Text 89: On Disjunction (Vibhāga)

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation of Text 89:

विभागो विभक्तप्रत्ययनिमित्तम् । शब्दविभागहेतुश्च । प्राप्तिपूर्विकाऽप्राप्तिर्विभागः । स च त्रिविधः । अन्यतरकर्मज उभयकर्मजो विभागजश्च विभाग इति । तत्रान्यतरकर्मजोभयकर्मजौ सम्योगवत् । विभागजस्तु द्विविधः कारणविभागात् कारणाकारणविभागाच्च । तत्र कारणविभागात् तावत् कार्याविष्टे कारणे कर्मोत्पन्नं यदा तस्यावयवान्तराद्विभागं करोति न तदाकाशादिदेशात् यदा त्वाकाशादिदेशाद्विभागं करोति न तदावयवान्तराद् इति स्थितिः । अतोऽवयवकर्मावयवान्तरादेव विभागमारभते ततो विभागाच्च द्रव्यारम्भकसम्योगविनाशः तस्मिन् विनष्टे कारणाभावात् कार्याभाव इत्यवयविविनाशः तदा कारणयोर्वर्तमानो विभागः कार्यविनाशविशिष्टं कालं स्वतन्त्रं वावयवमपेक्ष्य सक्रियस्यैवावयवस्य कार्यसम्युक्तादाकाशादिदेशाद्विभागमारभते न निष्क्रियस्य कारणाभावादुत्तरसम्योगानुत्पत्तावनुपभोग्यत्वप्रसङ्गः न तु तदवयवकर्माकाशादिदेशाद्विभागं करोति तदारम्भकालातीतत्वात् प्रदेशान्तरसम्योगं तु करोत्येव अकृतसम्योगस्य कर्मणः कालात्ययाभावादिति । कारणाकारणविभागादपि कथम् । यदा हस्ते कर्मोत्पन्नमवयवान्तराद्विभागमकुर्वदाकाशादिदेशेभ्यो विभागानारभ्य प्रदेशान्तरे सम्योगान् आरभते तदा ते कारणाकारणविभागाः कर्म यां दिशं प्रति कार्यारम्भाभिमुखं तामपेक्ष्य कार्याकार्यविभागान् आरभन्ते तदनन्तरं कारणाकारणसम्योगाच्च कार्याकार्यसम्योगान् इति । यदि कारणविभागानन्तरं कार्यविभागोत्पत्तिः कारणसम्योगानन्तरं कार्यसम्योगोत्पत्तिः नन्वेवमवयवावयविनोर्युतसिद्धिदोषप्रसङ्गः इति । न । युतसिद्ध्यपरिज्ञानात् । सा पुनर्द्वयोरन्यतरस्य वा पृथग्गतिमत्त्वमियन्तु नित्यानामनित्यानां तु युतेष्वाश्रयेषु समवायो युतसिद्धिरिति । त्वगिन्द्रियशरीरयोः पृथग्गतिमत्त्वं नास्ति युतेष्वाश्रयेषु समवायोस्तीति परस्परेण सम्योगः सिद्धः । अण्वाकाशयोस्त्वाश्रयान्तराभावेप्यन्यतरस्य पृथग्गतिमत्त्वात् सम्योगविभागौ सिद्धौ । तन्तुपटयोरनित्ययोराश्रयान्तराभावात् परस्परतः सम्योगविभागाभाव इति । दिगादीनां तु पृथग्गतिमत्त्वाभावादिति परस्परेण सम्योगविभागाभाव इति । विनाशस्तु सर्वस्य विभागस्य क्षणिकत्वादुत्तरसम्योगावधिसद्भावाद् क्षणिक इति । न तु सम्योगविद्ययोरेव विभागस्तयोरेव सम्योगाद्विनाशो भवति कस्मात् सम्युक्तप्रत्ययवद्विभक्तप्रत्ययानुवृत्त्यभावात् तस्मादुत्तरसम्योगावधिसद्भावात् क्षणिक इति । क्वचिच्चाश्रयविनाशादेव विनश्यतीति । कथम् । यदा द्वितन्तुककारणावयवे अंशौ कर्मोत्पन्नमंश्वन्तराद्विभागामारभते तदैव तन्त्वन्तरेऽपि कर्मोत्पद्यते विभागाच्च तन्त्वारम्भकसम्योगविनाशः तन्तुकर्मणा तन्त्वन्तराद्विभागः क्रियते इत्येकः कालः । ततो यस्मिन्नेव काले विभागात् तन्तुसम्योगविनाशः तस्मिन्नेव काले सम्योगविनाशात् तन्तुविनाशस्तस्मिन् विनष्टे तदाश्रितस्य तन्त्वन्तरविभागस्य विनाश इति । एवं तर्ह्युत्तरविभागानुत्पत्तिप्रसङ्गः । कारणविभागाभावात् । ततः प्रदेशान्तरसम्योगवति सम्योगाभाव इत्यतो विरोधिगुणासम्भवात् कर्मणश्चिरकालावस्थायित्वं नित्यद्रव्यसमवेतस्य च नित्यत्वमिति दोषः । कथम् । यदाप्यद्व्यणुकारम्भकपरमाणौ कर्मोत्पन्नमण्वन्तराद्विभागं करोति तदैवाण्वन्तरेऽपि कर्म ततो यस्मिन्नेव काले विभागाद् द्रव्यारम्भकसम्योगविनाशः तदैवाण्वन्तरकर्मणा द्व्यणुकाण्वोर्विभागः क्रियते ततो यस्मिन्नेव काले विभागात् द्व्युअणुकाणुसम्योगस्य विनाशः तस्मिन्नेव काले सम्योगविनाशात् द्व्यणुकस्य विनाशः तस्मिन् विनष्टे तदाश्रितस्य द्व्यणुकाणुविभागस्य विनाशः ततश्च विरोधिगुणासम्भवान् नित्यद्रव्यसमवेतकर्मणो नित्यत्वमिति । तन्त्वंश्वन्तरविभागाद्विभाग इत्यदोषः । आश्रयविनाशात् तन्त्वोरेव विभागो विनष्टो न तन्त्वंश्वन्तरविभाग इति एतस्मादुत्तरो विभागो जायते अङ्गुल्याकाशविभागाच्छरीराकाशविभागवत् तस्मिन्नेव काले कर्म सम्योगं कृत्वा विनश्यतीत्यदोषः । अथवा अंश्वन्तरविभागोत्पत्तिसमकालम् तस्मिन्नेव तन्तौ कर्मोत्पद्यते ततोंश्वन्तरविभागात् तन्त्वारम्भकसम्योगविनाशः तन्तुकर्मणा च तन्त्वन्तराद् विभागः क्रियते इत्येकः कालः । ततः सम्योगविनाशात् तन्तुविनाशः तद्विनाशाच्च तदाश्रितयोर्विभागकर्मणोर्युगपद्विनाशः । तन्तुवीरणयोर्वा सम्योगे सति द्रव्यानुत्पत्तौ पूर्वोक्तेन विधानेनाश्रयविनाशसम्योगाभ्यां तन्तुवीरणविभागविनाश इति ॥ ८९ ॥

