Text 9

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation of Text 9:

अयुतसिद्धानामाधार्याधारभूतानां यः सम्बन्धः इहप्रत्ययहेतुः स समवायः ॥ ९ ॥

ayutasiddhānāmādhāryādhārabhūtānāṃ yaḥ sambandhaḥ ihapratyayahetuḥ sa samavāyaḥ || 9 ||

Text (9): Inherence is the relationship subsisting among things that are inseparable, standing to one another in the character of the container and the contained,—such relationship being the basis of the idea that ‘this is in that.’

Commentary: The Nyāyakandalī of Śrīdhara.

(English rendering of Śrīdhara’s commentary called Nyāyakandalī or Nyāyakaṇḍalī from the 10th century)

The author proceeds to explain the nature of Inherence. ‘Yutasiddhi’ is separate existence, the existence of two relative things apart from each other; those that have no such separate existence are ‘ayutasiddhas’; and it is the relationship of these that is known as ‘Inherence’; e. g. the relationship between the Cloth and the Yarns composing it; though the Yarns have an independent existence of their own, apart from the Cloth (lit. inhere in substrates other than the Cloth), yet the mutual relationship between the Yarn and the Cloth is such that they do not bear the relationship of the container and the contained to anything else (i.e. have no existence apart from each other). It is only when the two factors are so related that each bears to the other the relationship of the container and the to something other than the other factor, that we have what is known as ‘yutasiddhi’; e.g. the relationship between the organ of Touch and the Body, where we find that the Body has an existence in its other parts, apart from the organ of Touch. Consequently the relationship in this latter case, would be one of Conjunction, and not of Inherence.

In the case of two eternal substances, ‘yutasiddhi’ would mean separate existence, the capability of moving or going separately; and those that are devoid of this capability would be ‘ayutasiddha’; and the relationship of these would be what is known as ‘Inherence;’ e. g. the relationship between Ākāra, and the general character of ‘Substance.’

If Inherence were defined merely as the relationship subsisting between two things that are incapable of separate existence, then the relationship between Virtue and Pleasure— which is one of cause and effect,—would also become ‘Inherence’; as neither of the two has any existence apart from the self wherein both of them inhere. Hence with a view to exclude this, the Text adds—‘standing to one another in the character of the container and the contained’,—which is not added (as some people have supposed) for the purpose of excluding the relationship of Ākāśa and the flying bird; as the latter is excluded by the expression of ‘Āyutasiddhi’ (the Ākāśa having an existence independently of the bird).

In the same manner, the relationship between Ākāśa, and the word ‘Ākāśa’—which is one of the denoter and the denoted—would be mistaken as ‘Inherence’; hence with a view to exclude this, the Author adds: ‘the basis of the idea of that this is in that.’ In the case of the relationship of the denoter and the denoted, the idea that we have is that this word expresses such and such a meaning, and not that it is in this.

In as much as the two qualifications, ‘Ādhārādhāryabhūtānām’ and ‘ihapratyayahetu [ihapratyayahetuḥ],’ could not exclude the relationship between the pit and the fruit fallen in it,—the author has added ‘ayutasiddhānām.’

Some people put forth two alternative explanations of the word ‘ayutasiddhi’ (in order to show that its use is not admissible); what they say is this: “Does the word mean that the \two things are not recognised as joined together, or that they are recognised as not joined together (but one and the same)? In the former case, what could be their relationship, they themselves being not recognised? and in the latter also, what could the relationship be, when they would not be distinct from each other? As it is only when two objects are distinct that they are related, e.g. in the case of the fruit and the pit wherein it falls.”

Others do not accept this; and this is what they say: ‘Uśutam na siddhan’ does not mean that they are not fully accomplished objects; because we do not admit of any Inherence between nonentities. Nor does the compound mean ‘recognised as not joined together as if the two things were identical, there would be one object only, and not two; as duality consists in the negation of identity between two things. In the case of Inherence, the two things are not one in reality; as their forms are always recognised as distinct from each other; and “Difference’ only consists in the cognisability by two distinct ideas; otherwise there would be no proper differentiation between Difference and Non-difference. Consequently ‘Ayutasiddhi.’ cannot mean ‘identity.’

