Text 94

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation of Text 94:

संशयस्तावत् प्रसिद्धानेकविशेषयोः सादृश्यमात्रदर्शनाद् उभयविशेषानुस्मरणाद् अधर्माच्च किंस्विदित्युभयावलम्बी विमर्षः संशयः | स च द्विविधः अन्तर्बहिश्च | अन्तस्तावत् आदेशिकस्य सम्यङ्मिथ्या चोद्दिश्य पुनरादिशतस्त्रिषु कालेषु संशयो भवति किन्नु सम्यङ्मिथ्या वेति | बहिर्द्विविधः प्रत्यक्षविषये चाप्रत्यक्षविषये च | तत्राप्रत्यक्षविषये तावत्साधारणलिङ्गदर्शनाद् उभयविशेषानुस्मरणाद् अधर्माच्च संशयो भवति | यथा'टव्यां विषाणमात्रदर्शनाद् गौर्गवयो वेति | प्रत्यक्षाविषये'पि स्थाणुपुरुषयोरूर्ध्वतामात्रसादूश्यदर्शनात् वक्रादिविशेषानुपलब्धितः स्थाणुत्वादिसामान्यविशेषानभिव्यक्तावुभयविशेषानुस्मरणाद् उभयत्राकृष्यमाणस्यात्मनः प्रत्ययो दोलायते किं नु खल्वयं स्थाणुः स्यात् पुरुषो वेति ॥ ९४ ॥

saṃśayastāvat prasiddhānekaviśeṣayoḥ sādṛśyamātradarśanād ubhayaviśeṣānusmaraṇād adharmācca kiṃsvidityubhayāvalambī vimarṣaḥ saṃśayaḥ | sa ca dvividhaḥ antarbahiśca | antastāvat ādeśikasya samyaṅmithyā coddiśya punarādiśatastriṣu kāleṣu saṃśayo bhavati kinnu samyaṅmithyā veti | bahirdvividhaḥ pratyakṣaviṣaye cāpratyakṣaviṣaye ca | tatrāpratyakṣaviṣaye tāvatsādhāraṇaliṅgadarśanād ubhayaviśeṣānusmaraṇād adharmācca saṃśayo bhavati | yathā'ṭavyāṃ viṣāṇamātradarśanād gaurgavayo veti | pratyakṣāviṣaye'pi sthāṇupuruṣayorūrdhvatāmātrasādūśyadarśanāt vakrādiviśeṣānupalabdhitaḥ sthāṇutvādisāmānyaviśeṣānabhivyaktāvubhayaviśeṣānusmaraṇād ubhayatrākṛṣyamāṇasyātmanaḥ pratyayo dolāyate kiṃ nu khalvayaṃ sthāṇuḥ syāt puruṣo veti || 94 ||

Text (94):—As for Doubt,—when two objects possessed of well-known distinct specific characteristics, are seen, and we perceive only the similarities between them, then we recall to our mind the peculiarities of the objects; and from, this cause, and also by reason. of a certain adharma, there arises in our mind a pondering, in the form of whether it is this or that’; and it is this pondering that constitutes Saṃśaya, ‘Doubt.’—(II-i-17-20.)

It is of two kinds, internal and external. Where, an astrologer made certain predictions from certain circumstances, which turned out to be true in one case, but false in another,—if this same person makes for the third time similar predictions from similar conditions, with regard to past, present and future events, there arises in his mind a doubt as to whether his predictions would turn out true or false; and this is an example of Internal Doubt. External Doubt is of two kinds, as pertaining to perceptible and imperceptible objects. In the case of two imperceptible objects we find, that when we come across a ‘mark’ common to both of them, we remember their peculiarities, and then, from a certain adharma there arises a Doubt; e.g. when in a forest we see the horns only, we doubt whether the animal seen is a cow or a gavaya. In the case of two perceptible objects, like the post and the man, when we perceive only the tallness that is common to both, and do not notice the crookedness and other marks peculiar to each, there is no manifestation (in our mind) of the class ‘post’ or ‘man’; and then when we come to remember the peculiarities of each, the Self has its conviction swinging from the one to the other, and falls into a doubt as to whether the object seen is a post or a man.

Commentary: The Nyāyakandalī of Śrīdhara.

(English rendering of Śrīdhara’s commentary called Nyāyakandalī or Nyāyakaṇḍalī from the 10th century)

The particle ‘tāvat’ is added in order to denote the sequential order of the subject taken up for consideration; the meaning being that we now proceed to describe Doubt. The ‘two objects’—i.e., the post and the man—having various such distinctive features as are well-known from before, such i.e. as the presence of crookedness and cavities,—having only their similarity—i.e., the qualities common to both—perceived, and then there appearing a remembrance of the said well-known distinctive features,—and from a certain adharma, there arises a doubt &c. &c., which while touching both the man and the post does not touch anyone of them definitely; and this cognition partaking of two contradictory objects is what is called ‘Saṃśaya’ or ‘Doubt.’