vibhāgo vibhaktapratyayanimittam | śabdavibhāgahetuśca | prāptipūrvikā'prāptirvibhāgaḥ | sa ca trividhaḥ | anyatarakarmaja ubhayakarmajo vibhāgajaśca vibhāga iti | tatrānyatarakarmajobhayakarmajau samyogavat | vibhāgajastu dvividhaḥ kāraṇavibhāgāt kāraṇākāraṇavibhāgācca | tatra kāraṇavibhāgāt tāvat kāryāviṣṭe kāraṇe karmotpannaṃ yadā tasyāvayavāntarādvibhāgaṃ karoti na tadākāśādideśāt yadā tvākāśādideśādvibhāgaṃ karoti na tadāvayavāntarād iti sthitiḥ | ato'vayavakarmāvayavāntarādeva vibhāgamārabhate tato vibhāgācca dravyārambhakasamyogavināśaḥ tasmin vinaṣṭe kāraṇābhāvāt kāryābhāva ityavayavivināśaḥ tadā kāraṇayorvartamāno vibhāgaḥ kāryavināśaviśiṣṭaṃ kālaṃ svatantraṃ vāvayavamapekṣya sakriyasyaivāvayavasya kāryasamyuktādākāśādideśādvibhāgamārabhate na niṣkriyasya kāraṇābhāvāduttarasamyogānutpattāvanupabhogyatvaprasaṅgaḥ na tu tadavayavakarmākāśādideśādvibhāgaṃ karoti tadārambhakālātītatvāt pradeśāntarasamyogaṃ tu karotyeva akṛtasamyogasya karmaṇaḥ kālātyayābhāvāditi | kāraṇākāraṇavibhāgādapi katham | yadā haste karmotpannamavayavāntarādvibhāgamakurvadākāśādideśebhyo vibhāgānārabhya pradeśāntare samyogān ārabhate tadā te kāraṇākāraṇavibhāgāḥ karma yāṃ diśaṃ prati kāryārambhābhimukhaṃ tāmapekṣya kāryākāryavibhāgān ārabhante tadanantaraṃ kāraṇākāraṇasamyogācca kāryākāryasamyogān iti | yadi kāraṇavibhāgānantaraṃ kāryavibhāgotpattiḥ kāraṇasamyogānantaraṃ kāryasamyogotpattiḥ nanvevamavayavāvayavinoryutasiddhidoṣaprasaṅgaḥ iti | na | yutasiddhyaparijñānāt | sā punardvayoranyatarasya vā pṛthaggatimattvamiyantu nityānāmanityānāṃ tu yuteṣvāśrayeṣu samavāyo yutasiddhiriti | tvagindriyaśarīrayoḥ pṛthaggatimattvaṃ nāsti yuteṣvāśrayeṣu samavāyostīti paraspareṇa samyogaḥ siddhaḥ | aṇvākāśayostvāśrayāntarābhāvepyanyatarasya pṛthaggatimattvāt samyogavibhāgau siddhau | tantupaṭayoranityayorāśrayāntarābhāvāt parasparataḥ samyogavibhāgābhāva iti | digādīnāṃ tu pṛthaggatimattvābhāvāditi paraspareṇa samyogavibhāgābhāva iti | vināśastu sarvasya vibhāgasya kṣaṇikatvāduttarasamyogāvadhisadbhāvād kṣaṇika iti | na tu samyogavidyayoreva vibhāgastayoreva samyogādvināśo bhavati kasmāt samyuktapratyayavadvibhaktapratyayānuvṛttyabhāvāt tasmāduttarasamyogāvadhisadbhāvāt kṣaṇika iti | kvaciccāśrayavināśādeva vinaśyatīti | katham | yadā dvitantukakāraṇāvayave aṃśau karmotpannamaṃśvantarādvibhāgāmārabhate tadaiva tantvantare'pi karmotpadyate vibhāgācca tantvārambhakasamyogavināśaḥ tantukarmaṇā tantvantarādvibhāgaḥ kriyate ityekaḥ kālaḥ | tato yasminneva kāle vibhāgāt tantusamyogavināśaḥ tasminneva kāle samyogavināśāt tantuvināśastasmin vinaṣṭe tadāśritasya tantvantaravibhāgasya vināśa iti | evaṃ tarhyuttaravibhāgānutpattiprasaṅgaḥ | kāraṇavibhāgābhāvāt | tataḥ pradeśāntarasamyogavati samyogābhāva ityato virodhiguṇāsambhavāt karmaṇaścirakālāvasthāyitvaṃ nityadravyasamavetasya ca nityatvamiti doṣaḥ | katham | yadāpyadvyaṇukārambhakaparamāṇau karmotpannamaṇvantarādvibhāgaṃ karoti tadaivāṇvantare'pi karma tato yasminneva kāle vibhāgād dravyārambhakasamyogavināśaḥ tadaivāṇvantarakarmaṇā dvyaṇukāṇvorvibhāgaḥ kriyate tato yasminneva kāle vibhāgāt dvyuaṇukāṇusamyogasya vināśaḥ tasminneva kāle samyogavināśāt dvyaṇukasya vināśaḥ tasmin vinaṣṭe tadāśritasya dvyaṇukāṇuvibhāgasya vināśaḥ tataśca virodhiguṇāsambhavān nityadravyasamavetakarmaṇo nityatvamiti | tantvaṃśvantaravibhāgādvibhāga ityadoṣaḥ | āśrayavināśāt tantvoreva vibhāgo vinaṣṭo na tantvaṃśvantaravibhāga iti etasmāduttaro vibhāgo jāyate aṅgulyākāśavibhāgāccharīrākāśavibhāgavat tasminneva kāle karma samyogaṃ kṛtvā vinaśyatītyadoṣaḥ | athavā aṃśvantaravibhāgotpattisamakālam tasminneva tantau karmotpadyate tatoṃśvantaravibhāgāt tantvārambhakasamyogavināśaḥ tantukarmaṇā ca tantvantarād vibhāgaḥ kriyate ityekaḥ kālaḥ | tataḥ samyogavināśāt tantuvināśaḥ tadvināśācca tadāśritayorvibhāgakarmaṇoryugapadvināśaḥ | tantuvīraṇayorvā samyoge sati dravyānutpattau pūrvoktena vidhānenāśrayavināśasamyogābhyāṃ tantuvīraṇavibhāgavināśa iti || 89 ||

Text (89): Disjunction is the basis of the idea of two things being ‘disjoined.’

