Verse 11.231

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

एवं सञ्चिन्त्य मनसा प्रेत्य कर्मफलोदयम् ।
मनोवाङ्मूर्तिभिर्नित्यं शुभं कर्म समाचरेत् ॥ २३१ ॥

evaṃ sañcintya manasā pretya karmaphalodayam |
manovāṅmūrtibhirnityaṃ śubhaṃ karma samācaret || 231 ||

Having thus considered in his mind the results arising after death from his deeds, he should perform good acts, by his thought, speech and body.—(231)

 

Medhātithi’s commentary (manubhāṣya):

‘Thus’—refers to the whole. lot of injunctions and prohibitions.

‘Results arising after death from his deeds’—‘The result of good acts is Heaven, and that of bad ones, hell, if expiations are not performed, and expiations are extremely painful,’—having thought over all this, ‘he shall perform, good deeds.’

‘Good’ is that which is enjoined, as also the determination, or desire, to do it Thus it is that, even though in the case of the prohibition ‘one shall not injure living creatures,’ what is expressed by the words is causing pain to others by the raising and letting fall of a stick or some other weapon, yet, on the strength of teachings like the present verse, it is taken as forbidding the wish to injure.

Similarly in the case of the eating of what should not be eaten. Though ‘eating’ is the name given to the act ending with the swallowing of food, yet even the mental act of desiring to eat has been forbidden.

Similarly also in the case of having intercourse with women with whom one should not have intercourse; though ‘intercourse’ really stands for the actual penetration of the organ, yet the act of mere willing to do the act has been forbidden by other texts.

“If such be the ease with the acts of killing, eating and intercourse, then the expiation for the desire to do these should be the same as that for the actual acts themselves.”

There is no force in this objection. So far as the killing of a Brāhmaṇa is concerned, what has been urged is certainly true; because of the assertion—‘even though the man have not actually killed him, etc., etc.’ In other wises, the right course to adopt would always be to accept the direct meaning of the-words of the texts concerned. As regards prohibitions, on the strength of the said texts, they are taken us pertaining to the whole series of acts, beginning with the desire to act and ending with the actual act itself.

“If this be so, then, inasmuch as the liability to expiations has been made conditional upon the doing of ‘a forbidden act’ (11. 44), the expiation in each case would have to be in accordance with the prohibition (even on the mete desire to act).”

Who says that there is no expiation? All that the words imply is that in the case of the mere will to act, the expiation would be lighter than that in that of the actual act. This would be the right course to adopt in the course of all expiations.

“Whence is this particular rule obtained?”

From the very nature of prohibitions. In fact ‘the expiations also, consisting in vows, restraints and pious acts, have their source in determination.’ This last passage also refers to only Injunctions and Prohibitions. ‘Vows’ are of the nature of Injunctions and ‘Restraints’ of the nature of Prohibitions. And having their purposes have been fulfilled in these, the words need not be applied to other conditions and circumstances (?). In the case of all prohibitions however, the condition is present that the act is forbidden; whence it follows’ that an expiation is necessary. But the expiation (in the case of mere determination or desire) need not be the same as that in the case of the actual act.

All this we shall show under the verse ‘coveting the property of others, etc., etc,’ (12.5)

 

Comparative notes by various authors

(verses 11.227-233)

See Comparative notes for Verse 11.228.