Verse 6.89

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

सर्वेषामपि चैतेषां वेदस्मृतिविधानतः ।
गृहस्थ उच्यते श्रेष्ठः स त्रीनेतान् बिभर्ति हि ॥ ८९ ॥

sarveṣāmapi caiteṣāṃ vedasmṛtividhānataḥ |
gṛhastha ucyate śreṣṭhaḥ sa trīnetān bibharti hi || 89 ||

Among all these however, in accordance with the injunction or the direct Vedic text, the Householder is declared to be the best; because he supports the other three.—(89)

 

Medhātithi’s commentary (manubhāṣya):

“What is asserted here does not appear to be right. For what it means is that the order of the Householder is directly enjoined by Vedic texts, which speak of the others only as supported by the former. In fact, in the event of the order of the Householder alone being directly enjoined by the Veda, there would be no room for the other orders; because the Vedic text (laying down Householding) would be more authoritative than the Smṛti -texts laying down austerities and other things (connected with the other orders.)’—It might be argued in this connection that—‘the words of the present verse are not to be construed as By reason of the injunction of the Vedic text (the Householder is superior), but that the superiority of the Householder spoken of in the Vedic text is due to the fact of his supporting the others; this is what is made clear by the sentence ‘he supports the other three’.—It has however got to be explained how this can be.—It may be urged that this would be so on account of the other orders also being enjoined in the Veda.—But if they are enjoined in the Veda, (and this is what is referred to in the present verse), then the present -text clearly runs counter to the Smṛti text that—‘the Householder’s order alone is directly enjoined by the Veda’ (Gautama, 3.36). Nor is there any other construction possible.—It might be urged that ‘In view of the Jābāla-śruti, where we read that, having become a Householder, one shall become a Hermit, and having become a Hermit he shall go forth as a Wandering Mendicant,—all the orders are equally enjoined by the Veda’.—But even So, the contradiction of the Smṛti- text remains unexplained. Then again, this Jābāla-śruti is not injunctive in connection with the other orders; it does not contain any such injunction as that ‘one shall wander about in the forest in such and such a manner,’—such and such acts shall be done by the man dwelling in the forest,—and such and such by the man who has gone forth as a Wandering Mendicant’,—in the way in which the duties of the Householder, beginning from the Laying of the Fire and ending with the Final Sacrifice, are found to be directly laid down; it merely mentions their name—‘having become a householder &c.’ From all this it is clear that to speak of the Householder’s order as well as the other orders as equally enjoined in the Veda involves a contradiction of what has gone before.”

Our answer to the above is as follows:—It is true that for the man who has taken a wife to himself, the Veda has directly enjoined the duties, commencing with fire-laying and ending with the final sacrifice. Now, in connection with the marriage-rite itself, we have to consider the question as to what it is by which that act of marriage is prompted,—whether It is prompted by the Vedic texts that speak of persons entitled to offer the Agni-hotra -libations?—or by the injunction that lays down the duty of begetting children?—or by the visible (worldly) purpose of the man?

“What sexual love prompts is only the taking of a woman, and not the marriage-rite; that alone can be regarded as prompting an act, without which this latter could not be accomplished; and for persons influenced by sexual love, all their domestic business would be accomplished by simply having a woman; why then should they need to perform the marriage-rites?”

This would be all right, if intercourse with a mere woman in general were not forbidden. Though what the Veda says regarding the fire-laying may apply to any woman in general, yet the scriptures always make a distinction between the woman with whom one may, or she with whom he may not, have inter course. It is for this reason that for men with a steady character, the desired purpose cannot be accomplished without marriage. So that it is only natural that there should be the idea that marriage is prompted by the Veda itself.

“If it be as the text says, then there would be nothing to prompt the other orders. And the purposes of all orders being accomplished by Householdership alone, what would be the need of examining what prompts the others. That which prompts the marriage may serve as the prompter (of Householdership); but if Householdership alone is actually enjoined, how could the other orders come about? Under the circumstances again, how far would any investigation into the prompter of marriage be justified?”

Our answer is as follows:—It has been asserted that the purposes of all the orders are fulfilled (by Householdership). This is quite true; when one order has been duly prompted, and the aid required by the others becomes indirectly accomplished by the same, there can be no heed for the assumption of what would prompt these latter. For instance, the Vrīhi corn, the acquiring of which is prompted by the motive of livelihood, is also used in the performance of rites; and there is no acquiring of property for the purpose of the rites;—or again, even though the unlearned man is not entitled to the performance of sacrifices, yet the acquiring of learning is not prompted by those performances, being, as it is, already accomplished in obedience to the injunction of Vedic study itself. Similarly in the case in question (of marriage), the necessary motive being already supplied by the man’s own desires, the act does, not need the prompting of Vedic texts. Thus the injunction of the acts to be done would be applicable to those also who have not married.

