Sūtra 3.1.7 (Fallacious mark)

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration, Word-for-word and English translation of Vaiśeṣika sūtra 3.1.7:

अन्यदेव हेतुरित्यनपदेशः ॥ ३.१.७ ॥

anyadeva heturityanapadeśaḥ || 3.1.7 ||

anyat—something else; eva—certainly; hetuḥ—make; iti—hence; anapadeśaḥ—no mark.

7. A mark is certainly something else (than that of which it is a mark). Hence (a mark, which is identical with the thing of which it is a mark, is) no mark (at all.)—123.

Commentary: The Upaskāra of Śaṅkara Miśra:

(English rendering of Śaṅkara Miśra’s commentary called Upaskāra from the 15th century)

It may be urged, “It has been affirmed that an employer (a presiding soul) is inferred from the organ of hearing (and other instruments. But this is not a legitimate inference, for the auditory and other organs are neither identical with, nor are produced by, the Soul, and, unless one of these alternatives be admitted, there is no proof of the universal concomitance or inseparable existence of these organs and the Soul; and, unless there be such, inseparable existence, there can be no inference.” So he says in reply:

[Read sūtra 3.1.7 above]

The mark or means of proof can but be something else than that which is to be proved. It cannot be identical with that which is to be proved; for, were it so, it would follow that the thing which is to be proved, would have no difference from the means of proof. Therefore, a means of proof, constituted by identity with that which is to be proved, is no means of proof, i.e., no mark at all.—7.

Commentary: The Bhāṣya of Candrakānta:

(English translation of Candrakānta Tarkālaṅkāra’s Bhāṣya called the Vaiśeṣikabhāṣya from the 19th century)

Something quite different is the mark of inference of the Self; the sense or the object cannot be such a mark. What this ‘something quite different’ is, is declared in the eighteenth aphorism of this chapter.