Chapter VI - The Infinite and Evolution

The relation of the sequel to the foregoing.

The subject-matter of the whole vallī (Book II), expressed in an aphoristic form in the Brāhmaṇa passage (Chapter II) “The knower of Brahman reaches the Supreme,” has been briefly explained in the mantra (Chaps. Ill and IV). Again with a view to determine at greater length the meaning of the same passage, the śruti proceeds with the sequel which forms a sort of commentary thereon.

 

Mantra and Brāhmaṇa.

The Veda consists of two portions, Mantra and Brāhmaṇa.^[1] The Brahmavallī^[2] falls under the category of Brāhmaṇa. Brāhmaṇa again is eight-fold. And the eight varieties of Brāhmaṇa are enumerated by the Vājasaneyins^[3]: as follows:

1. Itihāsa or story—“Bhṛgu, the son oī Varuṇa, once approached his father Varuṇa,”^[4] and so on.

2. Purāna (cosmogony):—the portion treating of sarga and pratisarga, primary and secondary creations: such as “That from which all these creatures are born,” etc.^[5]

3. Vidyā or Upāsana:—the contemplations, such as are enjoined in the words “Whoso should contemplate these great conjunctions thus declared,” etc.^[6].

4. Upaniṣad or instruction in the secret wisdom:—In the Lesson XI (Exhortation) in the Śikṣāvallī, it has been said “This is the secret of the Vedas.”^[7]

5. Ślokas or verses:—such as those to be quoted in the sequel of this Book, Ānanda-vallī.

6. Sūtra or aphorism—such as “the knower of Brahman reaches the Supreme.”^[8]

7. Anuvyākhyāna or a short succinct gloss, such as “Real Consciousness, Infinite is Brahman,” etc.,^[9] where the words of the sūtra are succinctly explained one after another.

8. Vyākhyāna or a clear exhaustive exposition of that point in the anuvyākhyāna which needs further explanation. The passage forming the text ' of the present chapter is a Vyākhyāna, because of the evolution (sṛṣṭi) being described there with a view to explain how Brahman is infinite as declared in the Anuvyākhyāna. So the Vākyavṛttikāra says:

“Do thou know That which the śruti (first) declares to be infinite, and to prove whose infinitude the śruti then says that the universe is evolved from it.”

The evolution which will serve to shew that Brahman is infinite, the śruti describes as follows:

तस्माद्वा एतस्मादात्मन आकाशः संभूतः । आकाशाद्वायुः । वायोरग्निः । अग्नेरापः । अद्भ्यः पृथिवी । पृथिव्या ओषधयः । ओषधीभ्योऽन्नम् । अन्नात् पुरुषः ॥ ३ ॥

tasmādvā etasmādātmana ākāśaḥ saṃbhūtaḥ | ākāśādvāyuḥ | vāyoragniḥ | agnerāpaḥ | adbhyaḥ pṛthivī | pṛthivyā oṣadhayaḥ | oṣadhībhyo'nnam | annāt puruṣaḥ || 3 ||

3. From That, verily,—from This Self—is ākāśa (ether) born; from ākāśa, the air; from the air, fire; from fire, water; from water, earth; from earth, plants; from plants, food: from food, man.

 

Brahman is absolutely infinite.

Now, in the beginning of the mantra it has been said “Real, Consciousness, Infinite, is Brahman”. How can Brahman be real and infinite?

It has been taught in the mantra that one’s own Self is Brahman who is the Real, Consciousness, and the Infinite; who is beyond the five kośas; who is the Fearless; who is described in the śāstras as invisible” and so on. Then the question arises, how can Brahman be such? —(S) That is to say, like all things which are marked by the threefold limitation, Brahman is also a thing divided from other things, and like them He must be finite, unconscious and unreal. How can Brahman be the Real, Consciousness, and the Infinite?—(A)

We answer:^[10] Brahman is infinite in three respects—in respect of time, in respect of place, and in respect of things respectively. Ākaśa for example, is infinite^[11] in space; for, there is no limit to it in space. But Ākāśa is not infinite either in respect of time or in respect of things.—Why?—Because it is an effect (kārya).^[12] Unlike ākāśa, Brahman is unlimited even in respect of time, because He is not an effect. What forms an effect is alone limited by time. And Brahman is not an effect and is therefore unlimited even in respect of time. So, too, in respect of things.—How is He infinite in respect of things?—Because He is inseparate from all. That thing, indeed, which is seperate from another forms the limit of that other; for, when the mind is engaged in the former, it withdraws from the latter. The thing which causes the termination of the idea of another thing forms the limit of that other thing. The idea of the cow, for instance, terminates at the horse; and because the (idea of) cow thus terminates at the horse, the cow is limited, finite. And this limit is found among things which are separate from one another. There is no such separation in the case of Brahman. He is therefore unlimited even in respect of things.

Here one may ask: How is Brahman inseparate from all?—Listen. Because He is the cause of all things. Brahman, indeed, is the cause of all things,—time, ākāśa, and so on.

(Objection):—Then Brahman is limited by other things, in so far as there are other things called effects.

