Verse 5.27

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

प्रोक्षितं भक्षयेन् मांसं ब्राह्मणानां च काम्यया ।
यथाविधि नियुक्तस्तु प्राणानामेव चात्यये ॥ २७ ॥

prokṣitaṃ bhakṣayen māṃsaṃ brāhmaṇānāṃ ca kāmyayā |
yathāvidhi niyuktastu prāṇānāmeva cātyaye || 27 ||

He may eat meat that has been consecrated; also at the wish of Brāhmaṇas; and when invited according to law; and when his life is in danger.—(27)

 

Medhātithi’s commentary (manubhāṣya):

The remnant of the meat of the animal sacrificed at the Agniṣṭoma is figuratively called ‘consecrated’.

“The term ‘prokṣita’ literally means sprinkled with water, being derived from the root ‘ukṣa,’ ‘to sprinkle’; and it is in this sense that the word has been used in all such expressions as ‘bring the prokṣaṇī water-vessels,’ ‘butter is th e prokṣaṇa, the sprinkling-material,’ ‘prokṣaṇībhiḥ udvejitāḥ,’ ‘bothered by sprinkings (sprinklings?),’ and so forth. Thus then, if the word literally means ‘what is done by sprinkling,’ then why should such terms us are expressive of certain consecrations prescribed in the Veda, (such as sprinkling with water and the like), be taken as indirectly indicating the animal (sacrificed) and its meat? Why should the direct signification of the word be abandoned in favour of an indirect indication? For these reasons it is better to take the text to mean ‘meat sprinkled with water and such liquids’.”

What is urged would be quite true, if there were no other texts and commendatory passages bearing upon the matter; such as we have in the shape of such texts as ‘Unconsecrated meat etc.’ (Verse), ‘Animnls not consecrated with sacred texts etc.’ (36). A careful examination of all these texts leads to the conclusion that the meaning of the word is as we have explained it.

“If so, then what is said here being already mentioned in the texts quoted, what would be the use of the present text?”

Some people say that the present verse is purely re-iterative. It cannot be an injunction of eating meat when one wishes to do so. Because the man who is hungry and wishes to cat meat can take to it through his desire to relieve his hunger (and he does not need an injunction for that). That is called an ‘Injunction’ which points to such activity of the agent as would not be possible under the influence of any ordinary visible motive; such injunctions, for instance, as ‘one shall perform the Agnihotra through out his life;’ and on such a matter, the scripture is the sole source of knowledge (and authority) available. We need not seek for scriptural authority in the case of the acts in connection with which we have the positive and negative notions to the affect that—‘if it is done, such and such a reward shall follow—,and if it is not done, such and such an evil shall befall us.’ And it is only when there is no such source of knowledge available, and the matter is knowable by means of scriptures alone, that it becomes a case of ‘Injunction.’ As regards the case in question, even infants at the breast know, without being told, that eating brings strength and removes pain. [So that the present text cannot be regarded as an Injunction]. Nor again can it be taken as a Restrictive Injunction, for the simple reason that no such sense of restriction is recognised (as conveyed by the words), (a) For instance, if the restriction were in the form ‘one must eat what has been consecrated,’—then, since no time is specified the due observance of this injunction would disturb the entire routine of food and rest, and the man may have to be eating constantly; so that an impossible act will have been enjoined in this case. It has been said that—‘one who eats not at Śrāddhas etc.’,—and again ‘the day on which he is remiss etc.’ Then again, the author of the Mahābhāṣya has declared that a Restriction is always supplementary to an Injunction; so that when there is no Injunction, how can there be any Restriction? What has been ‘consecrated’ by one man cannot be obtained by another man; so that every man will have to eat all the meat that he consecrates, and this would entail a great calamity, (b) If. on the other hand, the restriction be taken to be in the form of preclusion—‘one shall eat only what is consecrated, and not what is not consecrated,’—on the ground of its fulfilling the condition of ‘Preclusion’, that hunger cannot be alleviated except by the eating of both consecrated and unconsecrated food, either simultaneously or one after the other;—even so this would be already implied by what has been said above regarding ‘consecrated meat’ (in verse 7). (So that in this case also there would be no point in taking the present text as an Injunction.)

Others however find the following fault in the above view:—if all unconsecrated meat were forbidden, birds would fall in the category of ‘forbidden food’; specially us there is no authority for any such restricted view that those alone are forbidden in their unconsecrated form, in connection with which consecration has been enjoined (and no consecration has been enjoined regarding birds).

Some people regard this view as improper. Because even so, the text cannot but be regarded as implying (if not directly asserting) the prohibition of (unconsecrated) birds also.

