Verse 8.160

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

दर्शनप्रातिभाव्ये तु विधिः स्यात् पूर्वचोदितः ।
दानप्रतिभुवि प्रेते दायादानपि दापयेत् ॥ १६० ॥

darśanaprātibhāvye tu vidhiḥ syāt pūrvacoditaḥ |
dānapratibhuvi prete dāyādānapi dāpayet || 160 ||

The law laid down in the preceding verse shall apply to the case of ‘Surety for appearance’; in the case of the death of the ‘Surety for payment’ however, the king shall make the heirs also to pay up.—(160)

 

Medhātithi’s commentary (manubhāṣya):

The ‘law laid down’—by me—‘in the preceding verse,’—viz., ‘the surety-money due from the father shall not be payable by the son’—applies only to the case of ‘surety for appearance.’

This assertion might give rise to the idea that the son should be made to pay in the case of ‘surety for guarantee,’—hence the author proceeds to add—‘In the case of the death of the surety for payment,’ the heirs are made to pay up, and not in the case of any other kind of surety.

“If such is the meaning, then the first half of the verse is superfluous; for when it is declared that the son is liable only for the dues by the Surety for Payment, it follows that he is not liable for the dues by any other form of surety. If it be argued that it is for the purpose of making things clear that the first, half is added,—then the case of ‘surety for guarantee’ also should have been added, otherwise, it would be doubtful whether the denial (contained in the preceding verse), excluded as it would be from the two cases of surety, is a prohibition or a positive injunction.”

There can be no such doubt; since the matter has been clearly stated in another Smṛti—‘In a case where the surety for appearance, or the surety for confidence, has died, the sons should not pay the dues, but they should pay in the case of the Surety for Payment,’ (Yājñavalkya, Vyavahāra, 54). In the present text also, as the assertion ‘in the case of the death of Surety for Payment, etc.,’ is in the form of a positive injunction, it cannot become applicable to the case of any other form of surety. There is nothing wrong however in the implications of merely re-iterative assertions (as the first half of the verse is) being extended (to cases other than those directly mentioned). If the question is raised, as to the purpose for which such re-iteration should have been made,—our answer is that it is a peculiarity of Manu’s style of writing.—(160)

 

Explanatory notes by Ganganath Jha

The first half of this verse is quoted in Vivādaratnākara (p. 57), which adds that ‘darśanaprātibhāvya’ includes the surety for trust also [this is clear from Yājñavalkya, 254, where both are put on the same footing]—the second half is quoted on p. 43 where ‘dānapratibhū’ is explained as ‘the surety who had promised I shall pay,’—and ‘dāyādān’ as ‘sons.’

(1) ‘Darśana-pratibhū’ is the person standing surety with the promise ‘I shall produce this man when required’;—(2) Pratyayapratibhū is one who says ‘give him the loan on my trust’;—(3) Dānapratibhū’—who says ‘give him the loan, which, if he does not pay, I shall pay.’

The verse is quoted in Kṛtyakalpataru (74a and 76b).

 

Comparative notes by various authors

(verses 8.159-162)

See Comparative notes for Verse 8.159.