(Answer):—No, because the things spoken of as effects are unreal. Apart from the cause, there is indeed no such thing as an effect really existing, at which the idea of the cause may terminate; and the śruti says:^[13] “(All) changing form (vikāra) is a name, a creation of speech,” etc. (vide ante p. 241). So, in the first place, as the cause of ākāśa, etc.,^[14] Brahman is infinite in space; for, it is admitted by all that ākāśa is unlimited in space. And Brahman is the cause of ākāśa. From this it may be concluded that (Ātman) is infinite in respect of space. Indeed an all-pervading thing is never found to arise from that which is not all-pervading. Hence the Ātman's absolute infinitude in point of space. Similarly, not being an effeét, Ātman is infinite in point of time; and owing to the absence of anything separate from Him, He is infinite in respect of things. Hence His absolute reality.

Since thus the threefold infinitude of Brahman and the unreality of all causes and effeéts have to be clearly shewn in the sequel, we should understand that it is the true nature of Brahman as real, etc., which the śruti expounds in the sequel by way of describing the evolution of the universe, and that the evolution does not form the main subject-matter.—(S. & A.).

 

Identity of Brahman and the Self.

“From That”: ‘That’ here refers to Brahman as described in the original aphoristic expression. “From This Self”: ‘This’ here refers to Brahman as subsequently] defined in the words of the mantra. From Brahman who has been first referred to in the aphoristic passage of the Brāhmaṇa section and next defined in the words “Real, Consciousness, Infinite is Brahman,”—from Him, from Brahman here, from Him who is spoken of as the Self (Ātman), is ākāśa born.— Brahman is indeed the Self of all, as the śruti elsewhere says “That is real, That is the Self.^[15] And thus Brahman is Ātman.—From Him, from Brahman who is here in us as our own Self, is ākāśa born.

Since in the words ‘the knower of Brahman reaches the Supreme,’ the śruti tells us that by mere knowledge of Brahman one attains Brahman; and since the word ‘wise’ in the expression “as Brahman, the wise,”is put in apposition to ‘Brahman,’ thus showing that Brahman and the wise man are one and the same, we understand that the Self and Brahman are identical. And in the passage we are now construing, ‘That’ and ‘This’ are put in apposition to each other; so that, here also, the śruti evidently implies the identity of Brahman and the Self. Indeed the word ‘Self’ does not primarily denote anything other than our own Inner Self. “From me all this is born; in me it is dissolved in the end; alone I support all this:” these words of the scripture also, speaking of the Self as the cause of the universe, point to the identity of the Self and Brahman, since there cannot be two causes of the universe.—(S).

The Thing spoken of as ‘Brahman’ and ‘Supreme’ in the aphorism is here referred to by the word ‘That’ signifying remoteness. And the Thing spoken of—as ‘Real’ etc., and as ‘hid’—in the verse just preceding the passage we now interpret and forming a sort of commentary on the aphorism is here referred to by the word ‘This’ signifying proximity or immediateness. ‘Verily’ shews certainty. These three words imply that the Thing spoken of in the aphorism and the Thing spoken of in the verse are one and the same.

Or,—the word ‘That’ denoting remoteness (parokṣa) points to the Thing in Its aspect as Brahman which is revealed by Śruti. The word ‘verily’ signifies that such Brahman is declared in all Upaniṣads. The word ‘this’ implying immediateness (pratyakṣa) denotes the aspect of the Thing as one’s own immediate consciousness. To make this clear, the word ‘Self’ is used. The words ‘That’ and ‘This,’ put in apposition to each other and referring to one and the same thing, imply oneness (tādātmya) of the Self and Brahman. It is this oneness that is signified in the preceding verse by the words ‘Brahman’ and ‘wise’ being put in apposition to each other and thus referring to one and the same thing.

 

Brahman is the material cause of the universe.

That the Supreme Brahman who is the Inner Self of all living beings is the prakṛti or material out of which the ether (ākāśa), air, and all other born things are made is denoted by the ablative-case-termination ‘from.’ Pāṇini says that the ablative denotes the prakṛti, the material, of which the thing that is born or comes into being is made up. “Ākāśa is born:” this means that ākāśa passes through birth, is the agent in the act of being born or coming into being. So, the ablative termination signifies that Brahman is the upādāna-kāraṇa, the material cause, of ākāśa. ‘Prakṛti’ literally means that of which the effect is essentially made, and it therefore denotes the material cause, such as clay. It is true that even the potter, the efficient cause, has a share in producing the pot; still, in the production thereof, the potter’s share is not so important. The potter, indeed, is not constantly present in the pot produced, in the same way as clay is present. Thus, because of the importance of its share in the production of the effect, the upādāna or material cause alone is meant by the word ‘Prakṛti.’

(Objection):—It is Māyā, not Brahman, that is the material cause of the universe. So the Śvetāśvataras read:

“Māyā, indeed, as prakṛti man should know, and as the owner of Māyā the Mighty Lord.”^[16]

(Answer):—The objection has no force, because Māyā is only a śakti or power of Brahman and as such has no independent existence. That Māyā is only a śakti or power of Brahman is declared in the same Upaniṣad as follows:

“Of Him is no result, no means of action; none like to Him is seen, none surely greater. In divers ways His power (śakti) supreme is hymned, His wisdom (and) His might dwell in Himself alone.”^[17]

“Such men, by art of meditation, saw, in its own modes concealed, the power of the Divine.”^[18]

No śakti or power can ever indeed detach itself from its seat (āśraya) and remain independent. Therefore, to say that Māyā, which is a power, is the prakṛti is tantamount to saying that Brahman who possesses that power is the prakṛti. The word ‘Ātman’ in the ablative case here refers to the Paramātman (Supreme Self), the Maheśa (Mighty Lord), the Māyin ("possessor of the Māyā), the prakṛti of the Universe. From Him, from the Paramātman who is the Māyin, ākāsā was born. That is to say, it is the Paramātman Himself that is manifested in the form of the ākāśa, air, etc.