It consists in the separation of two things that have hitherto been in contact. It is of three kinds: (1) Produced by the action of any one of the two things, (2) by the action of both, and (3) by another Disjunction. The first two are like the similar kinds of Conjunction; and that produced by another Disjunction is of two kinds; as proceeding from the disjunction of causes and from that of the cause and the non-cause. The former of these we find when there appears an action in the cause as possessed by the effect, then that action brings about the disjunction of that cause from its other parts, and from the place occupied by Ākāśa &c.; and when it does bring about its disjunction from the place occupied by Ākāśa &c., then there is no disjunction from its other parts. Such being the case, the action of the part must be regarded as producing the Disjunction. from, another part only. From this Disjunction follows the destruction of the Conjunction that serves to keep the substance intact. And on the destruction of this, the substance as a composite whole is destroyed, as the effect could not survive the destruction of the cause. Then the Disjunction present in the two causes brings about the disjunction of the active part, from that point of Ākāśa—which may be in contact with the effect,—with reference either to the time qualified by the aforesaid destruction of the effect, or to the part independently by itself. This Disjunction could never be that of a part that would be inactive; as in the case of such a part there would be no cause for such disjunction; and further, no further Conjunction appearing after this, the disjunction would become altogether purposeless. The said action of the part however does not bring about a Disjunction from the point of Ākāśa &c.; as that action is past before the bringing about of any such disjunction. But that action does bring about the conjunction of another point of space; as no action ever becomes lost in time until it has produced some sort of a Conjunction.

Question: “How can Disjunction proceed from the Disjunction of the cause and non-cause?”

Answer: When an action takes place in the hand (as when the hand is waived) and without disjoining the hand from any other part of the body, it disjoins it from a particular point in Ākāśa and joins it to another point in it,—then we have such, ‘Disjunctions of the cause and the non-cause’ as bring about the ‘disjunctions of the effect and the non-effect,’ with reference to that point in space towards which the action is prone to produce its effect. After this that same action produces, out of the conjunctions of the, cause and the non-cause, the conjunctions of the effect and the non-effect. And if after the Disjunction of the cause there appear the disjunction of the effect, then after the Conjunction of the cause there would be the Conjunction of the effect.

Objection: “This would involve the absurdity of the whole and its parts having existences apart from one another.”

Reply: Not so, as apparently you do not understand what is meant by ‘separate existence.’ In the case of eternal things it only means ‘separate or distinct movement or action’; and in that of the transitory things, it means the ‘inherence or existence in distinct substrata.’ In the case of the Organ, of Touch and the Body there is no ‘distinct movement;’ but they are ‘inherent indistinct substrata and it is for this reason that the relationship between these two is that of Conjunction (and not of ‘Inherence’ which would have to be admitted if ‘separate existence’ meant only ‘distinct motion,’ as there would be absence of this in the case in question, and it is only this absence that, is the necessary condition of Inherence), In the case of the Atom and the Ākāśa however, even though they have no other, substrata (and as such the two would appear to bear the relationship of Inherence,) yet in as much as each of them is capable of independent action or motion (there can be no Inherence), and Conjunctions and Disjunctions between them, become possible. In the case of the Yarn and the Cloth however, both of which are transient, in as much as they do not inhere in distinct substrata (and are not capable of separate action or motion), there is no possibility, of Conjunction and Disjunction (and the relationship is that of Inherence). In as much as all Disjunction is momentary, and exists only till the next Conjunction, its destruction also is momentary. In the case of Conjunction we have found that it is destroyed by the disjunction of those very things that have been in conjunction; such is not the case with Disjunction; it is not destroyed only by the Conjunction of the two things disjoined; because the idea of two things being disjoined is not continuous like that of their being conjoined (i.e., the idea of Disjunction appears only at the moment of separation, while that of Conjunction continues as long as the Conjunction itself lasts.) Hence. Disjunction is regarded as momentary only on account of its existence being executed by the next Conjunction. In some cases Disjunction is destroyed by the destruction of its substratum. ‘How?’ When in a part of one of the yarns of a duplicate yarn an action is produced, it brings about its disjunction from another part of the same yarn; and at that very time an action is produced in the other yarn also. This Disjunction leads to the destruction of the cohesive Conjunction of the substance; and the action in the yarn produces a Disjunction from the other yarn. This constitutes one moment of time. Then, at the time that the Disjunction brings about the destruction of the Coni unction of the yams, there also follows from that destruction of the Conjunction, the destruction of the yarn. And this being destroyed, then, follows the destruction of the Disjunction of the other yarn, which has the former yarn for its substratum.

Objection: “If suck were the case then there would be no chance of the coming about of any subsequent Disjunction; as there would be no Disjunction present that could serve as the cause of any subsequent Disjunction. Hence, in as much as there would be no Conjunction in a thing in contact with another point in space, the action (in the yarn) would continue for a long time, specially as no contrary quality (in the shape of another Conjunction) would be appearing; and that action which would be inhering in an eternal substance would be eternal; and all this could never be admissible. ‘How so?’ When an action appears in the atom of the Water-diad, and brings about its Disjunction from another atom,—at that very time there appears an action in the other atom also; and hence at the time that the disjunction gives rise to the destruction of the cohesive conjunction of the substance, at that very time the action of the other atom brings about the disjunction of the atom from the Diad; and then, at the time that Disjunction produces the destruction of the Conjunction of the Diad and the Atom, at that very time from the destruction of the Conjunction follows the destruction of the Diad. And this being destroyed, the Disjunction of the Diad and the atom resting therein is also destroyed. And then, there being no possibility of the appearance of any contrary quality, there would be an eternality of the action inhering in the eternal substance (Atom).”

