the mountain and gets fire after reaching it. The Cārvāka answers that this is only a case probability. There is no guarantee that if there is smoke there is fire. But it is found in many cases that smoke is present along with fire. So it is only surmised that in case there is smoke there may be fire also. On the basis of such probability one acts and may be successful.^[1] It is not proved that the presence of smoke always proves the presence of fire.

Refuting the above Udayana says that probability actually implies a form of doubt. There is doubt regarding the presence of fire and one proceeds on its basis. But what kind of fire will be the object of such a doubt? It cannot relate to perceived fire, because its presence is definitely known. On the other hand, it cannot also relate to unperceived fire, because, according to the opponent it does not exist. Thus to justify the doubt the opponent will have to admit the existence of fire which is not perceived. This can be done only by inference. So the validity of inference has to be admitted.^[2] Moreover, the opponent will not be able to establish the validity of even perception. The instruments of perception are the senses. They are not themselves perceptible. So they do not exist. In fact their existence is really proved by inference. If the Cārvāka claim is accepted, there will be many absurdities. For example, when the Cārvāka leaves his home and goes to a different place, he cannot perceive his wife and children and in his view they should become nonexistent. Then, he should start lamenting for them. But he does not do so, because he knows that they are present in the home. In other words, he has to admit the validity of inference.^[3]

The Cārvāka may argue that the basis of an inference is an invariable relation between the hetu and sādhya. For example, fire is inferred from smoke because smoke is present wherever there is fire. But how can such a rule be established? A person cannot know all the smokes and all the fires of the world. There are also past smokes and past fires, and again future smokes and future fires. It is not possible to ascertain an invariable rule in the case of all such smokes and fires. Even in the case of present smokes and present fires it is not possible to know this rule, because the smokes and fires may exist in distant places. One can at best say that the cases of smoke and fire which one has come actually across show that smoke and fire coexist. In many cases there may be smoke and fire also, but this does not prove that it will be so always. Thus an element of doubt will always be there and there can be no inference.^[4]

In this connection another point also should be noted. In the Nyāya view vyāpti is defined as a relation free from condition (upādhi). In case there is a condition the ground (hetu) of inference becomes irregular and there can be no correct inference. For example, smoke is not inferred from fire, because there is a condition namely conjunction with wet fuel. Now, condition may be both perceptible and not perceptible. In the case of any inference, it cannot be said that there may be only a perceptible condition and not any imperceptible one. The possibility of an imperceptible condition being there is always there. Therefore, to establish an invariable rule a person will have to ascertain that there is no such condition also. He cannot say that it is not there, because it is not perceived. Nyāya does not believe that simple nonapprehension proves absence. It may be said that the absence of such a condition is proved by an inference. But, then, the same problem will arise in the case of the ground of the new inference also and a further inference will become necessary. In short, there will be infinite regress. So because of a doubt regarding the irregularity of the ground in every case of inference, no inference will be valid.^[5] Replying to the above Udayana raises a question. Does the Cārvāka really believe that there can be a doubt regarding irregularity? If the answer is positive then we have to find out to what kind of smoke and fire does this doubt of irregularity relate. The objects of doubt cannot be the present smoke and fire which are perceived because the rule is definitely proved in such cases due to the fact that smoke actually is present with fire in all the cases. Thus, there may be a doubt regarding only such smokes and fires which belong to different times and different places. But how do we know that such smokes and fires which are not now perceived exist? The answer must be that we determine such smokes and fire by inference only. The position of the Cārvāka is peculiar. To deny the validity of inference he has to depend on a doubt, but such a doubt can only be justified if the validity of inference is admitted. If the opponent says that we never accept inference as a source of valid knowledge, then it will be ease to prove the validity of inference, because the doubt of irregularity will not arise at all.^[6]

Even then, the Cārvāka may persist that a doubt may arise in spite of observing coexistence in many case. Sometimes it actually happens that coexistence between two things are found in many instances but finally it is found that in a single case there is no coexistence. The coexistence must be invariable and there should be no exception. Even if there is a single case of exception the rule will break down and there will be no valid inference. A doubt may arise even when concomitance is actually there between two things. So, the question is, how will such a doubt be removed? Udayana answers that it is proved that a doubt may arise even when there is an invariable rule. For example, it is established that there is concomitance between smoke and fire, but still one may have a doubt. But this is not a serious problem, because there is a means for removing the doubt, which is called an argument (tarka).^[7] In the case of smoke and fire, one may have a doubt and may think that it is possible that smoke is there, but there is no fire. Here the doubt can be removed by an argument based on causality. A causal relation exists between smoke and fire. Fire is the cause and smoke is the effect. An effect cannot exist without a cause. Where there is an effect there is also a cause and if there is no cause there is no effect also. So if it is doubted that there may be smoke but no fire it will be as good as claiming that there may be an effect without a cause. But this is never possible. Therefore, if smoke, the effect, is there, fire, the cause, will also be there.^[8]

The Cārvāka may put an objection even against this. The argument of Nyāya is based on the causal relation. This implies that there is an invariable rule that wherever there is an effect there is a cause. But this relation is also a kind of concomitance. Here also a question may arise as in the case of smoke and fire. How can it be determined that everywhere an effect is produced by a cause? A person cannot observe all the cases of effects and causes. So he cannot ascertain whether the rule is applicable to the cases which are outside his experience.In answer, Udayana points out that contradiction (vyāghāta) is the limit for a doubt. One cannot go on having doubts continuously. There is a limit to doubts. One does not have a doubt with regard to something if that doubt contradicts his own practical activity. For example, one does not have a doubt regarding the rule that hunger is satisfied by food. Whenever one feels hungry, one takes food. One does not doubt if hunger may not be satisfied by taking food. Like the Cārvāka no one goes on to deliberate that in all the previous causes hunger has been satisfied by taking food. But this is a new case, is there any guarantee that it will be so even in this or future cases? Similarly when one wishes to express his feelings he takes the help of words and expresses them through sentences. He never doubts the fact that a sentence or a group of words is capable of making others understand his feeling. So finally it is established that inference has validity.^[9]

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

Udayana under Nyāyakusumāñjali 3.6.

[2]:

Nyāyakusumāñjali 3.6.

[3]:

Ibid.

[4]:

Under Nyāyakusumāñjali 4.7

[5]:

Nyāyakusumāñjali 3.7

[6]:

Ibid.

[7]:

Ibid.

[8]:

Ibid.

[9]:

Ibid.