Verse 4.80

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

न शूद्राय मतिं दद्यान्नोच्छिष्टं न हविष्कृतम् ।
न चास्योपदिशेद् धर्मं न चास्य व्रतमादिशेत् ॥ ८० ॥

na śūdrāya matiṃ dadyānnocchiṣṭaṃ na haviṣkṛtam |
na cāsyopadiśed dharmaṃ na cāsya vratamādiśet || 80 ||

He shall not offer advice to a Śūdra, nor the leavings, nor what has been prepared as an offering to the Gods. He shall hot expound the law to him; nor shall he indicate to him any penance.—(80)

 

Medhātithi’s commentary (manubhāṣya):

No advice shall be offered to a Śūdra regarding his welfare or otherwise, regarding matters temporal or spiritual; that is to say, one should not become an adviser to a Śūdra.

This prohibition pertains to being an adviser as a means of livelihood; there would be nothing wrong in offering advice in a purely friendly manner; in fact, there may be hereditary friendship between Brāhmaṇas and Śūdras; and certainly through friendship advice for welfare is always offered. Further, it has been declared (by Manu himself) that the Brāhmaṇa should be friendly to all castes—‘the Brāhmaṇa is one who is friendly to all.’

Some people offer the following explanation:—

“From what is said in other texts, it is better to take the present verse to mean that advice shall not be offered unasked; as declared above (in 2. 110),—‘He should not say anything to any one without being asked.’”

This explanation, however, is not right. What has been said under 2,110, is in connection with the reading of the

Veda; the sense being, ‘if a man is found to be committing a mistake in accent, or syllable, or in some other detail, one should not tell him, unless one is asked, that he had murdered the Text.’ Similarly, in connection with the enumeration of persons who shall not be taught the Veda, it has been said—‘One shall not speak unasked;’ and this also means that, in the case of persons other than his own pupils, one should not say anything, even if he finds them reciting the Veda wrongly, either as regards accent or syllables.

‘Nor the leavings’—The term ‘ucchiṣṭa’ denotes impurity, specially in relation to food. One who has paid calls of nature, is also called ‘ucchiṣṭa,’ ‘impure,’ till he has washed; as we shall explain under the text—‘One who is impure, ucchiṣṭa, shall not touch with his hand, &c.’ (142). But, as a rule, the term is used in connection with food. So that, while one is eating, the food that comes into contact with his mouth, whether within the mouth or outside, becomes known as ‘impure.’ It is in this sense that under 5.141—where it is said—‘nor the hairs of the moustache entering the mouth,’—everything, with the exception of the hairs of the moustache, is said to become ‘impure.’ It is in this sense also that the eater, the thing eaten and the dish containing the food, all come to be called ‘impure’; ‘ucchiṣṭa.’

In some cases, the word is also used in the sense of ‘what has been left unused,’ ‘remnant,’ ‘leaving;’; e.g., in the passage—‘The leavings of the substance offered are to be given as the fee.’ Thus, it is on the basis of usage that the term ‘ucchiṣṭa’ is applied to the food that has been served in the dish for a particular person,. and out of which a little has been eaten by him; and the clean food that is simply placed in the dish and not even touched by the eater,—this also is rejected, on the strength of usage, as ‘impure,’ on the ground of its being in contact with the dish which is in contact with that food out of which the person has eaten (and which therefore has become a ‘leaving’). It is in accordance with this that each passages as—(a) ‘the leavings of food should be given’ (10.125), and (b) ‘leavings shall not be given, etc.’—which contain an injunction and a prohibition, respectively—are taken as pertaining to the same thing, and as applying to the ‘true’ and the ‘untrue’ Śūdra, respectively, and also as referring to the remnants of different kinds of materials offered (and hence not being mutually contradictory). Or, the meaning (of the prohibition) may be that what has been left in the pot, after the guests and others have eaten, and which is as good as ‘stale’ and ‘leavings,’ should not be given to the Śūdra. It is argued that, since the term is found to be used (in 10.125) along with ‘torn clothes,’ this latter explanation is the right one to be accepted. Further, since the root ‘śiṣ’ (from which ‘ucchiṣṭa’ has been derived) denotes ‘other than what has been used,’ and the preposition (‘ut’) has to be construed in accordance with that signification,—there need be nothing incongruous in construing this passage also in the same sense as the passage ‘the leavings of the substance offered are to be given as the fee.’ In this manner, there is no incompatibility between these two Smṛti- texts (‘the leavings of the food shall be given’ and ‘the leavings should not be given’); though in most passages the term is restricted, by convention, to people who stand in need of washing. As for the declaration that ‘the method of purification is like that of the Vaiśya, etc.’ (5.139)—this refers to the Slave-Śūdra; and the term ‘ucchiṣṭa’ in this passage is understood to mean ‘the leavings of food,’ as we shall show under this passage.