Reply:—In as much as the Disjunct ion would follow from the Disjunction of the yarn from its other part, there would be none of the absurdity urged above. The destruction of the substratum destroys only the Disjunction of the two yarns and that of the yarn and its other parts; and from this latter Disjunction would proceed other subsequent Disjunctions; just like the Disjunction of the Body and Ākāśa following from that of the finger-tip and Ākāsa; and as the action brings about the Conjunction and becomes destroyed, there is no anomaly in this. Or, simultaneously with the appearance of the Disjunction of the yarn from its other part there appears in that same yarn an action; and then from the Disjunction of the yarn from its other part there follows the destruction of the cohesive Conjunction of the yarn,; and the action of the yarn brings about its Disjunction from another yarn; all this forming one unit moment of time. Then from the destruction of the Conjunction there follows the destruction of the yarn; and this destruction brings about simultaneously the destruction of the Disjunction and the action inhering therein. Or, when (during weaving) there is a Conjunction of the yam with the Brush, as (at that point of time) no substance is produced, we would have the destruction of the Disfunction of the yam and the brash, brought about by the destruction and Conjunction of the substratum,—all this occurring in the same process as explained before.

Commentary: The Nyāyakandalī of Śrīdhara.

(English rendering of Śrīdhara’s commentary called Nyāyakandalī or Nyāyakaṇḍalī from the 10th century)

As Disjunction is always preceded by Conjunction the author having dealt with the latter, proceeds to explain the former: The verbal explanation of the first sentence is in the same manner as that of the similar sentence in the preceding section.

Objection: “The notion of ‘disjoined’ is present only when there is an absence of Conjunction (and hence Disjunction cannot be anything apart from such absence).”

Reply: Until there is a Disjunction, whence could the absence of Conjunction arise?

Objection: “It is brought about by action.”

Reply: That cannot be; as no action is ever found to have the power of destroying a quality. It is qualities alone that are found to be destructive of qualities; and hence for the destruction of Con junction also. We must postulate a distinct quality as the cause.

And further, in the case of the “absence of Conjunction,” the notion that we have is in the negative form—‘these two things are not joined’, and not in the positive form ‘these are disjoined’; and the reason for this is that a negative entity (‘absence of Conjunction’) could not be conceived of in the positive form.

Objection: “The form of the notion may be said to be figurative (the positive form could figuratively apply to a negative entity).”

Reply: Then that would not mean a denial of Disjunction; for unless there be some positive thing to which the form of the notion could apply directly, it could not have any mere figurative implication.

The effects of Disjunction are next shown:—vibhāga etc., Disjunction is not merely the basis of the notion of but it is also the basis of the production of sound.

As for instance, when a bamboo is torn, the sound that proceeds must be regarded as due to another quality—because it is a sound, like the sound born of the conjunction of the stick and the drum; the sound in question however could not be due to a Conjunction; as no Conjunction is found to be present in the case; hence it must be accepted to be produced from the separation or Disjunction of the bamboo-fibres; as it is found to be invariably concomitant with this. How Disjunction cau be the cause of a further Disjunction we shall explain later on.

The definition of Disjunction is given in the form—‘Prāptipūrvikā &c.’ Just as the negative word ‘Adharma’ is applied not to the mere absence of Dharma, but to a distinct quality, the opposite of Dharma; so in the same manner, the negative word ‘aprāpti’ is applied, not to the mere absence of approach. or contact, but to a distinct quality, the opposite of approach or contact; and it is to this quality that the name ‘Disjunction’ is given.

Question: “Is the ‘prāpti’ you speak of a mere antecedent of the Disjunction, or has it any causal efficiency towards the bringing about of the Disjunction?”

Answer: We hold that it is only an antecedent. If Conjunction (which would be the same as ‘prāpti’) were the cause of Disjunction, then as soon as the two constituent molecules of a substance would come together, this Conjunction, being endowed with the causal efficiency towards Disjunction, would bring this latter about, and thus there being a disruption of the molecules, no existence would be possible for the whole composite substance.

Objection: “It is not mere Conjunction by itself, but Conjunction aided by certain actions, which must be regarded as the cause of Disjunction.”

Reply: Then we can have for the requisite cause, this action itself with which the Disjunction may be found to be invariably concomitant; (and no causal efficiency need be admitted in the Conjunction) specially as Disjunction is not found to follow always when Conjunction is present. Hence we conclude that, as in the case of the production of Destruction, we regard ‘existence’ as a mere antecedent, so in that of the production of Disjunction also, Conjunction can be regarded as only preceding it in time; as Disjunction is a quality of a nature contrary to that of Conjunction.

Disjunction is of three kinds only:—the limitation of the number being indicated by the particle ‘ca.’ The three kinds are—(1) that brought about by the action of any one of the two things concerned; (2) that brought about by the action of both, and (3) that brought about by Disjunction. The first two kinds are similar to the corresponding two kinds of Conjunction. That is to say, just as the Conjunction of the mobile with the immobile object is of the first kind, so also is the Disjunction of the mobile from the immobile object. And as to the second class belongs the Conjunction of two fighting rams or wrestlers, so also does the Disjunction of those belong to the second kind.

The third kind of Disjunction is of two kinds: (it is this difference from the first two kinds that is meant to be indicated by the particle ‘tu’): There is one Disjunction due to the Disjunction of the causes, and another is due to that of the cause from the non-cause. The Disjunction due to the Disjunction of causes is thus explained: when an action is produced in the cause pervaded by the effect, then it produces in it a Disjunction of one of its component particles from another, a Disjunction that tends to the destruction of the cohesive Conjunction of that substance; and at that time that action does not bring about any Disjunction of the substance from the point of space occupied by it; and at the time that this latter Disjunction is brought about, there is no trace of the former Disjunction of the parts. Hence it is on account of this general rule that the action of the component parr brings about the Disjunction from another component part and from the point of space &c.

The sense of ail this is as follows: The power, in the action, of bringing about the Disjunction from Ākāśa, is pervaded by [i.e. is always concomitant with) its power of not bringing about any such Disjunction as would be incompatible with (i.e., destructive of) the cohesive Conjunction of the Substance; and this latter power is opposed by the power of bringing about a Disjunction that would be incompatible with the cohesive Conjunction of the Substance; consequently, wherever this last power would be present, there that other power of not bringing about such a Disjunction would naturally become excluded; and the exclusion of this would mean the exclusion of its concomitant, the power of bringing about the Disjunction of Ākāśa; just as the exclusion of fire means the exclusion of smoke.

Objection: Between the power of bringing about the Disjunction of Ākāśa, and that of not producing a Disjunction incompatible with the cohesive Conjunction of a substance,—there is mere concomitance, and not an absolutely invariable concomitance, (as between Fire and Smoke) (and hence the exclusion of the latter would not necessarily involve the exclusion of the former).”