From the perception of mere, similarity.—The addition of the word ‘mere’ indicates the non-apprehension of the distinctive features; the word ‘darśana’ here means apprehension and not direct sense-perception; as even inferential cognitions or apprehensions are found to give rise to doubts. The ‘cognition of similarity’ implies the congnition of one object wherein the similarity exists; as in the absence of the cognition of the object, there could be no cognition of the similarity belonging to it. The Doubt too pertains to the object and not to mere similarity, which latter is distinctly and definitely recognised;and with regard to which thus there can be no doubt. The word ‘similarity’ indicates only the possession of common properties; and it is not something inhering in many objects; because with regard to the single object, Self, we have a doubt as to whether it is subtile and small or large,—the doubt being due to the fact of the nontouchability (which is found in the Self) being found in the extensive Ākāśa as well as in the subtile and small internal organ.

The upshot of the whole thus is this:—When a person perceives in any object a certain property that is common to it with another object,—and by some reason or other fails to perceive the distinctive feature of that object,—and then remembers the two objects as perceived on some former occasion, as possessed of mutually contradictory properties, and yet does not perceive the likelihood of these properties existing in any single object, by reason of their contradictory character,—nor does he perceive their nonexistence, as he actually perceives the common properties concomitant with it,—then, at that time he having definitely cognised the object as possessing the common properties, there arises in his mind an uncertain feeling as to that object being possessed or not of its distinctive features; and this uncertain feeling is what we call ‘doubt.’

Objection: “To say that it is a ‘cognition,’ and yet to call it ‘uncertain’ is a contradiction in terms; as the very nature of cognition lies in the fact of its ascertaining the object.”

Reply: Not so; since both are possible. The cognition in question is produced by the apprehension of an object qualified by a property in common with another object, aided by the remembrance of the distinctive features of both, which would be contrary to the perception of the particular (common) property; and thus pertaining to the object qualified by the| common property, the cognition cannot definitely ascertain which one of the two objects, post and man, it is; and it is for this reason that it is called ‘uncertain’; though still retaining the character of cognition. It is a fact of common experience that peculiar accessories bring about peculiar effects; as in the case of ‘recognition.’

Doubt is Avidyā; and this is an undesirable thing; and as such an effect of adharma; this is what is meant by ‘adharmāt.’

Objection: “In a case where after having perceived a commonality (the common property), the. man remembers a peculiarity (the distinctive features of the objects),—in as much as, on the occasion of this latter remembrance, the previous perception of the commonality will have been destroyed, it could not serve as the cause of Doubt.”

Reply: It is not so; inasmuch as the single remembrance of the distinctive peculiarities of the two, objects is brought about by the impressions of these peculiarities, awakened simultaneously, there is every chance, at that time, of the existence of the disappearing cognition of the commonality.

Doubt is of two kinds.—External and Internal. These include the five kinds of Doubt put forward by other Vaiśeṣika writers,—these five kinds being: (1) due to the perception of common properties, (2) due to the perception of many properties, (3) due to contradiction or disagreement, (4) following from the indefinite character of the perception, and (5) following from the indefinite character of non-perception.

To give an example of Internal Doubt: An astrologer, having consulted the positions and motions of the planets and stars, makes certain calculations as to a certain event having happened, happening or likely to happen (in the past present and future); and he finds them true; on another occasion however he finds his deduction from the same causes turn out false; and then when on. a third occasion he makes similar predictions from the same causes, he has his doubts as to whether it would, turn out true or not

The external Doubt is of two kinds—that pertaining to perceptible objects, and that to imperceptible ones &c. &c. As instance of the latter kind we have the case where on seeing the horn only &c. &c. &c. In this case the object is hidden from view behind, some large tree like the banyan; and its character is only inferred from the sight of the horn and hence the object of Doubt on this case is said to be imperceptible. As an instance of the former kind we have the well-known case of the post and the man; in which case we see the object and therein perceive and cognise definitely only the tallness that is common to the post and the man. The distinctive features not perceived are those of crookedness, (in the case of the post) and the presence of hands, feet &c. in the body of the man. The word ‘etcætera,’ in the sentence “there being no manifestation of the ciass ‘post’ &c” is added to include the class ‘man.’ The ‘crookedness’ &c., are the causes of the manifestation of the class ‘post,’ and the presence of ‘head,’ ‘hands’ &c. is the causes of the manifestation of the class ‘man’. And when these distinguishing features are not perceived in the object before the person, the class ‘man’ or ‘post’ is not manifested (i.e. recognised) and then the observer happening to remember the characteristics of the man and the post, when he is inclined to conclude that the object before him is a post, he is met by the characteristics of the man that present themselves to his mind; and when he wishes to conclude it to be man he is met by those of the post; and thus being drawn from the one to the other, he finds his cognition ‘swinging,’ ‘inconstant,’ moving from one to the other. The similarity of the swing lies in the unsettled character of the conviction, which is in the form—‘is this a post or a man.’