Vakyapadiya of Bhartrihari

by K. A. Subramania Iyer | 1965 | 391,768 words

The English translation of the Vakyapadiya by Bhartrihari including commentary extracts and notes. The Vakyapadiya is an ancient Sanskrit text dealing with the philosophy of language. Bhartrhari authored this book in three parts and propounds his theory of Sphotavada (sphota-vada) which understands language as consisting of bursts of sounds conveyi...

This book contains Sanskrit text which you should never take for granted as transcription mistakes are always possible. Always confer with the final source and/or manuscript.

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation of verse 3.4.3:

वस्तूपलक्षणं यत्र सर्वनाम प्रयुज्यते ।
द्रव्यामित्युच्यते सोऽर्थो भेद्यत्वेन विवक्षितः ॥ ३ ॥

vastūpalakṣaṇaṃ yatra sarvanāma prayujyate |
dravyāmityucyate so'rtho bhedyatvena vivakṣitaḥ || 3 ||

3. That in reference to which a pronoun can be used is substance, presented as something to be differentiated.

Commentary

As quality etc. depend upon substance, the latter is first defined.

[Read verse 3 above]

[Pronouns can do one of two things. Some merely denote things in general, like ‘sarva’. Others denote particular things like ‘anyatara’. It is the former which are used to refer to substance. In fact, that is just the characteristic of substance, namely, that it can be referred to by a pronoun (sarvanāmapratyavamarśayogyatvam). Pronouns refer to things in general either as present or as past. When the element of present or past is discarded, what remains is just the thing in general and that is substance. It is presented as something to be qualified by such limiting factors as the universal. What is meant by ‘presented’ is that what is being defined is not external reality, but reality as presented by words. Thus, even a universal, when presented as something to be qualified, becomes substance. This conception of substance is quite different from that of other schools. In this way, anything can be presented by words as substance, as something to be differentiated. This is true of the other conception also, namely, that of Vājapyāyana who held that all words denote the universal i.e., something which is the cause of the same cognition arising and the same word being applied to something. Such a universal exists in action also. That is why we cognise every step in the process of cooking as cooking. If only the last stage in the process, that is, the softening of the substance cooked, were the meaning of the root ‘to cook’ (√pac) then the other stages would have to be understood through inference or implication and would not be the actions of the cook. If the activity of the agent is not expressed by the root, but is understood by inference or implication, then there would be no connection between the meaning of the suffix, namely, the agent and his activity which would not be expressed by the root but only understood by implication. If the root ‘√pac’ denotes only the softening of the material (viklitti), then the material can only be kartā or karmakartā, but never the object. In other words, we would never be able to say—devadattaḥ odanaṃ pacati. Secondly the softening is only the last stage or moment. So it cannot be the action at all. Action is a process of which the parts are arranged in a sequence. The action of cooking is in the same position. Such moments as putting the vessel on the fire must be part of that process, because at these moments also we get the idea of cooking. So there is such a thing as the universal of cooking inhering in every moment of the process. This is true of all actions. Even though every verb denotes the universal aspect of action, the accessories become connected with the individual aspect which is something to be accomplished (sādhya) and only sādhya can be connected with ‘sādhana’ (the means).

Just as it has been shown that action is a universal, it can also be shown that it is a substance. Even according to the view that the verb denotes action primarily, it must denote substance, that is, the accessory secondarily. Otherwise, in regard to what would action be the primary meaning? Would it not be simpler to say that the verb denotes primarily the accessory in activity? Even according to the other view, the accessory comes in secondarily. Otherwise, the expressiondevadattaḥ pacati’ where the word expressive of action and the word expressive of accessory are in apposition to each other, would be inexplicable. Action, the meaning of the verb, can be referred to by a pronoun, characteristic of substance. In the expression ‘sādhu pacati’ we see that the meaning of the verb is modified or differentiated by the word ‘sādhu’. Similarly, the verb ‘āsyate’ can be qualified by the word ‘sukham’ and so its meaning becomes ‘bhedya’, a characteristic of substance, as stated in the verse under consideration.

The Mīmāṃsakas argue that the verb expresses ‘bringing about’ (bhāvanā) and that substance is understood by implication only and is not the expressed meaning of the verb. This is wrong. It is the root which expresses bhāvanā. The suffix denotes the accessory. Thus the former expresses the sādhya and the latter the ‘sādhana’ and that is how the two are correlated. If ‘sādhana’ is understood only by implication, there would be no relation between the two].

Now the definition of quality (guṇa), based on indications found in the śāstra, is being given.

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