Verse 1.68-69

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation of verse 1.68-69:

स्वं रूपमिति कैश्चित्तु व्यक्तिः संज्ञोपदिश्यते ।
जातेः कार्याणि संसृष्टा जातिस्तु प्रतिपद्यते ॥ ६८ ॥
संज्ञिनीं व्यक्तिमिच्छन्ति सूत्रे ग्राह्यामथापरे ।
जातिप्रत्यायिता व्यक्तिः प्रदेशेषूपतिष्ठते ॥ ६९ ॥

svaṃ rūpamiti kaiścittu vyaktiḥ saṃjñopadiśyate |
jāteḥ kāryāṇi saṃsṛṣṭā jātistu pratipadyate || 68 ||
saṃjñinīṃ vyaktimicchanti sūtre grāhyāmathāpare |
jātipratyāyitā vyaktiḥ pradeśeṣūpatiṣṭhate || 69 ||

68. According to some, in the sūtra—“svam-rūpam” etc., the particular form of the word (vyakti) is taught as the name (saṃjñā) of the form in general (jāti). The general form as existing in a particular one undergoes grammatical operations.

69. Others, on the other hand, look, upon the particular form to be understood as the named in this sūtra; in particular places, the particular form conveyed by the general form, comes up (for grammatical operations).

Commentary

(While explaining the sūtra svaṃ rūpaṃ śabdasya etc., P. 1.1.68.) some commentators say:—“the own form of a word is the expressor, the illuminator, the conveyor of the word,” while others say—‘the own form of a word is the expressed, the illuminated, the conveyed.’ These two views have been set forth by these two verses. In regard to the universal, there are two views current among thinkers.¹ Some maintain that the individuals have their special forms. The form of the individuals is not something unknowable, unnameable and non-existent. It is the individual cow which is the cow and not cowness. It is the individual blue which is the blue and not the universal blue. The universal is the cause of the uniformity of cognition. It is the same thing in regard to the different individuals in which there is no inherence (of the universals). It is this (uniform cognition) which is the cause of the inference of the existence of the universal.

Others, however, are of the opinion: words attain their form in regard to the universal as identical with the otherwise inexpressible individual. Everywhere, from a thing in which the cause (nimitta) exists, a cognition corresponding to that cause arises. In such cases, those causes which have their own expressive words and those which have not,² bring about the same cognition and the application of the same word, on the basis of a partial or complete resemblance. That being so, in the sūtra in question, the words ‘own form’ (svaṃ rūpaṃ) stand, according to some, for the universal (jāti) and in the expression ‘of the word’ (śabdasya) ‘word’ stands for the individual. According to others, it is just the opposite. Either the individual is the name of the universal or the universal is the name of the individual. This universal, (of the word) uttered in the different contexts, conveys the individual as connected with the relevant action (i.e. grammatical operation). The universal is never uttered as unconnected with the individual. Nor is the individual ever brought into use unconnected with the universal. The speakers’ intention differs according to his purpose. One of the two is the main thing and the other comes inevitably with it. That it is the universal on which the action is to be done according to the Science of Grammar or that it is the individual that is so is only a difference in the statement (in particular cases).

In regard to the sūtra svaṃ rūpaṃ śabdasya (P. 1.1.68.) the tradition of the circles of Grammarians is very varied. It may be stated as follows—The mere form which is a part of that meaningful combination of form and meaning, possessed of the powers of the universal, particular etc. and referred to as the word (śabdasya) is the name. Or the meaningful combination including the form, characterised by the powers inherent in it, is the name. The fact is that what is called the word is a combination of parts. Form etc. are its parts. One does speak of a whole and its parts as different from each other as when we say ‘the branch of a tree’.