Reply: It is not so; because we never find these two powers apart from each other. It is only when we, in some cases, perceive two things apart from each other, and in other cases, together,—that we conclude that there is mere occasional concomitance between them;—e.g. the Earthiness and scratchibility by Iron are not found together in the Thunderbolt, though we find them together in a piece of wood; in the case of the two powers in question however, we never find them apart from each other. Even then we might have been led to suspect that they may have separate existence, only if their concomitance were due to certain external conditions, as we find in the case of the meeting of the pupil and the teacher; as a matter of fact, however, such is not the case; as we do not find any such external conditions. Then if such a concomitance,—independent as it is of all external conditions, and unfailing as it is actually found to be—were not accepted as absolutely invariable, then there would be no invariable concomitance between Fire and Smoke either; and thus all Inferential processes would be done away with at a single stroke.

Question: “Even if the action of the part were to bring about Disjunction from another part, and not from the Ākāśa what would that prove?”

Answer: From the Disjunction follows the destruction of the cohesive Conjunction of the substance. That is to say, if it were to bring about Disjunction from Ākāśa, then, as no specific disruption within the substance itself would be brought about, there would be no destruction of the cohesive Conjunction of the substance.

Question: “What would follow from the destruction of this Conjunction?”

Answer: The Conjunction, which is the non-material cause of the substance, having been destroyed, and no effect being possible when there is no cause,—there would follow the destruction of the composite whole. And the composite substance haying been destroyed, the Disjunction of the component parts would bring about the Disjunction of the active part from that point in space which had been in contact with the composite substance,—this Disjunction being either with reference to the particular point of time, qualified by the destruction of the substance, or to the part itself independently of all other things. So long as the composite substance is not destroyed, there is, in the component part, neither independent existence, nor any capability of moving to another place by itself; and hence till then there is no possibility of any Disjunction from the point of space occupied by the part, It is for this reason that we have said that what is needed is either the point of time, qualified by the destruction of the substance, or ‘independent existence’.

Question: “What reason have you got for asserting that the present Disjunction of the component particles brings about the Disjunction of the active part only?”

Answer: It could not be that of the inactive part, because of the absence of the requisite cause. In the production of Disjunction from Disjunction, we have Action (Motion) also as the efficient cause; and as in the inactive part, this cause would be absent, there could be no Disjunction of that part.

Another reason for the same is all that action or motion appears for the purpose of bringing about a subsequent Conjunction; as it always tends to fulfil the desirable ends of a man by means of the substance that will have reached another point in space. Then, if there were no Disjunctoin of the active or mobile part from such point in space as would be in contact with the component substances, then there would be no cessation or removal of the preceding Conjunction, which is an obstacle in the way of the subsequent Conjunction; and thus no subsequent Conjunction appearing, the original action would become wholly futile; and this would be far from desirable. Hence it must be admitted that the Disjunction is that of the mobile or active part only. Nor is it possible for the action or motion of the two component parts to bring about the Disjunction from Ākāśa, simultaneously with the Disjunction of the component whole.

Objection: “Wo grant that the action does not bring about the two Disjunctions simultaneously; but what would be the objection to its bringing them about, one after the other? It is only on account of some such objection that we could be justified in precluding this action, which has been found to be possessed of the capability of bringing about a Disjunction, and admitting the fact of the Disjunction (from Ākāśa &c.) being due to another Disjunction which has never been found to be endowed with the said capability.”

Reply: The motion of the part does not bring about Disjunction from the point in space, because of the passing off of the time of its production. The nature of Actions is such that they produce, immediately after their own appearance, the Disjunction which is being produced by the actions themselves as the non-material cause. And the time of the production of this Disjunction becomes past at the time of the appearance of another Disjunction; and hence this latter can never be said to be produced from those actions.

Objection: “In that case, how does the action bring about the subsequent Conjunction? As certainly there are many intervening moments of time between the appearance of the action and that of the Conjunction.”

Reply: It brings about the Conjunction of another place. Just as the point of time immediately after the appearance of the action is the moment for its bringing about Disjunction, so, in the same manner, the point of time immediately after the previous Conjunction is the moment for the appearance of the Conjunction of another place. Specially as the substance located in the former place cannot possibly reach another place. Nor is the time for the appearance of the Conjunction past; as the time would have become past if the action had previously brought about the Conjunction of another place; as a matter of fact however, it is not so; hence in as much as the action will not have brought about any Conjunction, the time for its bringing about a Conjunction, will not have passed off; and hence the action would bring about a Conjunction, but not a Disjunction. If the Conjunction were not brought about by the action, then,—in as much as there would be no other action, and as nothing could be brought about without a nonmaterial cause,—the only thing that could be regarded as the cause of the Conjunction would be the Disjunction inhering in the same substance with itself. The word ‘iti’ indicates the end of the process.

Having thus understood Disjunction of a thing brought about by the Disjunction of its Material cause, the Enquirer wishes to understand the character of that Disjunction which is brought about by the Disjunction of the Cause and Non-cause. And with this view he puts the question—“How &c.?”

The answer is—When &c. When, by some cause or other, an action or motion is produced in the hand, it does not disjoin the hand from the other parts of the body; but it does bring about its Disjunction from certain points in space, as also its Conjunction with other parts in space; and then we have what has been called the “Disjunction of the cause and the Non-Cause”;—there being the Disjunction of the hand (which is the component cause of the Body) from the points in space (which are not the cause of the Body); and this Disjunction brings about the Disjunction of the Body (which is the effect of the Hand) from the, point in space (which are not its effects); all these Disjunctions being brought about in that same direction towards which the disjunctive action (or motion) tends, and towards that same point in space where this succeeding Conjunction is to be brought about; when, for instance, we find the Hand being disjoined from a point in a wall, we have the Disjunction from that point in the wall, of the Body also (to which the Hand belongs); and yet this latter Disjunction is not the effect of the action or motion of the Body,—the Body at that time being absolutely at rest; nor can this Disjunction of the Body be the effect of the action of the Hand; because we have never seen an action producing a Disjunction elsewhere than the substratum in which it itself appears; and it is for this reason that we postulate, as the cause of this Disjunction, the aforesaid Disjunction of the Cause and Non-cause.

The word ‘ādi’ in the expression ‘ākāśādi’ is meant to include other omnipresent things; and it is for this reason that we have the plural ending in ‘vibhāgān’—the Disjunctions of such omnipresent things are of an endless number.