 

The three Theories of Creation.

The upādāna or material cause such as clay gives rise to a pot which is quite distinct from clay. The material cause such as milk is itself transformed into curd. The material cause such as a rope, combined with ignorance, turns out to be a serpent. The philosophers of the Nyāya school declare, on the analogy of clay and pot, that the universe comprising earth and so on is newly created out of atoms, (paramāṇus); whereas the Sāṅkhyas declare, on the analogy of milk and curd, that the Pradhāna composed of the guṇas,—Sattva, Rajas, and Tamas,—transforms Itself into the universe composed of Mahat, Ahaṅkāra, etc. But the Vedāntins declare, on the analogy of rope and serpent, that Brahman Himself, the One Partless Essence, the Basic Reality underlying the whole imaginary universe, puts on, in virtue of His own Māyā, the form of the universe. Of these three theories, the theory of creation and the theory of transformation, the Ārambha-vāda and the Pariṇāma-vāda, have been refuted in the Sārīraka-Mīmāmsā (the Vedānta-sūtras).

 

How far the Nyāya theory is right.

How then, it may be asked, to explain the theories propounded by the two great Ṛṣis, Gautama and Kapila? We answer thus: The two theories have been propounded to help the dull intellects and refer to secondary or minor evolutions (avāntara-sṛṣṭis). The Great Īṛṣi, Gautama, taught the creation of earth, etc., out of the atoms, with a view to impart instruction concerning jīva and Īśvara to him who, following the views of the Lokāyatas or materialists, identifies himself with the body; who, not knowing that there is a self distimft from the body and going to svarga or naraka, does not observe the Jyotiṣṭoma and other sacrificial rites; and who, not knowing that there exists Īśvara whom he should worship, does not practise the contemplation of Īśvara which leads him to Brahma-loka. Ākāśa, time, space, and atoms having been once evolved from the Supreme Brahman, the First Cause, the process of further evolution from that point may correspond to the account given by Gautama and others of his school. How is the Vedāntin’s theory violated by it? So far, the Māyā theory is not vitiated by it, inasmuch as Gautama’s false theory—false because it is dṛśya, an object of consciousness external to the Self—has been generated by the very Māyā which gives rise to the illusion of saṃsāra of wonderful variety in all beings of life from Brahmā down to plants.

 

How far the Sāṅkhya theory is right.

On the same principle,—it may perhaps be urged,—the Evolution described in the Vedānta (Upaniṣad) is also an illusion. We admit that it is an illusion, and it is the very objedt of the Vedānta to teach that the whole creation is an illusion. Just as Gautama’s endeavour is to teach to the duller intellects (mandādhikārins) that there is a soul distinct from the body who is the doer of actions and who is capable of going to svarga, so the great sage, Kapila, taught the Sāṅkhya-śāstra with a view to impart to men of average intellect (madhyamādhikārins) a knowledge of the Conscious Ātman,—the mere Witness, free from agency and attachment of every kind,—and thus to prepare them for Brahma-jñāna. In the Sāṅkhya-śāstra, Evolution in some of its later stages prior to the Evolution of atoms is described in order to enable the student to distinguish between Chit and Achit, Spirit and Matter. Where there is Brahman alone who is the One Partless Essence, Māyā sets up two distinct things such as chit (sentient) and jaḍa (insentient), sets up many individual souls distinct from one another, and sets up Guṇas such as Sattva, Rajas, and Tamas. The subsequent process of evolution may correspond to the account given in the Sāṅkhya system.

Similarly, the Śaivāgamas treat of the evolution of eleven tattvas or principles prior to the evolution of the twenty-five described in the Sāṅkhya, with a view to clear the conception of Īśvara, the object of all worship.

 

All accounts of Evolution contribute only to a knowledge of Brahman.

The Śruti, however, has here described just a little of the Evolution beginning with ākāśa, only by way of illustration. An exhaustive description of the evolution is indeed impossible and is of no avail. This description of evolution is intended as a means to the knowledge of Brahman, and this purpose is served by a description of even a part of the evolution. That the evolution serves as a means to the knowledge of Brahman is declared by Gauḍapādāchārya in his memorial verses on the Māṇḍūkya-upaniṣad as follows:

“Evolution as described by illustrations of earth, iron, sparks of fire, has another implication; for, they are only means to the realisation of the Absolute; there being nothing like distinction.”^[19]

No contemplation or knowledge of evolution in itself is declared anywhere as a means to a distinct end. Nowhere does the sṛuti say “Let a man contemplate evolution;” or “the knower of evolution attains to well-being.” Hence it is that all accounts of evolution given in the śruti, the śmṛti, the āgama, and the purāṇa have been accepted by the Vārtikakāra:

“By whatever account (of evolution) a knowledge of the Inner Self (Pratyagātman) can be imparted to men, that here (in the Vedic Religion) is the right one; and there is no one (process)fixed for all.”^[20]

There can be no rule that, of the various dreams seen by many, a certain one alone should be accepted and not the rest. Let us not discuss more, lest we may say too much.

 

Unreality of Evolution.