Another declares: Even though an object remains the same, the meaning of the word (which refers to it) varies. A word makes a choice between the different powers relating to the same object.³ For example, in the expression ‘this stick’ the pronoun presents the object as something existing before one’s eyes, not as something having the universal ‘stickness’ even though that is also perceived. The pronoun cannot express the connection with the universal stickness. The power of the word ‘stick’ which expresses a particular universal is debarred, even though it is visible, from presenting it as present before the eyes. In the same way, in the expression ‘the own form’ (svaṃ rūpaṃ), the words agni etc., even though they have the universal in them, are presented as the words agni etc, not as universals of the words. By word in ‘of the word’, what is conveyed is the connection with the universal (of the word agni) and not its aspect as being the word agni. All this is just an illustration of the principle that a word, in one of its aspects, considered as a name, can convey the same word in another of its aspects as the named.⁴ All the different views relating to the sūtra svaṃ rūpaṃ. etc, have not been set forth in order to avoid prolixity resulting from one thing leading to another.

Notes

1. So far, the sūtra svaṃ rūpaṃ was explained on the basis of the view that the own form of a word that may occur in a sūtra is the name and the external object which it denotes is the named. The present two verses set forth two other views in regard to the name and the named. They are—(1) that the individual aspect of a word is the name (saṃjñā) and its universal aspect, the named (saṃjñin), (2) that it is vice-versa. As this involves the concept of the universals, the author refers to two views in regard to universals current among thinkers of his day. The first view is that the existence of the universal is inferred from our uniformity of cognition in regard to the individuals. The individuals themselves can be perceived and spoken about without the universal existing in them being directly perceived. There are other distinguishing features in the individuals which enable us to perceive them without the help of the universal. That there is uniformity in our cognition of the individuals does not mean that we cognise directly the universal existing in them. We only infer its existence on the basis of the uniformity of cognition. The second view is that words primarily convey the universal. They convey the individual also as identical with the universal and, therefore, nameable. The universal existing in the individual is what enables us to cognise the individual as such: it is the ‘ṃmitta’ and our cognition of the individual takes the form of this nimitta according to the principle: sarvatraiva hi nimittānnimittavatyarthe nimitta—svarūpaḥ pratyaya utpadyate. It is this nimitta which causes uniformity of cognition in regard to the individuals and the application of the same word to them.

2. Dṛṣṭābhidhānāni adṛṣṭābhidhānāni ca nimittāni. Nimitta is of two kinds: kāraka and jñāpaka. It is the latter which is subdivided into dṛṣṭābhidhāna and adṛṣṭābhidhāna. Gotva is a jñāpakanimitta which exists in the cow. It is ḍṛṣtābhidhāna, because it has a recognised word to express it. When we see different individuals having gotva in them, we see the same gotva (jāti) in all of them, our cognition (pratyaya) of all of them is uniform and we apply the same word to all of them. As Vṛ. puts it, three things persist. Dṛṣṭabhidhāneṣu trayam anuvartate jātiḥ śabdaḥ pratyaya iti. utpalagandha is given as an example of adṛṣṭābhidhāna, because the word does not denote any universal, but only two things connected by a relation. In this case, therefore, only two things persist: the word and the cognition. As though not satisfied with this example, Vṛ. gives that of rājapuruṣa.

3. Śabdo hyekavastuviṣayāṇāmapi śaktīnām avacchedenopagrahe vartate. Any given thing has many aspects. Words have the power to convey them. But a given word, on a given occasion, conveys one of them to the exclusion of others. In ayaṃ daṇḍaḥ = this stick, ayam conveys the aspect of the stick being present before the eyes to the exclusion of the universal which is also present in the stick.

4. Tatra śabdāntarārthaḥ śdbdāntarārthasya prasiddhabhedasya saṃjñātvenopādīyamānasya saṃjñibhāvaṃ pratipadyate. What is meant is that śabdavyakti is saṃjñā and śabdajāti is saṃjñin. To refer to both of them as śabdāntarārthaḥ is using rather peculiar language, a general characteristic of the Vṛtti. It seems to be a bahuviīhi compound the analysis of which would be: śabdāntaram (vyaktirūpaṃ) jātirūpaṃ vā artho yasya sa śabdaḥ śabdāntarārthaḥ.