Some people argue thus: “As a matter of fact we find that the Disjunction of the Body from the wall, is simultaneous with that of the Hand from it; and as such it is contrary to a perceptible fact to assert that these two Disjunctions bear to each other the relation of cause and effect.”

But this is most unreasonable; because at the time of the Disjunction of the Hand, there is no cause present for the Disjunction of the Body; as an effect is not possible without its cause; and we have already said above that the action of the Hand cannot be its cause. Hence it must be admitted that the said idea of simultaneity is a mistake.

Objection: “The fact of the Disjunction of the Body appearing after that of the Hand can be proved only by Inference; while their simultaneity is perceived directly by the Senses; and so long as a contrary fact of Sense-perception is present, no Inference can be effective; as any such Inference would be negatived and set aside by the Sense-perception and as such j would not fulfil the only condition of validity. Under the circumstances, bow can we regard the fact of Sense-perception to be a mistake, on the sole strength of an inferential fact?”

Reply: How do you find Inference operative in the case; of the piercing of the many petals of the lotus—where though the piercing is perceived to be simultaneous, yet such simultaneity is universally regarded to be not true.

Objection: “Ah Inference contrary to Sense-perception ceases to operate only when the matter is decisively pointed out by the latter to be of a character contrary to that pointed out by the Inference; in the case of the lotus-petals however the matter is doubtful; as it is quite possible that the perception of simultaneity may be due to the extremely quick succession in which one petal is pierced after the other. On the contrary however we have the decisive premiss universally recognised that the needle pierces an object only when it is in direct contact with it and not otherwise (and as all the petals cannot be in contact with the needle at one and the same time, the piercing cannot be simultaneous); and hence even though there is a perceptible fact to the contrary, yet, as it appears to be doubtful, there is every room for the operation of this contrary Inference which is fully decisive on the point.”

Reply: The evidential strength of the proposition that, ‘an action does not bring about any Disjunction apart from its own substance,’ being quite unimpeachable, and the perceptible fact being capable of being explained away differently, the Inferential reasoning about the sequential Disjunctions becomes fully established. And it is on this account that it is regarded as setting aside the aforesaid perceptible fact. Specially as the inference has a distinct object to operate upon; whereas the perception has no basis, being, as it is, due to the extremely quick succession in which the two Disjunctions appear; and that means of knowledge which has an objective basis, is on account of the aid of that basis, stronger in its authority than another which is weaker on account of its being devoid of such objective basis. Then again whenever a perceptible fact is said to be set aside by an inferential conclusion, the setting aside is done, not by Inference, but by another perceptible fact upon which the premisses of the inference are based. For instance, we find such settings aside in the case of a man having mistaken notions of the directions,—this being admitted by all experienced persons, who declare that in such cases Inference is more authoritative than perception. In the case of such perceptions however, as that of the heat of fire, we find that it is not capable of being in any manner explained away; and hence when the object has been once cognised by means of it, it can never be set aside by any Inferential reasoning.

Question: “On what ground do you assume the feet of one cognition being set aside by another?”

Answer: Because we find that while bearing upon the same object, they contradict each other. For instance, a single object is apprehended by one Cognition as Silver, and by another as Shell; and it is not possible for one and the same thing to be both; as we always find Silver to be something distinct from the Shell. Thus then, there being a contradiction between the objects of the two cognitions, we conclude that the cognitions also are contradictory; and as such one should naturally set aside the other.

Question: “What do you mean by this ‘setting aside,’ ‘Bādha’?”

Answer: It consists in the taking away (or depriving) of the object.

Objection: “In the case of the shell, even after it has been recognized as shell, there still continues the object that was illumined by the previous Cognition of silver; and as for actual silver, that never existed; and as such what is it of the previous cognition of silver, that has been ‘taken-away’ by the succeeding cognition of the shelll For certainly ‘taking away’ can be nothing more than destroying the connection of one thing with another.

“Objection: ‘Though the silver did not exist, yet it did appear in the cognition (and hence it can very well be taken away by the subsequent cognition).’

“Reply: True it did appear in the cognition. But this appearance in the cognition cannot be taken away; for the simple reason that it is a fully accomplished fact; certainly that which has once appeared, can never be reduced to the condition of the non-appeared.

“Objection: ‘Though in reality the silver did not exist, yet it was shown, by the cognition, as existing; and the separation or removal of this as manifested by cognition would consist merely in the putting forward of the contradictory of that cognition.’

“Reply: In that case, all that the setting aside would do would be to prove the non-existence of silver; and in what way could that affect the cognition of silver? This cognition only manifested the silver and made it cognisable; it did not bring it into existence; and this manifestation was duly effected by the mere appearance of the cognition; and then what is there that could be set aside by the subsequent cognition of the shell?”

Reply: When the absence of silver has been cognised, it becomes patent that the previous cognition of silver was one that had no basic objective reality,—i.e. it was false; and it is in this way that the idea of the non-existence of silver affects the cognition of silver.

Objection: “In this way then, what is taken away from the cognition is its phala (the resultant activity of the cogniser), and not the object as said before; because whenever a cognition is regarded as false, it does not give rise to any activity.”

Reply: Not so; because the taking away of the resultant activity is concomitant with that of the object itself. It is not always that a cognition rests in its resultant activity; as this activity is always dependent upon the will of the person; and we often find a cognition ending in mere indifference, and not leading to any activity at all. Even in cases where it does lead to a resultant activity, this latter is tied down to the object; and the object being in its turn tied to the cognition, any setting aside of the cognition would invariably mean a deprival of the object, and of the resultant activity; as the deprival of the latter would naturally follow upon that of the former. We desist from further details on this point, which we have explained in the Saṃgrahaṭīkā.

In as much as what, follows after the ‘Disjunction born of Disjunction,’ is the ‘Conjunction born of Conjunction’ of the substance that has long been produced, the author now proceeds to explain this Conjunction, which he had promised to do before (in the section on ‘Conjunction’).

After that &c. After the ‘Disjunction born of Disjunction’ the action of the Hand having g ven rise to the Conjunction of the Hand, which is the component cause, with its noncauses, the points in space,—from this Conjunction follows the Conjunctions of the inactive Body, which is an effect of the Hand, with its non-causes. the points in space; and this latter Conjunction is not brought about by the action of the Hand; as all that this action can do is to carry its own substratum (the Hand) to another point in space. The particle ‘iti’ indicates the conclusion of the subject.