Seeing that Brahman is inseparate from all, changeless, one, neither the cause nor the effect, it is not possible to maintain that evolution takes place in the Supreme Brahman Himself. All things other than Brahman should— because of that very fact of their being other than Brahman—be regarded as effects. And since Bahman is not the cause,^[21] there can be no cause of evolution. If the cause of evolution lies in the very essential nature of Brahman, then since Brahman’s presence is constant, the universe must be constant,—which cannot be; for (every thing that is born has its birth in time and space, and) there cannot be another time and another space in which that time and that space can have their birth.—(S).

Evolution (of the universe from Brahman) was not (in the past), because Brahman is not of the past; and Brahman was not of the past because He is the cause of time.—(S) That is to say, Brahman, the alleged creator, is unrelated (asanga) to anything else and is therefore unrelated to the time past. And unlike pots, etc., Brahman is not conditioned or limited by time. Such association with time as is implied in the statement that He is the cause of time is a mere maya. —(A). And the evolution (of the universe from Brahman) will not take place in the future, since (Brahman) is not of the future; and He is not of the future because no change can ever arise in Brahman. Evolution does not take place in the present because Ātman is ever secondless and immutable. Therefore, from the standpoint of the real state of things, the evolution of the universe from Brahman never was, nor is, nor is yet to be. It is quite as meaningless to speak of the evolution as having taken place in the past or as taking place now or as yet to take place in the future, as it is meaningless to speak of an atom as a camel. Therefore avidyā alone is the cause of the evolution.—(S.)

The universe, again, must have been existent or nonexistent as such before its birth. It could not have been non-existent, since then it could have no cause. If the universe were non-existent, how could there have been that relation between it and the cause, in virtue of which the universe should come into being? Neither could the universe have existed as such prior to its birth; for there would be nothing new in the effect. Moreover, birth, destruction and other changes to which all things in the universe are subject cannot themselves be subject to birth, destruction and so on, and must therefore be eternal and immutable; for, to speak of the birth of birth involves the fallacy of infinite regress (anavasthā): which is absurd.—(S&A)

As the triple time (past, present and future) has its origin in avidyā, it cannot be the cause of the universe. For the same reason, neither Karma nor Devas, nor Īśvara, nor anything else can be the cause. The birth of the universe, its continuance (sthiti) and its dissolution, all these occur every moment. The śruti indeed declares that the creator (kartṛb generates the universe by his mind and acts. As a moon is generated by the eye-desease called timira, so is akaśa born of Brahman tainted with avidyā, which has neither a beginning nor a middle nor an end. What is thus evolved cannot stand even for a single moment: whence its permanence? To the deluded vision it appears permanent like the serpent generated by avidyā out of the rope. He who is attacked by the eye-desease (timira/ thinks of the moon-light born of it as something external to himself; similarly one looks upon the (universe) evolved (out of the Self) as distinct from the Self—(S).

 

Ākāśa.

Ākāśa is that thing which has sound for its property and which affords space to all corporeal substances.

The ākāśa thus evolved out of the material cause (upā-dāna)—namely, Brahman combined with Māyā,—partakes of the nature of both Brahman and Māyā. Brahman has been described as Real, and this means that Brahman is Existence; for, having started with the words “Existence alone, my dear, this at first was,” the śruti concludes “That, the Existence, is Real.”^[22] Ākāśa partakes of (the nature of Brahman as) Existence, inasmuch as it presents itself to our consciousness as something existing. Māyā means wonder; for, when houses, mountains, etc., are swallowed by a juggler, people say “this is māyā.” Just as the appearance of a reflected image of the vast expanse of heaven in an imporous mirror of solid bell-metal is a wonder, so the appearance of ākāśa in Brahman is a wonder, it being inconceivable how ākāśa can make its appearance in Brahman who is impenetrable, who is the pure essence of Bliss and Bliss alone, who is Real, Consciousness, and Infinite. Since none but a juggler can swallow houses and mountains, others call it a wonder; similarly, since none of the jīvas can create ākāśa and other things which have been created by Īśvara, those things are a wonder to us. In so far as ākāśa is thus something wonderful, it partakes of the nature of Māyā. But the power of ākāśa to afford space to all (corporeal) things constitutes its own peculiar nature. “Ākāśa is a wonderful thing affording space in this form ākāśa presents itself to our consciousness as partaking of the nature of Brahman and Māyā. And it has sound for its property. The echo heard in mountain-caves etc., is supposed to be inherent in ākāśa and is therefore said to be the property of ākāśa.

 

Evolution by Brahman’s Will and Idea.

The will (kāma) and idea (saṅkalpa^[23]) alone concerning the evolution of ākāśa—which, as has been shewn above, has mere sound for its property and affords space to all corporeal substances — pertain to the Brahman endued with Māyā. His will (kāma) takes the following form, “I will create ākāśa.” His idea (saṅkalpa) is the thought “let ākāśa (of the said description) come into being.” Brahman being devoid of mind, it is true that no idea in the form of a mano-vṛtti or mode of mind is possible. Still His Māyā, the unthinkable power (achintya-śakti), transforms itself nto the two vṛttis or modes called kāma and saṅkalpa, will and idea. That in virtue of His unthinkable power (śakti) all experience is possible for Brahman though He is devoid of sense-organs is declared by the śruti in the following words:

Without hands, without feet, He moveth, He graspeth; eyeless He seeth; (and) earless He heareth.”^[24]

All acts (karmas), which were done by sentient creatures in a former evolution and were then unripe, remain during the time of pralaya (dissolution of the universe) in the Brahman endued with Māyā and slowly ripen. When the acts become ripe, He creates the world in order that the creatures may enjoy the fruits of those acts. This has been declared in the Tattvaprakāśikā, a digest of the teaching of the Śaiva-Āgamas:

“Out of mercy to all living beings who have been wearied in saṃsāra, the Lord brings about the Great Dissolution of all things for the repose of those very beings. Again, in virtue of their acts having become ripe, the Supreme Lord, out of mercy to the souls (paśus), brings about creation and fructifies the acts of the emboided beings.”

