Verse 9.203

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

यद्यर्थिता तु दारैः स्यात् क्लीबादीनां कथं चन ।
तेषामुत्पन्नतन्तूनामपत्यं दायमर्हति ॥ २०३ ॥

yadyarthitā tu dāraiḥ syāt klībādīnāṃ kathaṃ cana |
teṣāmutpannatantūnāmapatyaṃ dāyamarhati || 203 ||

If the eunuch and the rest should somehow happen to have longing for a wife, the child of such of them as have issue is entitled to inheritance.—(203)

 

Medhātithi’s commentary (manubhāṣya):

‘Longing’—desire to meet, with a view to sexual intercourse. When there is such longing, the man shall marry. And if there is issue from the marriage, the ‘child’—whether a son or a daughter —‘is entitled to inheritance’—to. a share in the property.

The share to which a daughter is entitled has already been explained.

“In the case of the eunuch of the ‘airy’ (infructuous) ‘semen,’ the desire for sexual intercourse is there; but, how could he have any ‘issue’?”

It has already been declared above (167) that—‘if a son is born to the wife of a dead man, a eunuch, an invalid, etc.’ (which shows that such men can have a ‘soil-born’ son, and this is possible only if they have wives).

Or, the verse may be taken as indicating that in the case of such men, marriage could only he prompted by lust. If marriage wore prompted entirely by religious motives, how could there be any marriage for the men mentioned, being as they are not entitled to the performance of any religious rites? Then again, the person born blind, the lame, and the eunuch of the ‘airy semen,’ have been declared to be fit for the Initiatory Ceremony; the lunatics and others of that kind however are not fit for that ceremony; how then can there be any marriage in the ease of those latter?

‘And the rest’—stands for only those already mentioned above (i.e., the invalid, etc); but if the phrase ‘and the rest’ were taken as including all, then the ‘outcast’ also would become included, which, bring contrary to Law, would be undesirable.

Or, the present rule may be taken as referring to the case where the man becomes insane or otherwise disabled, after he has been ‘initiated’ and ‘married.’

“But the clause ‘if they happen to have, longing for a wife’—could not apply to the ease of those who are already married.”

Not so; ‘longing for a wife’ (which has been explained as meaning desire for sexual intercourse) is quite possible in the case of married men.

The older writers have found in the present rule something that is usefully applicable to the case of also such marriages as are contracted for purely religious purpose?. So that for the eunuch also,—who is entitled to the performance of such rites as are prescribed by Smṛtis—it is only right that there be marriage, even in the absence of sexual desire. As for the rites prescribed in Śrutis, it is only one who has already got a son that is entitled to the ‘laying of fire’ (which is a necessary accompaniment for those rites); so that the eunuch can never be entitled to them. And it has been already explained what really prompts the marriage in such cases.—(203)

 

Explanatory notes by Ganganath Jha

‘Kathañcana’.—This indicates that the eunuch and the rest are not worthy to marry (Kullūka).

‘Apatyam’.—The Kṣetraja son (Kullūka, Rāghavānanda and Nandana).

This verse is quoted in Vivādaratnākara (p. 488), which explains ‘tantu’ as child;—in Aparārka (p. 750), to the effect that marriage is legal for the persons enumerated in 201; it remarks that in view of the epithet ‘jāti’, ‘born’, in the term ‘jātyandha’, the present verse cannot be taken as referring to cases where the disabilities appear after marriage; it comes to the conclusion that the disability to inheritance cannot thus be due to their not marrying and hence not being able to perform religious rites; it must be due to the mere authoritative assertion of the law.

It is quoted in Vīramitrodaya (Saṃskāra, p. 195) as indicating that the marriage of the said persons is sanctioned.

 

Comparative notes by various authors

[See Texts under 201-202.]

Gautama (28.44).—‘The male offspring of the idiot receives his father’s share.’

Viṣṇu (15.34-38).—‘Of the idiot and the rest the legitimate sons receive a share;—but not the children of an outcast,—provided they are born after the commission of the act that rendered the parents outcasts.’

Yājñavalkya (2.141).—‘Of the eunuch and the rest, the Body-born and the Kṣetraja sons, if they are free from defects, are entitled to shares; and their daughters should be maintained till they are made over to their husbands.’

Vaśiṣṭha (Aparāka, p. 751).—‘One born of the outcast is an outcast, except the female child.’

Nārada (Vivādaratnākara, p. 419).—‘The sons of these are entitled to shares.’

Kātyāyana (Do., p, 491).—‘The son of a wife married irregularly is entitled to inheritance when he belongs to the same caste as his father; so also is the son born of a regularly married wife, even though she may have been of a different caste; but the son of a woman married in the reverse order is not entitled to a share; to him his kinsmen should give food and clothing.’