Verse 8.56

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

ब्रूहीत्युक्तश्च न ब्रूयादुक्तं च न विभावयेत् ।
न च पूर्वापरं विद्यात् तस्मादर्थात् स हीयते ॥ ५६ ॥

brūhītyuktaśca na brūyāduktaṃ ca na vibhāvayet |
na ca pūrvāparaṃ vidyāt tasmādarthāt sa hīyate || 56 ||

—He who, on being ordered to speak, does not speak; or who does not prove what he has asserted;—or who does not grasp the previous and subsequent statements;—such a person fails in that suit.—(50)

 

Medhātithi’s commentary (manubhāṣya):

This verse is found to state what has been already mentioned in the foregoing verses. The use of such repetitions has been already explained on the ground that wholesome advice should be repeatedly driven home.

The meaning of the words of the text is as follows:—The plaint having been filed and duly expounded by the complainant, when the defendant is asked to make his statement regarding the matter of the plaint, if he does not make a statement, even though repeatedly asked to do so; i.e., he who, having no proper answer to make, does not give any answer at all, thinking that if ho gave an unsuitable reply, his defeat would be certain, whereas if he kept quiet, it would be doubtful, also fails in his suit.

The time-limit in connection with the filing of the answer is going to be laid down (under 58)—‘If he does not file the answer within three fortnights, etc.’ When the man is suddenly dragged to the court, since he does not know what the complaint against him is, he cannot find the right answer at once, and hence it is only right to grant a postponement, but when the law fixes the time-limit being fixed at ‘three fortnights,’ what is meant is that so many days are to be granted to the defendant, who proceeds to file portions of his answer within five, ten or twelve days,—and not that he is to keep absolute silence for such a long time. As for the law that allows of more time,—e.g., in the text ‘In some cases he may wait for one year, when there is non-understanding’ (Gautama, 13.28),—this should not be followed in practice; because if ‘non-understanding’ is sufficient cause for delay, why should it cease to be so after the lapse of one year only? Nor can there be any certainty as to the man, who does not grasp the plaint during one year, being able to grasp it after that time. Hence the postponement granted should he just for that period of time which may he regarded as a fair interval for the understanding of the suit and the finding of the answer. So that no more time shall be granted than what may be considered sufficient for a man of oven dull intelligence for the said purpose.

As regards the plaintiff, it is only right that he should file his plaint on the same day (that he presents himself before the Court); as he already knows that ‘such and such a man owes me such an amount,’ or that ‘such and such a man has done me this wrong’; and he takes action also entirely upon his own choice. So that when the man is setting forth his own case, why should he have a doubt upon any point (for the clearing of which he should need time)?

As for the defendant, on the other hand, he does not know anything about the complaint, when he is suddenly hauled up by the King’s officers; how then can he have any definite notion regarding either the plaint or the answer? He is in fact called upon to understand the plaint and find its answer at the spur of the moment; otherwise he would not be a ‘defendant’ at all.

Thus then, for the Plaintiff, it is necessary to complete his plaint, in regard to the case he has to prove, on the same day; or he may be granted two or three days. Both these views have been accepted by other Smṛtis:—e.g. (a) ‘The complaint should be always prepared with a definite idea of the ease and its proofs,’ and again: ‘He may strengthen his case for ten or twelve days’; and (b) ‘The plaintiff shall immediately set forth his case in writing’ (Yājñavalkya, Vyavahāra, 7).

As for the view that ‘postponement may be granted for one year,’ there is no authority for it, and as such it cannot be accepted. We cannot always assume the presence of Vedic texts corroborative of such Smṛti-texts as bear upon judicial proceedings,—in the same manner as we do in the case of the Smṛti texts dealing with the Aṣṭakā -offering; because the judicial proceeding is not of the nature of an act to be done. In fact, we have already shown that such assumption is not possible in the case of matters amenable to other moans of knowledge (than verbal authority).

This postponement of the complaint is not to be granted in all cases; since it has been laid down that—‘In the case of heinous crimes, of theft, of assault, of charges in connection with cows, of wrong done to the life and property of women, the defendant should be made to answer the charge at once; in other cases the time has been declared to be allowable according to the wish of the Court’ (Yājñavalkya, Vyavahāra, 12). In the case of heinous crimes and the rest, if a long postponement were granted, then, during the interval, the defendant might propitiate the other party. It is for this reason that immediate answer has been required. Specially as in such cases, there can be no lapse of memory or other causes that would justify the postponement of the answer; because as a rule charges of heinous crimes are laid before the King immediately, for the simple reason that in such oases there is great urgency. For instance, in the case of the theft of clothes, there is always the chance of its former colour being altered during the interval. Then again, in such cases such witnesses as may have happened to be present by chance would he immediately available, while (if postponement were granted) they would have gone to other places, and, as their name and caste, etc., would not he known, they could not be traced and found. So that there would naturally be absence of requisite proof.

Further, in the case of non-payment of debt and other matters, the parties may settle it between themselves, in which the King cannot interfere; for when the case has been amicably settled, it is no business of the King’s to enquire how much of the claim has been paid. As for the criminal, on the other hand, it is the duty of the King to punish him, even though he may have come to terms with the plaintiff. For these reasons, the conclusion is that there shall he postponement only in the case of non-payment of debt and such cases, while in the case of crime, etc., immediate answer shall be demanded. To this end wo have the following declaration—‘In the case of non-payment of debt, etc., postponement may he granted, for the purpose of finding out the truth, as disputes on such matters are intricate, and there is possibility of the defendant being incapable of supplying the answer at once, or of his having forgotten the facts of the case’;—and the meaning of this Smṛti text is that in a case, where the plaint happens to be an intricate one, it is only natural that being so intricate, it cannot he grasped Jut the spur of the moment,—and every one cannot remember, after the lapse of a long time, all the details clearly and in the correct order, in order to be able to offor a suitable answer.

‘And does not prove what he has asserted,’—i.e., having put forward the case he has to prove, he fails to establish it, because he has no proofs, and not because he has no opponent (against whom he would have to establish it).

‘Who does not grasp the precious and subsequent statements’;—this has been already explained (under 53).

For the said reasons, the person fails in the matter of the suit; i.e., is defeated.—(56)

 

Explanatory notes by Ganganath Jha

‘Pūrvāparam’—‘The plaint and its answer’ (Medhātithi);—‘the proof and the matter to be proved’ (Kullūka);—‘what should be said first and what afterwards’ (Nārāyaṇa and Nandana).

This verse is quoted in Kṛtyakalpataru (22b) which says that ‘brūhi’, ‘speak out’ has to he reiterated for the sake of firmness;—and in Vīramitrodaya (Vyavahāra, 31b).

 

Comparative notes by various authors

(verses 8.53-57)

See Comparative notes for Verse 8.53.