Verse 8.104

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

शूद्रविड् क्षत्रविप्राणां यत्रऋतोक्तौ भवेद् वधः ।
तत्र वक्तव्यमनृतं तद् हि सत्याद् विशिष्यते ॥ १०४ ॥

śūdraviḍ kṣatraviprāṇāṃ yatraṛtoktau bhaved vadhaḥ |
tatra vaktavyamanṛtaṃ tad hi satyād viśiṣyate || 104 ||

Where the telling of the truth would lead to the death of a Śūdra, a Vaiśva, a Kṣatriya or a Brāhmaṇa,—in that case falsehood should be spoken; as that is preferable to truth.—(104)

 

Medhātithi’s commentary (manubhāṣya):

There is the general prohibition.—‘one shall not speak a falsehood’; and the present verse declares that this prohibition applies to cases other than that entailing the death of the Śūdra and others; and it does not actually enjoin the telling of falsehood. For if it meant the latter, then any coordination between this and the said general prohibition would he impossible.

“What is the condition meant to refer to what is asserted here? the phrase in that case cannot be taken as indicating that condition; as this phrase qualifies death; and as death is not existent at the time, it could not be the required condition; for if it were, the meaning would come to be that ‘when the death has been brought about, falsehood should be spoken’; and this is not what is meant.”

The term ‘where’ referring to the case, the phrase ‘in that case’ also would refer to the same. Hence the meaning comes to be that—‘in a case where the party defeated becomes liable to death’; and this certainly can serve as the required condition.

As for the king’s wrath, this cannot he regarded as the required condition; as it is an uncertain factor, and also because any penalty inflicted entirely through wrath would be illegal.

For all these reasons the only right course is to take the text as supplementary to the prohibition of lying.

In connection with Gautama’s test, there is no chance of its being taken as an injunction of lying; for all that it says is—‘there is nothing wrong in lying, if a man’s life is dependent upon it’ (13.24).

In the face of such prohibitions and sanctions, it depends on the will of the man whether he shall tell the truth or untruth; so that arguing in his mind that by telling the truth, he becomes the cause of the death of the accused, and hence the transgressor of the law that ‘one shall not kill any living being,’—the man decides to tell the untruth; and in this he does what is quite reasonable.

Question. “All that the man does is to answer the question that is put to him; he does not kill; and without killing, how can he be tainted with the sin of killing?”

Answer. The man being free to say what he chooses, if, on account of his deposition, the accused comes to be killed by the king, he does become a means of thaṭ killing, and hence its perpetrator or agent.

Question. “Every kind of means does not become an agent, e.g., when nobility is acquired by wealth, or “fame by learning,” wealth and learning are the means but not the agents. What makes a certain thing the means is its capacity to bring about a special kind of effect in the form of substance or quality. Even when an action is spoken of as such an effect—e.g., in the assertion ‘cooking is done by fire’—the action that is spoken of by the verbal noun (‘cooking’) is in its accomplished form (and hence as good as a substance or a quality; since an action is that which is still in course of being accomplished). But the effect spoken of in the present context is of a totally different kind—scriptural or spiritual, and not temporal,—being brought about by what is declared in the scriptural texts; and the Agent of such an act is not of the same character as that of the former. If the character of the Agent were to consist in command and prayer—which mean ordering and requesting,—then, in the case of such assertions as ‘make the corns become hot,’ the use of the causal form would he impossible, as it refers to the corns, which are not sentient (and hence cannot have any command or prayer addressed to them).”

All this has already been answered by the commentators, who have explained that in such cases the action of the principal agent is imposed upon (represented as belonging to) the subordinate (insentient) agent. Such imposition upon insentient objects we find in such expressions as—‘alms-begging affords shelter,’ ‘the dry cow-dung teaches,’ and so forth. In such cases, the help accorded (in the shape of lodging and teaching) is not by the insentient things (begging and cow-dung), but by a different agent, who is the real instigator of the acts. the act of teaching, for instance, is prompted by the Injunction of having recourse to a Teacher; and when the teacher is doing this act of teaching, he is hampered by cold and such other hindrances; and this cold is removed by the dry cow-dung (being burnt as fuel); thus it is that the action of ‘teaching’ itself comes to be imposed upon the cow-dung. An ‘agent’ or an ‘instigator’ is so called because of the impelling or urging done by it; and we do find such impelling being done also by such insentient things as wind and water, in reference to the burning of fire and floating of wood (respectively). And in all such cases as there can be no directing, etc., done by the Fire, the words would have to be regarded as used in a figurative sense.