Therefore, owing to the ripeness of the acts of living beings, there arises in the Supreme Lord a desire to create and an idea (saṅkalpa=the imagining) of the things that are to be evolved in the creation. The things that are to be evolved come into being just in accordance with the will and the idea of the Lord. Accordingly, the Paramātman, the Supreme Self, is described in the śruti as “One whose desires are true, whose ideas are true.” Such being the case, all the things come into being one after another exactly as He thinks of them.

 

Vayu (the air.)

Thence, i.e., from ākāśa, comes into being Vāyu, the air, with two properties, the property of touch which is its own, and the property of sound belonging to ākāśa already evolved. Of these elements such as ākāśa, each is said to be possessed of one, two or more properties according as it is the first, second, and so on, in the order of evolution; for, on the principle that every effect is pervaded by cause, each of the succeeding elements is pervaded by the element or elements preceding it in the order of evolution. The air (Vāyu) is not born of the ākāśa, because the latter is a mere effect (kārya). The air (Vāyu) is born from Ātman assuming the form of ākāśa. Therefore it is from Ātman that the air takes its birth. The same is true in regard to the birth of other elements.—(S)

From Brahman associated with Māyā and having put on the form (upādhi) of ākāśa which was first evolved, the air was born. Māyā and Brahman are the cause of all things and, as such, are common to all, and therefore it is on account of the special relation of the air to Brahman’s Upādhi of ākāśa as its proximate invariable antecedent, that the air is declared to be born of ākāśa. The property of the air is touch which is neither hot nor cold. To carry away is the function of the air just as it is the function of ākāśa to afford space. In the air, also, the attributes of its cause are all present. The attribute of existence expressed in the words “the air exists” pertains to Brahman. That peculiar nature of the air which is not found in other things and is therefore strange is an attribute of the Māyā. The noise made by the air blowing on the sea-shore and other places is the attribute of sound pertaining to ākāśa.

The sound which inheres in ākāśa as its property is present in the air, etc., and the undiscriminating person ascribes it to the air itself, and so on, just as a person ascribes all the attributes of a garland to the serpent when he has mistaken the garland for the serpent (S. 115).

 

Fire.

In the same way we should interpret the [other passages, such as “from the air, the fire is born,” and so on.

From the air was born fire having three attributes, composed of the two preceding attributes and (the attribute of) colour which is its own.

Luminosity is the special property of fire, and its function is to illumine. In this case also, the existence of fire is the attribute of Brahman; its strangeness as something distinct from all other things is the attribute of Māyā. The “bhitg bhug” sound of the blazing fire is the attribute of ākāśa. It is hot to the touch: this is the attribute of the air. Now the touch and the sound of the fire are peculiar, distinct from the touch of the air and the sound of ākāśa; and this peculiarity causes wonder and is therefore due to Māyā.

 

Water.

From fire was born water with four attributes, comprising its own attribute of taste and the three preceding ones.

The special property of water is sweet taste. The attributes of the cause are also present in it. Thus, water exists. Owing to liquidity which distinguishes it from all the rest, it is something strange. In a current of water flowing through rocky river-beds the “bul! bul!” sound is heard. It is cold to the touch and white in colour.

 

Earth.

From water earth came into being, with five attributes, comprising smell which is its own and the four preceding attributes.

From water, of the nature described above, was born earth. Smell is its special property. Earth exists. It is something strange on account of its solidity which distinguishes it from all the rest. By contact with a corporeal substance the “kata! kata!” sound is produced. It is hard to the touch. It is of various colours, black, green and so on. Its taste is sweet and so on.

Thus has been described the evolution of the five elements of matter from ākāśa to earth.

 

Primary elements are only five.

(Question):—The Kauṣītakī-Up. (3-8) speaks of ten bhṇta-mātras or elements of matter. How is it that here the śruti speaks of only five?—(A)

(Answer):—There are only five primary elements of matter such as ākāśa mentioned above. Nothing else, we deem, exists besides the five elements, of which all causes and effects are made up.—(S)

 

Brahman is not made up of matter.

Though earth is possessed of the four attributes pertaining respectively to ākāśa and so on, yet it is not itself present in those four elements. Similarly though the whole uni verse is made up of Brahman, still Brahman is not made up of the universe.—(S)

Thus has been established the proposition declared above, that Brahman is Real, Consciousness, Infinite and Second-less, and that in Him nothing else is experienced.—(S )

 

Evolution of material objects.

From earth plants were born; from plants, food; and from food, transformed into semen, was born man (puruṣa) with a form composed of the head, hands and so on.