An objection is started; “If &c. That is to say, if from the Disjunction of the Cause, the Hand, there follow the Disjunction of the Effect, the Body,—then, if from the Conjunction of the cause were to follow the Conjunction of the effect, and there would be no simultaneity in that case, we would have the whole and its parts having a separate existence; and they would be independent of one another. That is to say, if the Body really inheres in the Hand, then whenever the Hand would move the Body should also move along with it; and in that case there could be no sequence in the appearance of their Conjunctions and Disjunctions (as described above); and on the other hand, if their Conjunctions and Disjunctions were to appear one after another, then that would mean that the Body would not move when the Hand would move, and the two would be independent of each other.”

Reply: Not so; there could be no such anomaly of “separate existence.” Because, apparently you do not seem to understand what “separate existence” means: what it means is the capability, in the two things concerned, of initiating or containing an action calculated to bring about Conjunction and Disjunction between themeelves. “Separate existence” in the form of “separate movement” applies only to eternal substances, e.g., in the case of two atoms of Ākāśa for instance. The particle ‘tū’ meaning only, should be construed with ‘nityānām,’—the sense being that this kind of ‘separate existence’ belongs to eternal substances only. As for transitory substances, on the other hand, their “separate existence,’ consists in their ‘inherence in separate substrates;’ that is to say, they are regarded as having ‘separate existence’ when it is found that one or both of them inheres in substrates different from the other—‘Inherence’ here meaning having distinct relationships of the container and the contained. As for instance, in the case of the Bird and Space we find that one of them, the Bird, is not the substratum of space, and as such has a distinct “inherence.” Though in this case we also find one of the two having a distinct motion also, yet we take no account of this, as this has been explained as pertaining to eternal substances only.

Question: “How is it that you do not define the ‘separate existence’ of transitory substances also as consisting in separate movement?”

Answer: In the case of the Organ of Touch and the Body, we find that there is no separate movement; and yet they inhere in distinct substrates; and hence the relationship between them is one of Conjunction, and not of Inherence; while if among transitory substances also “separate existence” were to consist in ‘separate movement,’ then as these two are never found to have ‘separate movement,’ they would be regarded as ‘in-separate’ or ‘inherent;’ and hence the relation between them could not be one of mutual Conjunction; as this latter relation; is invariably concomitant with ‘separate existence.’ For this reason in the case of transitory substances, ‘separate movement’ cannot be regarded as constituting ‘separate existence.’ As for the eternal substances, in as much as they have no substratum or receptacle, they could never be said, to have any ‘separate substratum;’ and their Conjunctions and Disjunctions would only be due to separate movement; and consequently in their case it is ‘separate movement’ that constitutes ‘separate existence.’ The sense of all this is that in the case of the organ of Touch and the Body, though, in the first instance, there is no separate existence, yet when it is found that they have distinct substrates, their Conjunction becomes possible; and hence it is concluded that in the case of transitory substances, ‘separate existence’ is in the form of ‘having separate substrates,’ and not in that of ‘having separate movement.'

With a view to further strengthen the same view, the author proceeds to show that in the case of the Cloth and the

Yarns (in it)—between which all parties recognise the relationship of Inherence—there is no possibility of Conjunction and Disjunction, even though they are incapable of ‘separate movement and the sole reason for this lies in the fact of their not having distinct substrates.

In the case of all-pervading substances, in as much as there is no ‘separate existence,’ there can be no Conjunction among them; nor Disjunction, as this latter always follows from Conjunction; hence in the case of these there is mere ‘continuance in their own forms.’

The upshot of all this is this: The mere fact of the Body not moving when the hand moves does not constitute ‘separate existence’; if the two had distinct substrates of their own, then there might have been ‘separate existence’; as a matter of fact however such is not the case, as the hand is inherent in the body (and has no distinct substrate).

All Disjunction is destructible, being momentary in its character. The author proceeds to show how all the three kinds of Disjunction—that caused by action, that existing in the cause, and that existing in the cause and the non-cause—are momentary, being liable to quick destruction:—The limit of all Disjunction lies in the subsequent Conjunction; and as the two things disjoined become immediately conjoined to some other things, the Disjunction can have but a momentary existence.

Question: “How do you know that this subsequent Conjunction is the limit of Disjunction?”

Answer: Disjunction is not like Conjunction. That is to say, in the case of Conjunction we find that it is destroyed only by the Disjunction of the two things that have been in contact; while Disjunction is destroyed by the Conjunction, not only of the two things disjoined between themselves, but of these things with other things also. For instance, the Disjunction of a man form the tree at its root is destroyed by his Conjunction with that particular point of the tree, and also by his contact with another part of it. And thus it becomes established that Disjunction has its limit in the subsequent Conjunction; all the more so as the action, that brought about the Disjunction, does not cease until it has brought its substratum into contact with another place.

Objections: “Your argument involves the fallacy of ‘Sādhyasama,’ in as much as you assert that the Disjunction ceases by Conjunction.”

Reply. In the case of the notion of two things being ‘conjoined,’ in contact, we find that the idea continues for sometime (all the time that the things remain in contact); in the case of Disjunction on the other hand, we find that as soon as the things concerned have come into contact with another place, the notion of the two things having been ‘separated’ or ‘disjoined’ ceases; and hence it is only right to say that Disjunction ceases with Conjunction.

In some cases Disjunction ceases with the destruction of its substratum.

Question: “How?”

Answer: An action originating in one part of the yarn that forms part of a ‘duplicate yarn,’ brings about the disjunction of that part from another part of the same yarn,—at that very time an action appears in the other yarn: and the resulting disjunction brings about, in the part of the yarn, the destruction of the cohesive conjunction of the yarn; and then the action of one yarn brings about its Disjunction of the other yarn,—all this constitutes one point of time. Then at the time that Disjunction brings about the destruction of the Conjunction of the two yarns,—there- is also the destruction of the conjunction of the parts of the yarn; and this leads to the destruction of the yarn composed of those parte. And this yarn having been destroyed, there follows the destruction of the ‘Disjunction from another yarn’ inhering in the former yarn; and in this case we find that the only cause of the destruction of the Disjunction is the destruction of the substratum, no other cause being available.

The Opponent comes forward again with the following objections:

“Thus then, the destruction of the Disjunction of the yarn is simultaneous with the destruction of the ‘yarn duplicate.’ The ‘subsequent Disjunction’—that of the mobile yarn from points in space—is brought about by such Disjunction as is born of Disjunction, (and this would not be possible) because of the absence of its cause, viz: the Disjunction of the two yarns.