If again the character of the ‘agent’ be hold to consist in doing something conducive to the act in question,—then this could only he in accordance with the actual action of the Agent concerned, which action would be in the form of preparing for the main act; for one who arranges for an act is said to hate it done; when for instance, for a person who is going to dine, one man brings up the dish and another serves the rice and so forth; similarly when a man is going to do the act of killing, one man offers him the weapon, while another, by recounting the misdeeds of the man going to ho killed, kindles the rage of the person going to kill him. In all such cases, though each of these other abettors does not do any directing or urging, yet, in as much as he helps to bring about conditions favourable for the fulfilment of the act concerned, becomes a sort of an ‘agent’ in it, in the sense that what he actually does is conducive to the said act.

According to this view, the cow-dung and the Teacher would stand on the same footing (as agents in the act of teaching).

But in this connection also that principal instigator is the ‘Agent’ without whom the act cannot be accomplished and who does not fall within the category of any other particular case-relation. Without the readier, the cow-dung itself cannot become a prompter of the teaching; while the teacher can do the teaching, even without the cow-dung, and hence the cow-dung becomes the subordinate factor. As for those things that are definitely recognised as the ‘instrument,’ or such other factor conducive to the accomplishment of an act,—these also would he clearly subordinate. For instance, when one sees a man going to a remote village again, even on slight business, he says ‘the horse makes Devadutta go.’

Question.—“As a matter of fact, in connection with the nomenclature of the case-relations, there is no reference made to the greater or less intimacy of the determining relation; what difference then is there between the cow-dung and the Teacher (so far as the character of the nominative agent of the act of teaching is concerned)? The. distinction that you have drawn between the two is a mere gratuitous assumption of yours, and there is no reality behind it; while all Injunctions and Prohibitions refer to realities. Further, it has also been declared that ‘the exact nature of case-relations is determined by the wish of the speaker.’ Under the circumstances, if a certain speaker wishes to speak of a nonagent as the agent, the Injunctions and Prohibitions relating to the Agent could become applicable to him. For instance, when enunciating the Sins, manu himself mentions ‘the buyer, the seller, the cooker and the server’ (ns the killer of the animal whose flesh is eaten). From this it is clear that the maxim that you have propounded is meant for the purpose of lending support to the position taken up by yourself, and it does not touch the reality of things.”

It is for this very reason that the commentators have agreed that if the mere doing of something conducive to an act were the condition of being the ‘agent,’ then every kind of cause (of the act) would have to be regarded as ‘agent.’ So that when one gives food to a man, and this man, being a glutton, happens to die by over-eating,—the man who gave the food would become the agent in the act of killing. As a matter of fact, however, the action of the feeder has not been prompted by the idea of killing the man; it was prompted by the idea of a totally different act, in the form of feeding, and not in that of killing; nor was it prompted by hatred or jealousy or any such feeling. So that oven though the man may have helped to bring about the death, yet he does not become the ‘agent’ of that act. That is all that we have to say. In a case where one takes away lands or gold, etc., belonging to another person, and the latter dies through grief caused by the robbery,—it has to be considered whether the robber becomes the ‘agent’ in the act of robbing only, or in that of killing also.

“What is then to be ‘considered’ in this connection? The relation of Cause and Effect can he ascertained by infallibility; and the robbing of land or gold is not an infallible cause of death, to the same extent as striking with the, sword or starving is.”

What sort of ‘infallibility’ is meant here? It may he held that if by a certain thing, some one dies, while others do not,—then the agency or causal efficiency of that thing (towards bringing about death) would be regarded as ‘fallible.’ But any such principle would be defective, on account of the divergence in the constitution of men. One and the same medicine is found to be beneficial to a man of phlegmatic constitution, but harmful to another. In fact in the case of all men, the appearance of now forces is dependent upon such contingencies as those of disposition, place, time, nature and accessories. In fact in the eases cited also, the death is dependent upon the wealth and progeny of the man concerned, as also upon thirst and other living organisms (?). For instance, if the man robbed is of a very passionate disposition, or liable to give way to grief, the trouble caused by the robbery becomes conducive to death. And in such a case can the agency (of the robber in the net of killing) he denied? On the other hand, if the man is easy-natured, ho ignores the robbery. This same reasoning applies also to the case of the man who, being obsessed by grief, commits suicide by having recourse to starvation, falling from a precipice, taking poison,—laying the blame of it upon other persons.

“But in such cases, in as much the taking of poison and other well-known causes of death would be present, the wrong done in the shape of robbing the land, etc., could not be regarded.os the cause of the death.”

But since the man has recourse to the means of death, by reason of being stricken with grief, caused by the robbery,—the robbery becomes the indirect cause of the death.

If such be the case, then if some one happens to be aggrieved by wholesome advice given by a well-wisher and commit suicide, the person offering the advice would be a ‘murderer.’ Similarly, jealous persons, withering under the pangs of jealousy, would place the blame of their suffering upon the wealthy person of whom they are jealous. Likewise, when a man with unhinged mind dies upon the death of his son or his loved person,—these latter would have to be regarded as ‘murderers.’ In the same manner some light-hearted people, on seeing a beautiful woman, become so affected that, becoming brokenhearted, they lose all consciousness; and in this case chaste women would have to be censured. And lastly (in the event of a Brāhmaṇa dying of grief caused by the death of a loved person) the dead person would incur the sin of having killed a Brāhmaṇa.