For these reasons, in as much as every Restriction is subservient to some enjoined act, it appears better to regard the present text as purely re-iterative of the eatability of consecrated meat. Just as at sacrifices, one must eat the consecrated meat, and omitting to eat it involves disobedience of the scriptural Injunction, so would it be in connection with all other occasions (on which meat is consecrated). And when the text is purely reiterative, it may also imply a preclusion (as shown above). The rule that ‘one shall not eat the unconsecrated meat of the cow, the sheep and the goat’ would only be a reiteration of the uneatability of ‘unconsecrated meat’ (mentioned in verse 7);—this reiteration in the present verse serving the purpose of permitting the eating of unconsecrated meat also, ‘at the wish of Brāhmaṇas’, and under certain other circumstances (specified in the present verse).

Others again have taken the following view.—Under 4.213 we have the mention of ‘needlessly prepared meat,’ and the present verse serves the purpose of explaining what the ‘needlessly prepared meat’ is; as in the absence of this it could not be known what is ‘needlessly prepared meat’.

Or, it may be that in one verse we have the rule for the enter (who does the consecration himself), while what the other means is that other persons, guests and others, shall not eat the meat belonging to (and offered by) a person who has not performed the worship of the Gods, etc. (and consecrated the meat at it). In the event of the householder being somehow not entitled to worship the Gods, his guests and other persons would be justified in doing that worship for him; and if the meat has been consecrated at such a worship, then they may eat it. The second prohibition (of unconsecrated meat)—‘one incurs no sin by eating meat after having worshipped the Gods and the Pitṛs’ (Verse 32)—is meant for those persons who are capable of performing the worship at their own house and have not performed it. What is stated in verse 36—‘animals not consecrated by sacred texts etc.’—is meant to be explanatory of what is meant by the term ‘consecration.’

Thus we have shown that all the five prohibitive passages have five distinct meanings and serve distinctly useful purposes.

‘At the wish of the Brāhmaṇas’—‘Brāhmaṇañca kāmyayā’—‘kāmyā’ is kāmanā, ‘wish’; the form ‘kāmyā’ being a Vedic anachronism.

“If this text permits the eating of unconscrated meat at the wish of the Brāhmaṇas, then what is the sense of this restriction? Does it mean that if one omits to eat at their wish, he incurs the sin of disobeying the scriptures? Or, does the present section set forth only a counter-exception? If it is a mere counter-exception, then such counter-exception, setting aside the force of the prohibition, would be available also in the shape of such assertions as ‘meat may be eaten at marriages’.”

The text does not mean that one must eat meat under the circumstances; all that is meant is that if the Brāhmaṇas are very superior persons, then the disobeying of their wish would not be right.

Others again construe the term ‘of Brāhmaṇas’ with verse 32 also, and take the present text as an Injunction for the eating of meat of the hare and other animals also; the sense being that—‘at sacrifices and marriages, or at other large dinner-parties, if the Brāhmaṇas request one to eat meat, then the meat of such animals should not be regarded as forbidden, as they ane, by their very nature, consecrated to the Gods’; and it is only under special circumstances that consecration and worship of the Gods etc. may be performed. In fact it is only those kinds of meat that have been forbidden under certain circumstances whose eating is sanctioned, at the wish of Brāhmaṇas; and the sanction does not apply to the eating of ‘carnivorous birds’ and the rest, or to the case of a man who has resolved to give up meat in view of ‘ceasing to eat meat being conducive to highest results,’—irrespective of the fact of the meat being either ‘consecrated’ or ‘unconsecrated,’ or ‘offered’ or ‘not offered.’

All that is meant by the present text is that the man who is entitled to receive the Madhuparka offering shall eat the unconsecrated meat that may be offered to him; and it does not contain an Injunction of offering the Madhuparka. The person meant here as the recipient of the Madhuparka is the Guest, and not the king and other honoured persons; just as we find it laid down for the Householder that ‘the guest shall not dwell in his house without eating.’ From this it would follow that nothing shall be offered to the guest against his desire. As for the notion that one may do what he likes in the matter of receiving an honoured guest and in feeding him,—if this idea were acted up to, then those acts would not have been done ‘for the sake of the guest.’

“But the position of the guest. also is uncertain.”

True; but it has been found that the performance of the act brings spiritual merit by producing pleasure in the recipient’s mind. Hence it is that by way of a rule it has been laid down for the giver, in accordance with the practice by which the calf is offered, that ‘there can be no Madhuparka without meat.’

“What is herein laid down may be regarded as pertaining to the case of priests officiating at one’s sacrifice.”

In that case, this also, like the preceding clause, may be only reiterative of what pertains to the officiating priest and to Śrāddhas.

“But in connection with the work of the priests, the eating of the Iḍū and such other materials has been prescribed; and the restrictions bearing upon that pertains to the Sacrifice, and not to the priests.”