Plants, food and man are formed of matter. Their evolution here stands for the evolution of the whole universe of material objects comprising mountains, rivers, oceans and so on. Though the bodies of cattle and the like which are born of sexual union are all ‘formed of food’ (annamaya), still owing to the importance of the human being as one qualified for the path of knowledge and works, the śruti has here spoken of man among others. The importance of man is thus declared in the Aitareyaka:

“But in man the Self is more manifested, for he is most endowed with knowledge. He says what he has known, he sees what he has known, he knows what is to happen tomorrow, he knows heaven and hell. By means of the mortal, he desires the immortal; thus is he endowed. With regard to the other animals, hunger and thirst only are a kind of understanding. But they do not say what they have known, nor do they see what they have known. They do not know what is to happen tomorrow, nor heaven and hell.”

 

Evolution of the Virāj and the Sūtra.

In declaring the evolution of matter and material objects the śruti tacitly implies the evolution of the Virāj whose body is made up of material objects in the aggregate. So, the Vārtikakāra says: whose senses are Diś and other (Devatās or Intelligences), who wears a body formed of the five elements (quintupled = panchīkṛta), and who glows with the consciousness “I am all.” And prior to the evolution of the Virāj must have occurred the evolution of the Sūtra^[25]; for, the Virāj could come into being after the Sūtra had come into being. The śruti elsewhere speaks of the Sūtra as the basis of the Virāj; and therefore, since the evolution of the Virāj is here mentioned, the evolution of the Sūtra also must have been meant here. Moreover, the śruti will speak of the Intelligence (i. e., the Sūtra) in the words “Intelligence increases sacrifice;” and this shows that the evolution of the Sūtra also is implied here. Further the śruti will refer to the Sūtra as “Life, sight, hearing, mind, speech,” distinguishing Him from “food (anna)”^[26] etc., and will also enjoin the contemplation (upāsana)^[27] of the sūtra in the words “Intelligence, as Brahman the eldest, do all the Gods adore.” Here “Intelligence” cannot refer to the mere act (of knowing) since a mere act cannot be an object of contemplation and cannot be qualified as ‘Brahman the eldest Neither can it refer to the individual soul, because one cannot contemplate oneself. Nor does the word denote Brahman, the first cause, because the first cause cannot be spoken of as Intelligence (Vijñāna). Therefore, the word ‘ Intelligence’ denotes the sūtra and it is the contemplation of the sūtra that is there enjoined. As the sūtra will be thus spoken of as an object of contemplation, the evolution of the sūtra is also implied in this connection. Piror to the evolution of the Virāj (the effect) the sūtra remains undifferentiated from the one Existence, the Paramātman, the Cause of the sūtra; and, therefore, though an effect, the sūtra does not manifest Himself as an effect. After evolving the effect (the Virāj) as clay evolves-the pot, the sūtra becomes as it were the effect. That is to say, in the form of the Virāj the sūtra becomes visible. But as long as the effect is not evolved, the sūtra is prajñāna-ghana, pure and simple consciousness; i. e., He abides as a mere potentiality of intelligence and motion (vijñāna and kriyā) in Brahman, the first cause, because of the absence of a vehicle through which to manifest Himself as the Universal Intelligence or as individual Intelligences, as Samaṣṭi or Vyaṣṭi. When conditioned by the effect (Virāj), the sūtra manifests Himself as the Universal Intelligence and the individual Intelligences—(S. & A.).

 

Akasa is not unborn.

The evolution of ākāśa from Brahman has been discussed as follows, in the Vedānta-sūtras (II. iii. 1—7).

(Question):—The question at issue is, whether ākāśa is eternal or has a birth.

(Prima facie view):—The śruti says “From Him, from This here, from the Self, is ākāśa born.” The ākāśa here spoken of is eternal and has no birth. For, it is hard to make out the three necessary causes of its birth,—namely, the samavāyin or material cause, the nimitta or efficient cause, and the asamavāyin or other accessory causes. But the śruti speaks of it as having been born from Ātman simply because it possesses the attribute of existence like those things which are admitted to have been born of Ātman. Therefore the ākāśa, which has neither a beginning nor an end, is not born.

(Conclusion):—All Upaniṣads proclaim aloud, as if by beat of drum, that, the one Thing being known, all else is known. This dictum can be explained only if ākāśa also is born of Brahman and, as such, is one with Brahman in the same way that the pot is one with clay; but not otherwise. Moreover, ākāśa must have a birth because it is separate from other things, like a pot etc. The proof of its separateness from other things lies in the well-marked distinction between it and the other things such as the air. Against this it may perhaps be urged that Brahman is distinct from other things and yet has no birth. We answer that Brahman is one with all and that it is not possible to shew that He is distinct from anything whatsoever. And, moreover, the śruti speaking of the birth of ākāśa will be respected if we maintain that it has a birth. As to the contention that it is impossible to make out the three necessary causes of its production, it is wrong to say so, because, though according to the Nyāya theory of new creation (ārambha-vāda) the three causes are necessary, they are not necessary according to the theory of illusion (vivarta-vāda). On these grounds we maintain that ākāśa is born from Brahman, the Cause.

 

The air is not unborn.

In the Vedānta-sūtra (II. iii. 8) the question of the birth of the air is discussed as follows:

(Question):—Is the air (vāyu) eternal, or is it born of anything else?

