Sūtra 1.9

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation of Sūtra 1.9:

शब्दज्ञानानुपाती वस्तुशून्यो विकल्पः ॥ १.९ ॥

śabdajñānānupātī vastuśūnyo vikalpaḥ || 1.9 ||

śabda—by verbal expression, jñāna—by knowledge. anupātī—followed in sequence. vastu—reality, an objective, substratum. śunyaḥ—devoid of. vikalpaḥ—imagination.

9. Imagination is followed in sequence by verbal expression and knowledge, and is devoid of objective substratum.

The Sankhya-pravachana commentary of Vyasa

[English translation of the 7th century commentary by Vyāsa called the Sāṅkhya-pravacana, Vyāsabhāṣya or Yogabhāṣya]

[Sanskrit text for commentary available]

Imagination is followed in sequence by verbal knowledge and expression, and is devoid of objective substratum. This does not reach up to real cognition. Nor does it reach up to unreal cognition. Even in the absence of an objective substratum, its action is found to be dependent upon the power of verbal expression and knowledge.

As for example:—‘Puruṣa is of the nature of consciousness.’ Now what is here predicated of what? seeing that Puruṣa is consciousness itself, and that there must always be a statement of the relationship of one to another in predication; as in the phrase Citra’s cow.

Similarly, “the puruṣa is inactive and the characteristics of an object are denied to it.”

“Bāna stands, will stand, has stood.” The meaning of the root alone is understood by (the act of) the cessation of motion.

Similarly in the sentence, “The puruṣa has the characteristics of not being born,” the mere absence of the characteristic of not being born is to be understood, and not any positive characteristic possessed by the puruṣa. That characteristic has therefore, been imagined and has come into practical usage.

The Gloss of Vachaspati Mishra

[English translation of the 9th century Tattvavaiśāradī by Vācaspatimiśra]

“Imagination is followed in sequence by verbal expression and knowledge, and is devoid of an objective substratum.” If it is followed in sequence by verbal knowledge and expression, why should not Imagination (vikalpa) fall under the heading of Real Cognition? If, on the other hand, it is devoid of objective substratum, it must be the same as unreal cognition. For this reason, says:—‘This does not reach up to Real Cognition.’ Why does it not reach up to real cognition? ‘Because, in the absence of an objective substratum, &c.’ This shows why it does not fall under the head of real cognition. ‘Its action is found to be dependent upon the power of verbal expression and knowledge.’ This shows that it does not fall under the head of Unreal Cognition.

This is the meaning. There being no differences in some particulars, it differs in others; while showing some points of similarity. There being no objective substratum for either the distinction or the absence thereof, imagination shows an unreal image of the substratum; and it is not, therefore, an act of real cognition. Nor is it Unreal Cognition, because it differs from it, in being recognised as such in practice.

Now gives illustrations taken from the sacred writings. ‘As for example,’ &c., which is the subject to be qualified? What is it predicated by? The quality and the thing qualified cannot come into relationship if they are not distinct from each other. The cow cannot be predicated of a cow; it can only be predicated of something different from itself, say Caitra.

This is what he says:—There must always be the statement of relationship of one to another in predication.’ ‘Predication is the relation between the predicate and the predicated.’ In other words, it is the relation between the quality and the thing qualified. It is of this that the statement of a sentence consists; as in the sentence, ‘This is Caitra’s cow.’

Adds another illustration from the sacred writings too:—“Similarly.”

He to whom the characteristics of an object (i.e., the essential force which informs earth, &c.) are denied is spoken of as such. Who is he? The inactive Puruṣa. There is of course no such characteristic of an object in the Sāṅkhya teaching as non-existence, by which the Puruṣa may be qualified.

The reading in some places is, “The characteristics of an objective substratum are denied.” This means as follows:—‘Are denied,’ means ‘are pervaded by denial,’ they are possessed of the quality of being denied. Or in ocher words, it means that the characteristics of an object are possessed of the quality of being denied. But the characteristics of an object are not possessed of the quality of the non-existence of something. because there can be no relation between existence and non-existence. They are, however, taken as such (i.e., existing).

Gives illustrations from the idiom of the world:—“Bāna stands.” As in the sentences, ‘He cooks,’ ‘He breaks,’ the whole series of the moments of action in which some are antecedent and others subsequent, is recognized as being qualified by one effect, so also in the sentence ‘He stands,’ the commentator mentions the same state of antecedence and postcedence:—‘Will stand, has stood?

Well, suppose that the action of cessation of motion consists in antecedent and post-cedent moments just like the action of cooking, and that being different from Bāna it may be predicated of him. For this reason, says:—‘The meaning of the root itself is understood by the act of cessation of motion? The cessation of motion itself is imagined to be the characteristic of an object. Then this fancied characteristic is imagined to be a form of positive existence and even there is fancied an order of the precedence and postcedence. Such is the series of astonishing fanciful conceptions. Non-existence is imagined to be existence, and then it is imagined that it comes after something in succession. This fanciful conception is found in all men. It is not, however, a characteristic different from the Puruṣa, so that it might be predicated of him.

Gives another illustration:—‘The Puruṣa has the characteristic of not being born?

Many a thinker has held that the modification of imagination is not different from real and unreal cognitions. The detail of these illustrations is meant to explain the matter to them.