What the word ‘ayutasiddhānām’ actually means is those that have no substratrum apart from the other correlative. In this case there would be no discrepancy in the relationship; as there would always be a certain difference in the forms of the two objects; and as between two distinct objects—e. g. in the case of fire and the ball of iron—no mutual contact would be possible, without some sort of a relationship. The only difference however between ordinary relationship and Inherence is this:

It is after it is produced that the fire becomes related to the ball of iron; while in the case of Inherence, it is during the process of production that one thing becomes related to the other by the peculiar nature of the potency of its cause; e. g. in the case of the action of cutting and the object cut. We cut short this discussion here.

Question:—“How is it that only six categories are mentioned, and not others?”

Answer:—Simply because it is only these six that exist, and no others—this non-exitense being ascertained from the fact of their not being known by any of the means of knowledge exactly like the horns of a hare.

Thus then the general definition applying to the six categories is the capability of being predicated; and the following are the specific definitions of each of them: (1) Substance is the substrate of Qualities; (2) Quality is that which has a general character, is devoid of qualities, and which never appears as the independent cause of conjunction or disjunction; (3) Action is that which resides in one substance, is devoid of qualities, and which is the independent cause of Conjunction and Disjunction; (4) Generality is that which serves as the basis of inclusive cognition; (5) Individuality is the basis of absolute differentiation (or exclusion); and (6) Inherence is the relationship of the container and the contained subsisting between two things that have no existence apart from one another.

Notes.

(1) The relationship of the container and the contained must be natural and not adventitious says the Kiraṇāvalī.

(2) “Samavāya etymologically means the aot of coming together closely, and is therefore used to denote a kind of ‘intimate union’ between two things which are rendered inseparable”. But as the word ‘union’ conveys the idea of conjunction, and not of inseparability, it has been thought fit to use the word ‘Inherence’ for ‘Samavāya’, specially as this word and its cognates are found convenient in places where the word ‘Samavita’ or ‘Samavāya’ occur in compounds.

(3) The word ‘Ayutasiddha’ means that which is known (siddha) as not separate ‘a-yuta)—the word ‘yuta’ being derived from the root ‘yu’ to separate.

(4) Though Kaṇāda (Sūtra VII.—ii- 26) has defined Samavāya as that relationship between the cause and its effects, whereby the one is cognised as residing in the other,—yet later writers have developed the theory to a great extent, applying the name to the following five relationships: (a) That between the whole and its parts; (b) between the quality and the substance it qualifies, (c) the motion and the moving; (d) the individual and the class to which it belongs; (e) the Individuality and the eternal substance wherein it resides.

(5) Samāvāya is regarded as eternal and non-producible in order to guard against the regressus ad infinitum that would be caused by admitting its productibility which would necessitate the assumption of an endless series of Samavāya upon Samavāya.

(6) The doctrine, of Samavāya is very important and may in one sense be said to be the corner-stone of the Nyāya Philosophy. It is the Samavāya that explains the phenomenon of causality as conceived by the Naiyāyikas; and it is this theory that makes them so intensely realistic in marked opposition to idealistic schools like the “Vedānta” (Athalye).

The Bhaṭṭa-Mīmāṃsakas, the Vedāntis and the Sāṅkhyas are all opposed to the Samavāya-theory. Śankarācārya in his Bhāṣya on the Brahma-Sūtras II-ii-23 in course of his refutation of the atomic theory of the Vaiśeshika which is a necessary corrollary to the Samavāya theory, has found in this the weakest point of the theory and has very strongly put forward the reasoning that there can be no finality in the theory, as it would always be necessary to assume a relationship whereby the Samavāya would reside in the Samavāyi, the thing related in the Samavāya relationship. The Vedanti admits of no uuion except that of Saṃyoga, Conjunction, and the relationship between the cause and effect they hold to be one of identity, Kumārila has dealt with the theory briefly in his śloka-vartika (Trans, p. 94); and in one of the Karikas he says—“If Samavāya is something different from the class and the individual (that resides in the class by Samavāya), then it (that Samavāya) could not exist in them as a relation; on the other hand if it be identical with them, then these two would be identical—by the law that things that are identical to the same thing are identical to themselves.”