(Prima facie view):—It is only in the Taittirīyaka that the air is spoken of as born from ākāśa. And this birth is only figurative, inasmuch as, when treating of creation, the Chhāndogya speaks of the birth of fire, water, and earth, but not of the air. It may be asked, how can the Taittirīya passage be regarded as figurative in direct contravention to the well-recognized principle that omission in one place cannot render nugatory what is expressly declared in another place? In reply we say that the passage should be understood in a figurative sense because it contradicts another statement of the śruti. In the Bṛhadāraṇyaka, for instance, it is said “This Intelligence (Devatā) whom we speak of as Vāyu never vanishes”.^[28] Because the destruction of Vāyu is thus denied in the śruti, and because the denial of destruction is incompatible with birth, we maintain that the air is unborn.

(Conclusion):—It is true that the Chhāndogya does not speak of its birth; still, on the same principle^[29] on which we understand in one place the attributes mentioned in another place though they are not expressly declared in the former, we may regard the birth of the air as declared in the Chhāndogya, seeing that all that is said in the Taittirīyaka have to be understood in the Chhāndogya. As to the statement of the śruti that Vayu never vanishes, it should not bj construed quite so literally. Occurring in a section devoted to upāsana or contemplation, it only serves to extol the Intelligence (Devatā). All the arguments, too, by which the birth of ākāśa has been established apply to the present case alike. It should not be supposed that, as having been evolved from ākāśa, the air is not comprehended in Brahman and that threfore by knowing Brahman we cannot know the air; for, it will be shewn in the sequel that Brahman Himself takes the form of every antecedent effect and so forms the cause of the succeeding effect: so that, here too, as having assumed the form of ākāśa, Brahman Himself is the cause of the air. We therefore conclude that the air has a birth.

 

Brahman has no birth.
(Vedānta-sūtra II. iii. 9).

(Question):—Now the question arises, has Brahman a birth or no birth.

(Prima facie view):—“Existence alone this at first was.”^[30] The Existence here spoken of, i. e., Brahman, must have a birth, because all causes must have a birth, as for instance ākāśa.

(Conclusion):—Brahman, the Existence, has no birth; for, it is hard to conceive a cause that can produce Brahman. In the first place non-existence cannot be the cause, because of the denial “how can existence be born of nonexistence?”^[30] Neither is existence itself the cause of Existence; how can a thing be the cause of itself? Nor can ākāśa or the like be the cause of Existence; for, ākāśa, etc., are themselves born of Existence. And as to the induction that every cause must have a birth, it is invalidated by the śruti “That One, the Self here, is great and unborn.”^[31] Therefore Brahman, the Existence, has no birth.

 

How fire is evolved from Brahman.

The Vedānta-sutra (II. iii. 10) discusses the birth of fire as follows:

(Question):—“It created fire:”^[30] in these words the Chhāndogya speaks of fire as born of Brahman, while the Taittirīya declares fire to have been born of the air. There arises the question, Is fire born of Brahman or of the air?

(Prima facie view):—The Taittirīyaka passage admits of the interpretation that fire comes after the air, and it may therefore be concluded that fire is born of Brahman.

(Conclusion):—The word ‘born’ occurring in a previous sentence has to be understood in the sentence “from the air, fire;” so that the sentence cannot but mean primarily that fire is evolved from the air as its material cause. By harmonising the Chhāndogya and the Taittirīyaka statements, we arrive at the conclusion that it is out of Brahman assuming the form of the air that fire is evolved.

 

Water is evolved from Brahman.

With reference to the evolution of water, the Vedānta-sūtra (II. iii. 11) discusses the question as follows:

(Question):—Is water born of Brahman, or of fire?

(Prima facie view):—It is true that both the Chhāndogya and the Taittirīyaka Upaniṣads declare that water is born of fire. But we cannot accept this statement, since two things so opposed to each other as fire and water, which can never coexist with each other, can be related as cause and effect.

(Conclusion):—Though the quintupled (panchīkṛta)fire and water of our sensuous perception are opposed to each other, still we should not suppose that the unquintupled (a-panchīkṛta) fire and water, which are beyond our sensuous perception and which are therefore knowable through the śruti alone, are opposed to each other. Further, we see that increase of heat produces perspiration. Therefore, as taught in the two Upaniṣads, water is born out of Brahman assuming the form of fire.

 

‘Food’ means earth.

The Chhāndogya says, “they (waters) created food.”^[32] This statement has been discussed as follows in the Vedān-ta-sūtra (II. iii. 12):

(Question):—What does ‘food’ mean? Does it mean the element of matter known as earth, or does it mean the eatable things such as barley?

(Prima facie view):—In common parlance the word ‘food’ is used in the latter sense.

(Conclusion):—The word ‘food’ means here the element of matter called earth, inasmuch as it occurs in a section treating of the evolution of the mahābhṇtas or primary elements of matter. Further, the sruti says: “The red colour of burning fire is the colour of fire, the white colour of fire is the colour of water, the black colour of fire is the colour of food.”^[33] It is mostly in earth, not in barley or rice, that we meet with black colour. And the parallel teaching is expressed in the Taittirīyaka in the words “from water, earth.” On the strength of this parallelism, we may interpret ‘food’ to mean earth. It should not be urged that this interpretation is not warranted by the etymology of the word ‘anna’ (what is eaten); for, the element of earth and food being related to each other as cause and effect, they are looked upon as one. Therefore the word ‘food’ here signifies earth.

 

Brahman is the essential cause of all evolved things.
(Vedānta-sūtra, II. iii. 13)

(Question):—In settling the various points discussed above, it has been assumed that every effect is evolved from Brahman Himself who assumes the form of the effect preceding. The question we how propose to discuss is: Is it the ākāśa, the air, etc, that produce their effects? or, is it Brahman assuming the form of the ākāśa, the air, etc., that produces the effects?

