Verse 8.46

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

सद्भिराचरितं यत् स्याद् धार्मिकैश्च द्विजातिभिः ।
तद् देशकुलजातीनामविरुद्धं प्रकल्पयेत् ॥ ४६ ॥

sadbhirācaritaṃ yat syād dhārmikaiśca dvijātibhiḥ |
tad deśakulajātīnāmaviruddhaṃ prakalpayet || 46 ||

What may be found to have been observed in practice by the good and the righteous twice-born men, that he shall ordain for countries, families and castes,—provided that it is not antagonistic.—(46)

 

Medhātithi’s commentary (manubhāṣya):

‘Good’—those who eschew what is forbidden;—‘righteous’—those who do what is enjoined. Though either one of these two words would have sufficed to express what is meant, yet they have both been used; that is the reason why we have explained them as having two different meanings.—What is practised by such persons, and in support of which we do not find any Śruti or Smṛti texts,—‘that he shall ordain’—cause to be acted up to—‘for countries, families and castes’;—‘provided that it is not antagonistic’—to directly perceptible Śruti and Smṛti texts.

Verse 41 has declared the authoritative character of ‘provincial laws, laws of families, etc., etc.’; and the present verse adds the qualification that such laws shall be not opposed to the scriptures. Local and king-made laws also, even when they pertain to temporal affairs, are to be obeyed only when they are not contrary to the scriptures. For instance, in some places the debtor is made to repay the debt by selling himself; and this is contrary to the Smṛti text—‘by service also the debt may be liquidated, etc.’ (Manu, 177); as is shown under that verse. Further, under 2.6, the authority of Practice (usage) has been explained as based only upon the fact of its being connected with (observed by) cultured men; and no man can be called ‘cultured’ if he acts contrary to the scriptures. Hence the present Terse is meant to be applicable to such practices as do not pertain to spiritual matters.

Another writer explains the text as follows:—What is practised by the good and righteous twice-born men in one country, the king should introduce in another country also, if it is found to ho not antagonistic to Śruti and Smṛti texts. E.g., the bull-sacrifice and other similar acts that are well known among the people of the North should be made to be performed by the people of the East, South and West also. Because from usage, we deduce the corresponding Smṛti, and from this latter the corresponding Śruti; so that if the text thus deduced on the strength of the practice of the northerners were in some such form as that such and such a sacrifice shall he performed by the udīcyas, people of the north’—then since the nominal affix conveys several such meanings,—such as (a) birth, (b) source, (c) origin, (d) destination and (e) supplement,—all which fall within one or other of the two categories of ‘distinctive’ feature and ‘modification,’—none of these as denoted by the nominal affix in the term ‘udīcya’ could help to mark off any people that could be called ‘udīcya’ ‘northerner’; so that the meaning of the said deduced text would come to be that every man should perform the act in question; specially as the exact denotation of names of countries is always vague. Even if the text deduced were in the form—‘the act is to be done by one who is born in the north, or who lives in that country,’—then this would not be compatible with facts; since as a matter of fact, a man, even though horn in a particular country, does not follow its usage when he lives elsewhere, or even though a man may be living in a certain country, he does not adopt its practice if he is not born there. If again, the terms used were ‘the native or inhabitant of such and such a country,’ then also, in as much as nativity and habitation are always uncertain, this also would not be right; neither nativity nor habitation is fixed to the same extent as one’s caste or qualities or race. Thus there being no such term as would infallibly single out the performers of the acts in question, they should he taken as to be performed by all men; so that there is no such thing as ‘local usage.’ The same reasoning holds good regarding ‘family usage’ also.

“If this is so, then how is it that smṛti-writers mention ‘local usage,’ ‘family usage’ and ‘caste-usage’ as distinct from one another?”

It has been already explained that the restriction of the acts concerned is for temporal purposes; and in this sense the restriction regarding acts is quite reasonable.

‘Family’ is a part of ‘race.’ The duty that is laid down for the entire race,—such as people of the Vaśiṣṭha-race shall not mix with those of the Viśvāmitra-race,’—are to be regarded as binding, since race-names are fixed for all time.—(46)

 

Explanatory notes by Ganganath Jha

According to Medhātithi this verse permits the king to admit the authority of only such local and family customs and practices as are not contrary to Śruti and Smṛti,—Kullūka, Nārāyaṇa and Rāghavānanda, however, take it to mean that he is to accept as authority only such scriptural rules of conduct as are not contrary to local and family customs,—According to ‘others’ (mentioned by Medhātithi) what, the verse means is that ‘whatever virtuous practices the king finds being followed in one country, those he shall introduce in other countries also, if they are not contrary to scriptural texts.’

This verse is quoted in Smṛticandrikā (Saṃskāra, p. 25), which says that family and country customs are to be regarded as right, but only when they are not repugnant to Śruti and other authoritative sources of knowledge.

 

Comparative notes by various authors

Gautama (11.20).—‘The laws of countries, castes and families, which are not opposed to sacred texts, have authority.’

Āpastamba (2.15.1).—‘The law of custom observed in particular countries and families.’

Kātyāyana (Smṛticandrikā-Vyavahāra, p. 58).—‘Therefore the King shall decide suits according to the scriptures; in the absence of texts bearing upon the subject, he shall come to a decision on the basis of the custom obtaining in the land. That is called the custom of a land which has been followed for all time and which is not repugnant to Śruti or Smṛti.’

Pitāmaha (Smṛticandrikā-Vyavahāra, p. 58).—‘Whatever is done by the elders,—be it right or wrong,—in accordance with the practice prevalent in the land or in the family, is called custom. For villages, corporations, cities, guilds, traders and army, suits should be dealt with according to custom;—so says Bṛhaspati. When the dispute lies between parties belonging to these same corporations, etc., their custom is the determining factor; but when it lies between them and others, then it is to be dealt with according to the scriptures.’