“And when the ‘subsequent Disjunction' would not be brought about, then there would be no cessation of the ‘Conjunction of the yarn and Ākāśa,’ which acted as an obstacle to it; and then there can be no conjunction of it with any other point in space. Thus then no contrary quality, in the shape of this subsequent Conjunction, being present, the Action would continue at other times also, in fact it would continue as long as its substratum would not be destroyed, or as some other cause for its cessation would not appear, and thus there would be the anomaly that the action of all eternal substances would be eternal (as the substratum of such an action would never cease to exist).

“Question: ‘How so?’

“Answer: When action appears in the atom composing the Water-diad, it brings about its disjunction from the other atom; and at that time there appears an action in the other atom composing the Diad. And hence at the time that from the Disjunction of the atoms there follows the destruction of the cohesive Conjunction of the substance, there appears the Disjunction of the atom from the Diad, brought about by the action in the atom; and then at the time when there follows from the Disjunction of the Atom and the Diad, the destruction of the conjunction of the Atom and the Diad, at that very time there follows, from the destruction of the conjunction of the atoms, the destruction of the Diad formed by that Conjunction; and this Diad having been destroyed, the ‘Disjunction of the atom from the Diad,’ which inhered in that Diad, would also he destroyed; and thus this Disjunction having ceased to exist, there could not appear its effect, in the shape of the Disjunction of the atom from the points in space; and thus the previous Conjunction continuing to exist, and there being no possibility of the subsequent Conjunction which would oppose and destroy it, the action inhering in the eternal atom would continue for ever.

The author offers the following reply to the above:

The disjunction of another part of the yam &c. That is to say, as a rule when an action appears in the cause as containing the effect, it disjoins its own substratum from another part of the substance, and not from the points of space &c., specially as the capability of bringing about Disjunctions from points in space is invariably concomitant with the non-capability of bringing about any specific disjunctions. And yet the said action does bring about the Disjunction of the part in contact with its own substratum from another part; as there could be no incongruity in this. Thus then, when an action is produced in one of the two yarns composing the ‘yarn-duplicate,’ it is simultaneous with the disjunction of that yarn from the other yarn; and this action also brings about the disjunction from the part of the yarn. And this disjunction of the yarn from the part of the other yarn remains intact (and is not destroyed by the destruction of this latter yarn, which was the substratum of its own disjunction from the other yarn); for the simple reason that even on the destruction of the yarn, its part remains intact, and so does also the other yarn. This is what the author means by sayiug—by the destruction of the substratum it is only the Disjunction of the yarn that is destroyed, while that of the part of the yarn from, the other yarn remains intact.

Question: “Yes; but what then?”

Answer: Etasmāt &c. The sense of the example is that, just as from the action-born Disjunction of the finger from the Ākāśa we have the Disjunction of the Body from the Ākāśa, so, in the same manner, from the action-born Disjunction of the yarn and its part, we have the Disjunction of the yarn from the Ākāśa.

Objection: “It is quite right that from the Disjunction of the Hand and the Ākāśa there follows the Disjunction of the Body from Ākāśa; but it is not right that this latter Disjunction should follow the Disjunction of the finger from Ākāśa; as the Finger is not the (direct component) cause of the Body.”

Reply: If this argument be accepted, then the Hand also is the direct component of the arm, and not of the Body; and as such how could any Disjunction from the Body follow from Disjunction from the Hand? If the Hand be regarded as a component of the Body, on the ground of this latter pervading equally over all its parts,—then, on the same grounds, the Finger would also be a component of the Body; as it is the aggregate of all the different members, the Hand, the Finger &c., that is recognised as the “Body.”

The Disjunction of the Yarn from Ākāśa having thus come about, the previous Conjunction (which was an obstacle to further Conjunctions) having ceased, the action in the Yarn brings about another Conjunction, and then ceases.

The author next proceeds to explain another manner in which Disjunction is destroyed by the destruction of its substratum. Simultaneously with the Disjunction of the other part of the Yarn, there appears an action in the disjoined part of that same Yarn; and then from that Disjunction follows the destruction of that Conjunction of the parts of the Yarn which constituted the Yarn; and the action of the Yarn brings about the Disjunction of that Yarn from another Yarn—all this forming one point of time. After that, from the destruction of the Conjunction there follows the destruction of the Yarn formed by that Conjunction; and from that there follow simultaneously the destructions of the Disjunction and the action.

We have seen above that the opponent had brought forward an objection based upon the “anomaly of the eternality of the action inhering in eternal substances.” This particular phrase of the objection the author did not choose to take the trouble of repudiating, as it was found too absurd for any serious consideration. As a matter of fact, we find that when an action appears in the cause as containing the effect, it does not bring about the Disjunction from the points of space, simultaneously with the Disjunction from other parts of the substance; and the reason for this is that the capability of bringing about disjunctions from Ākāśa de., is not compatible with the capability of bringing about a disjunction opposed to the cohesive Conjunction of a substance. But an action in the atom, which is in contact with the Diad, into whose composition that atom does not enter, does bring about its Disjunction from the points in space, simultaneously with the disjunction from the Diad; and that Disjunction having brought about the cessation of the previous Conjunction of that atom with Ākāśa, there appears another Conjunction of it with the same; and then the previous action in this atom certainly ceases (and thus the action in the eternal atom need not necessarily be eternal).

It has been explained how, when there is a Conjunction of homogeneous substances a substance is produced, and then the substratum having been destroyed, we have the destruction of the Disjunction and the initial action. The author now proceeds to show how when there is Conjunction of heterogeneous substances, a substance is not produced, there is a destruction of the Disjunction, following from the destructions of the Conjunction and the substratum (of the Disjunction.) There being a Conjunction of the Yarn with the shuttle de., &c. The sense of this is that, at the very time that the action appears in the part composing the Yarn, there appears an action in the shuttle; and then the action of the part of the Yarn brings about its disjunction from another part of the Yarn; and the action of the shuttle brings about the disjunction, from Ākāśa, of the Yarn whose parts had been thus disjoined; and then from the disjunction of the parts of the Yarn, there follows the destruction of the Conjunction of these parts; and from the disjunction of the shuttle, follows the disjunction of the yarn from the shuttle and also that of the shuttle from Ākāśa. And then from the destruction of the Conjunction of the parts of the Yarn there follows the destruction of the Yarn; and another Conjunction of the shuttle. And thus from this subsequent Conjunction, and from the destruction of the substratum (the yarn), there follows the destruction of the disjunction of the shuttle from the Yarn.