Thus it is that the man who has all his passions deadened during the period of Studentship itself, does not wish to marry at all; and such a person, on account of having no companion (wife), would not be entitled to the second order. Thus not being entitled to the rites prescribed in the Vedic texts, he would naturally take to the next (the third) order (having skipped over Householdership).

Others have offered the following explanation:—Marriage does not stand on the same footing as Property. Without some property living is impossible, as it is on property that man lives; but in the absence of the wife living is not impossible; so that the wife is not as essential as property; and the act of marrying a wife is prompted soley by considerations of religious acts (which cannot be done without a wife); and it is necessary to realise in this connection the necessity of making every effort to become entitled to the performance of religious acts. Otherwise, (if no such effort were necessary), having lost his title to such acts by reason of the impurity brought about by evacuations, if one were to omit the necessary purifying processes, he would not be open to the charge of having omitted an obligatory duty; under the circumstances, why should anyone take the trouble of getting rid of the impurity caused by death and other circumstances?—It might be argued that this latter is also itself enjoined.—Even so, the omission would involve the transgression of this one injunction only, and not of the thousands of injunctions (relating to the acts that the man would perform after due purification).

In answer to this, the following arguments may be put forward:—“Of what particular injunction would it be the meaning that ‘for the sake of acquiring the title to the performance of religious acts, the agent shall make an effort to accquire that title’? All the Injunctions that there are pertain to the performance of the Agnihotra and other rites, and all that they lay down is that the acts therein specified ought, to be performed, and they do not urge the bringing into existence of the Fires. These fires are kindled, in connection with the voluntary acts, by the man who undertakes them through desire for the rewards to be obtained from them; and it is only when these Fires have been thus kindled that the man becomes ‘one who has laid the Fires,’ and hence subject to the injunctions relating to the lifelong performance of the Agnihotra rites. Then again, it is only the man with a wife that is entitled to the ‘laying of fire’; so that the man would desire to marry a wife in the same manner as he lays the Fires for the purpose of acquiring the title to the performance of religious acts. So that the sense of no Injunction is offended if one omits to acquire the title to the performance of the Agnihotra and other rites [simply because there is no such Injunction as that one shall acquire this title ]. Nor does the Injunction of Marriage itself indicate that marriage shall be performed; because the act of Marriage is a sanctificatory or sacramental rite, just like the Vedic rites of the obligatory daily Agnihotra and other rites; specially as no rewards are mentioned in connection with it.”

In answer to this the ancients offer the following explanation: There is a direct Vedic text laying down the paying off of the ‘three debts’—‘When the Brāhmaṇa is born, he is born beset with three debts &c. &c.’; and this text becomes applicable to the man as soon as he is born; this ‘birth’ can not refer to the second ‘birth’ in the form of ‘Initiation’; as in that case, the man would be as good as an animal, prior to his ‘Initiation’. In fact the exact time referred to by the passage speaking of the ‘debts’ is that at which the man, having been born, comes to realise his responsibilities. Thus then, after the has accquired learning and thus become entitled to marry, if after having sought for a bride, he fails to obtain one and becomes grey, he would certainly be entitled to proceed to the stage of the Hermit. In fact, such a man comes to the following conclusion—‘all through my youth I have been seeking for a bride;—they say that Fire-laying has been enjoined for only such men as have their hair still black;—and by the man of grey hairs Fire is not to be laid except in the event of his wife having died,—such is the meaning that they attribute to the Vedic Injunction’.

The ‘Householder is the best of all’, because of his connection with religious acts; hence the superiority belongs to the stage itself (not to the man).

‘These three.’—That it supports the other three stages is another ground for its superiority. This is what has been referred to by the text—‘By means of knowledge and by good &c. &c.’—(89).

This same dea (idea?) is further supported by means of an example.—

 

Explanatory notes by Ganganath Jha

(verses 6.87-93)

See Comparative notes for Verse 6.87.

(verses 6.89)

This verse is quoted in Vīramitrodaya (Saṃskāra, p. 563), which explains the meaning to be as follows:—As a matter of fact we find that all the scriptures lay down in great detail the duties of the Householder; hence this is recognised as superior to the other life-stages;—and in Smṛticandrikā (Saṃskāra, p. 175).

 

Comparative notes by various authors

Gautama (3.36).—‘The venerable teacher prescribes one order only; because the order of Householders is explicitly prescribed.’

Vaśiṣṭha (8.14).—‘A householder alone performs sacrifices; a householder alone performs austerities; and the order of Householders is the most distinguished among the four.’

Viṣṇu (59.27-29).—‘These three—the Student, the Hermit and the Renunciate—derive their subsistence from the order of Householders; therefore must a Householder not treat them with disdain, when they have arrived. The Householder offers sacrifices, the Householder practises austerities, the Householder distributes gifts; therefore is the order of Householders the best of all.’