All this would be quite true, if there were no specific injunctions and prohibitions covering special oases. As a matter of fact however, the offering of wholesome advice is enjoined, while the robbing of what belongs to another is forbidden. It has been thus declared—‘In the case of people engaged in doing good to others, if there happen something untoward, no blame attaches to those people; as for example, in the case of physicians administering medicine.’ This does not mean that it is only in the case of medicines administered by physicians producing untoward results that there is no blame attaching to the physicians,—but in all similar cases; e.g., when a cow has become stuck in the mire, if a man exerts himself to the utmost in pulling her out with his hand, and the cow happens to die, the man, who tried to pull her out, is not open to blame. Similarly in all analogous cases.

If a man happens to carry on bis business carefully and acquires much prosperity in the shape of riches,—if some people happen to burn with jealousy, that man does not transgress any scriptural prohibition. Further, an act becomes an object of prohibition only when its causal efficiency (towards harm) is certain and unfailing; and no definite deduction can be drawn regarding the momentarily changing mental aberrations of. living beings; so that it cannot be definitely ascertained that such and such a person has died on account of the beauty of such and such a woman. And so long as we can get at well-ascertained objects of prohibition, it cannot be right to make it pertain to doubtful cases.

“But in a case where the fact of the man becoming pale and withered in body, it is definitely ascertained that the cause of his suffering lies in the beauty of a certain woman,—this woman should either renounce her chastity and meet him, or else she should be regarded as a murderess.”

Certainly not; even though the causal efficiency (of the woman’s chastity towards her lover’s sufferings) be duly ascertained, yet chastity cannot become an object of prohibition; because such a prohibition would be contrary to a definite Injunction; there is such an Injunction regarding the avoidance of unchastity; and so long as an Injunction has room for application in an objection not touched by any other Injunction, it cannot encroach upon the objective of a contrary Injunction (so that so long as the prohibition of killing has room for application in the shape of ordinary murder, etc., it cannot encroach upon the objective of the Injunction of chastity.)

Some people argue as follows:—“What the injunction of chastity prohibits is that act which is done under the impulse of sexual passion, and not that which is done under a righteous impulse sanctioned by the scriptures. Hence, if the woman has intercourse with her dying lover, solely for saving his life, being moved entirely by the consideration that the poor man may lose his life,—she does not, by the act, transgress the injunction of chastity as regards the dictum that one injunction cannot encroach upon the objective of another; as the act in question does not form the objective of any other injunction, being due entirely to passion. It might he argued that there is no scriptural injunction sanctioning the act (of the woman meeting the dying lover), because there is no Smṛti text permitting adultery in such cases, as there is one sanctioning the begetting of a child from the dead husband’s younger brother. It is true that if she did not act so, she would be encompassing the death of the man,—and it is on account of the prohibition of the act of killing that she acts in that manner. But that prohibition applies only to the killing that is done through the passion of hatred; while when the woman desists from meeting the man, it is not through hatred of him, but on account of the prohibition of adultery. The act too that one may do for benefiting another person, must be one that avoids the transgressing of all prohibitions.”

In a case where some one asks a man for a certain thing, and threatens that he would kill himself if the thing is not given to him,—and does actually kill himself,—the man who refused the request cannot be regarded as a murderer. For if men were to be so regarded, there would be an end to all worldly business.—(104)

 

Explanatory notes by Ganganath Jha

This verse is quoted in Prāyaścittaviveka (p. 432), which says that this is to be regarded as mere arthavāda, as expiatory rites are prescribed for this lying also;—in Smṛticandrikā (Vyavahāra, p. 207), as an exception to the general rule regarding deposing truthfully;—in Kṛtyakalpataru (38a);—and in Vīramitrodaya (Vyavahāra, p. 58a), which explains that this verse makes silence, or even lying, better than telling the truth, under the circumstances.

 

Comparative notes by various authors

Gautama (13.24-25).—‘No guilt is incurred in giving false evidence in case the life of a man depends thereon;—but not if the man involved be a wicked one.’

Vaśiṣṭha (16.35).—‘Men may speak an untruth in marriage, during dalliance, when their lives are in danger, or the loss of their entire property is imminent; and for the sake of a Brāhmaṇa; they declare that an untruth spoken in these five cases does not make the speaker an outcast.’

Viṣṇu (8.15).—‘Whenever the death of any member of the four castes is involved, if witnesses give false evidence, they are not to blame.’

Yājñavalkya (2.83).—‘When the death of a member of any caste is involved the witness may speak an untruth.’

Bṛhaspati (7.34).—‘Let him preserve, even by telling a lie, a Brāhmaṇa who has sinned once through error, and is in peril of life, and oppressed by rogues and others.’