True; but if the priests do not eat, they are censured, and also become beset with transcendental evil. Even if they eat, they do not become related to the result following from the act. Servants employed on wages (such as the priests are) perform the details prescribed in the scriptures; and it has been prescribed that ‘the priests along with the sacrificer as the fifth eat the Iḍā cake,;’ so that it is incumbent upon those who have accepted the priestly office to do that eating. And in that case it is only right that this eating should be reiterated. There is however nothing^‘scriptual’ in the eating done by persons eating at Śrāddhas or by the priests. So that the reiteration is of the eating done by the sacrifices—It may be asked—“For what purpose is this reiteration?”—But reiteration does not always need a purpose. All that is done is that it reiterates what has been enjoined elsewhere. Similarly in the case in question also, if the owner of the cow has promised to honour the guest with the killing of the cow, then the guest must eat it; for he accepts the offering of Madhuparka as a favour to the offerer; so that it is necessary that he should accomplish the act preceding the offering. Otherwise, in the event of the Madhuparka not being accepted, the said favour would not be bestowed; consequently in the matter of the eating of forbidden meat, it is necessary for the man at the very outset to accept the Madhuparka and the duties of the priest:—similarly in the matter of feeding the Brāhmaṇas. As regards the Student, since certain strict observances have been prescribed for him, meat should be regarded as altogether ‘unfit to be eaten.’

^‘When his life in in danger’.—From the context it follows that what is meant is that—‘in the event of his not eating meat without worshipping the gods, and no other food being available, if there be a fear of his losing his life, either though disease of through hunger, one may eat the cow, the sheep and the goat.’ This rule is based upon the Vedic declaration that ‘one shall protect himself from everything.’ So that under the circumstances, if one omits to eat meat, he becomes his own murderer; and suicide has been forbidden by such text as—(a) ‘One shall protect himself from everything’; (b) ‘Hence the man, expecting to live to the fullest extent of human life, shall never kill himself with a desire to proceed to heaven; as such an act would make him unfit for heaven’;—all which shows that by eating even forbidden meat to save his life, one does not incur sin. Says the Mantra also (Iśopaniṣad 3)—‘Those who kill themselves go, after death, to those regions that are covered by blind darkness and are fit only for demons.”

When there is danger to life, even the Student may eat meat; and for him his young age would necessitate the performance of the expiatory rite as prescribed in the text—‘If the Student ever eats meat and honey, etc.’ (1?.158). Vyāsa has declared that when there is tear of losing one’s life through hanger, one may eat even forbidden meat; and by the instance of the ‘dog’s thigh’ (eaten by Viśvāmitra) it is indicated that such meat may be eaten, but once only.

From this it follows that in the case of serious developments of diseases, where one cannot be sure that the man will certainly recover by eating meat, one shall not eat forbidden meat, such as that of the village-cock and the like; though it is permitted to eat such meat as has been consecrated or offered to the gods.

In the case of disease also one shall not eat meat for the purpose of recovering from a disease that may have just set in; but in the case of men who have become enfeebled and emaciated through disease, the eating of meat is always permitted: as asserted in the verse—‘Persons daily addicted to wine and women, consumptives, those emaciated through fatigue and disease, as also enfeebled patients, live upon the juices of meat.’ It is necessary for these persons to worship the gods in the case of the meat of unconsecrated goat: there would however be no harm, if on some day this be not found possible.—(27).

 

Explanatory notes by Ganganath Jha

This verse is quoted in Vīramitrodaya (Āhnika, p. 527), which adds the following notes:—‘Prokṣita’ is that which has been sanctified by means of mantras for being offered at a sacrifice;—‘brāhmaṇānañca kāmyayā’—when one is pressed by a Brāhmaṇa to eat meat, if he eats it but once, then there is no harm; that this is justifiable once only is clearly stated by Yama; if the same Brāhmaṇa should press him again, then he is not to accede to this; nor is he to eat it, even though the second time he may be pressed by another Brāhmaṇa; that he is to eat it once does not mean that he is to take a single morsel; what is meant is that he may eat at a single meal;—‘Yathāvidhiniyuktaḥ’—this, means that when invited to the Madhuparka-offering or to a Śrāddha, one may eat even unconsecrated meat;—‘prāṇānāmeva cātyaye’—meat may be eaten if during an illness, or during food-scarcity, one’s life would be in danger if meat were not taken.

The verse is quoted also in Smṛtitattva (p. 449), which explains ‘prokṣitam’ as which has been duly consecrated by means of mantras, being obtained from an animal killed in connection with a sacrificial performance;—‘brāhmaṇānām kāmya’—at the wish of a Brāhmaṇa one may eat once;—‘yathāvidhiniyuktaḥ’—i. e., at a Śrāddha;—in the Prāyścittaviveka (p. 280), which notes that ‘prāṇānāmeva cātyaye’ is meant to refer to Religious Students and to such House-holders as have renounced meat;—and in Smṛtisāroddhāra (p. 300).

 

Comparative notes by various authors

(verses 5.26-27)

See Comparative notes for Verse 5.26.