(Prima facie view):—The first of the two alternatives appears to be reasonable. In the words “from ākāśa, the air is born; from the air, fire,” and so on, the śruti declares that from the ākāśa, etc., unassociated with Brahman, the succeeding things are evolved.

(Conclusion):—In the words “He who is within controlling the ākāśa,”^[34] “He who is within controlling the air,”^[34] the śruti denies the independence of the ākāśa, etc. Similarly in the words “the light saw”^[35] “the waters saw,”^[35] etc., the śruti teaches that light, etc., are creators endued with thought; and this power of thinking is not possible in the insentient things which are quite independent of the intelligent Brahman. Wherefore the cause of every thing is Brahman Himself assuming the form of ākāśa etc.

 

Dissolution occurs in the reverse order of Evolution.
(Vedānta-sūtra II. iii. 14.)

(Question):—Does the dissolution of things take place in the same order in which they are evolved, or in a different order?

(Prima facie view):—The order in which the evolution of things takes place being once defined, the same order must apply to the process of dissolution.

(Conclusion):—If it be held that the cause is dissolved before the effect, it would follow that the effect will remain for a time without its material cause: which is absurd. On the other hand, the Purāṇa says:

“O God-sage, the world-basis, namely, earth, is dissolved in water, water is dissolved in fire, fire is dissolved in the air.”

Thus the reverse order of evolution is equally well defined in the Purāṇa as the order in which dissolution takes place. We conclude therefore that dissolution takes place from earth upward, the order of evolution being reversed here.

 

No Self-contradiction in the Sruti as to Evolution.
(Vedānta-sūtra, II. iii. 15.)

(Question):—Is the foregoing order of evolution contradicted or not by the following passage of the śruti:

“From Him rise life, mind, and all the senses, aether, air, fire, water, and earth supporting all.”^[36]

(Prima facie view):—The order of evolution from ākāśa downwards is violated by the order given in this passage wherein prāṇa, etc., are said to have been evolved prior to ākāśa, etc.

(Conclusion):—.“For, truly, my child, mind comes of earth, life comes of water, speech comes of fire.”^[37] In these words, the śruti declares that prāṇa, etc. are things composed of the elements of matter. They should accordingly be classed with the elements of matter, and therefore there can be no reference here to any special order of their evolution. Moreover, the passage quoted above from the Muṇḍaka does not mean any particular order at all. There is no word or particle in the passage signifying order, as there is in the Taittirīya passage, “from ākāśa is born the air” and so on; whereas the Muṇḍaka passage is a mere enumeration of things evolved. Hence no contradiction between the two passages.

 

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

Mantra and Brāhmaṇa are thus distinguished: Mantra is that portion of the Veda which consists of prayers or hymns or words of adoration addressed to a deity or deities and intended for recitation. Brāhmaṇa is that portion of the Veda which contains rules for the employment of the mantras at various sacrifices, detailed explanations of these sacrifices, their origin and meaning, with illustrations in the way of stories and legends.

[2]:

Or Ānandavallī as Śaṅkarāchārya calls it. (T’r).

[3]:

Bri. Up. 2—1—19.

[4]:

§ Taitti. Up. o—1.

[5]:

Ibid.

[6]:

Ibid. 1-3.

[7]:

Ibid. 1-11.

[8]:

Ibid. 2-1.

[9]:

Ibid.

[10]:

Brahman being the cause of time, space, and all, He is infinite in all three respects, and as such He is the Real and Consciousness; so that it is now necessary to show first that He is the cause of all; and when it is shewn that Brahman is infinite in all three respects, it will necessarily follow that He is the Beal and Consciousness.—(S),

[11]:

Because ākāśa is the prakṛti or material cause of all that exists in spa»e. An effect is, indeed, a part of the cause, and does not exist elsewhere outside the cause.—(S).

[12]:

i. e., it is born in time. And ākāśa is not infinite as a thing; for, there are other things besides ākāśa.

[13]:

What is real or not imaginary cannot be limited by what is imaginary; and that time, etc., are imaginary is shewn in the srnti quoted hero.—(S)

[14]:

fund therefore one with all things.

[15]:

Chhā. Up. 6–8–7.

[16]:

Op. cit. 4–10.

[17]:

Op. cit. 6–8.

[18]:

Op. cit 1–3.

[19]:

Op. cit. 3–15.

[20]:

Bṛ. Up. Vārtika, 1-4-402.

[21]:

i.e., since Brahman is eternal and immutable (Kūṭastha)—(A);

[22]:

Chhā, 6.

[23]:

= the imagining.

[24]:

Śvetā. Up. 3–19.

[25]:

The Sūtrātmau (the Thread-Soul), the Cosmic Intelligence, the Hiraṇyagarbha, having for His upādhi or vehicle the totality of the subtle bodies.

[26]:

3–1

[27]:

2–5

[28]:

Op. Cit. 1–5–22

[29]:

Vide ante pp. 46-47.

[30]:

Chhā. 6-2.

[31]:

Bṛ. Up. 4-4-22.

[32]:

Op. cit. 6-2-4.

[33]:

Ibid. 6–4–1.

[34]:

Bṛ. Up. 3–7.

[35]:

Chhā. 6–2.

[36]:

Muṇḍaka. Up. 2-1-3.

[37]:

Chhā. 6-5-4.