‘Nor what has been prepared as an offering to the Gods’—The term ‘haviṣ-kṛtam’ means ‘haviṣe kṛtam,’ ‘prepared as an offering to the Gods.’ The compound is an irregular one; the compounding of the participle ‘kṛṭa’ or ‘kalpita,’ with the noun ending in the Dative, having the sense of ‘for the purpose of,’ is not sanctioned.

According to the maxim of the ‘stick and the cake’—by which, when the stick on which cakes are hanging is brought down by rats, we are led to believe that the cakes have been eaten by them,—the prohibition contained in the text pertains to every such thing as has the slightest possibility of being intended for being offered. And thus it is that the prohibition becomes applicable (a) to what has been set aside as being meant for an’ offering, (b) to the remnant of the substance that has been offered, and (c) to such offering-material as has not been left after having been eaten. It is in view of this that the text has used the term ‘kṛta,’ which is the most general term denoting action of any kind; and the compound ‘haviṣ-kṛta’ means ‘what has been kṛta,’ i.e., determined upon—as to be offered.’ And in this way, the offering-material that is left after the sacrificer has eaten it, does not cease to be included under the term ‘haviṣ-kṛta,’ since that also is what ‘had been determined upon as to be offered.’ And thus the prohibition becomes applicable to the substance in all conditions (after it has been once fixed upon as to be offered).

By others the term ‘haviṣ-kṛtam’ has been explained as ‘mixed with the offering-material;’ and since what is mixed up with something else is prohibited, the unmixed offering-material also becomes forbidden. For instance, when it is intended to forbid what is related to the Brāhmaṇa, the texts use the word ‘Brāhmaṇa’ only.

“But how can the prohibition of the thing mixed with something else imply the prohibition of that thing by itself?”

If the thing by itself were prohibited, then it might have been argued that the prohibition of the mixed thing is secondary. In a case, however, where, even on being mixed up, the two things are percieved as distinct,—or, when, even though the colour of the two things is not visible, yet by means of taste and such other means they are percieved as distinct,—the two things are treated as if they were there by themselves.

For instance, when fried flour and other things are mixed with wine, even though the colour of the wine is not visible, yet, since the taste of the wine is distinctly felt, the eating of such flour entails the expiratory rite prescribed in connection with the drinking of wine.

Objection—“But even so, when the wine is mixed up with the flour, it loses its liquid form; so that it cannot be a case of drinking of the wine.”

There is no force in this objection. ‘Drinking’ has been mentioned, because that is how wine is generally taken; and what is forbidden is the ‘taking’ of wine; as the present context is dealing with what shall be eaten and what shall be not eaten; and ‘eating’ here means only ‘taking,’ of which drinking, eating, chewing and the rest are only special forms. As for smelling, since it is felt even when the substance is not near at hand, it does not necessarily lead to the presence of the substance itself. For instance, even when camphor and such things are at a distance, their odour is felt. If it be assumed that the odour is felt because of the fine particles of the substance (having been wafted into the nostrils),—then such wafting away of the particles should bring out a gradual diminution of the size of the substance (which is not found to take place). In a case where two things become mixed up and form one composite substance, and there is nothing to indicate a reference to either one of them singly,—either a sanction or a prohibition cannot apply to either of them by itself. E.g., when it is said ‘milk should be drunk,’ it applies to the milk and the water both mixed together, and not to the water alone, or the milk alone; as each of these would be a distinct substance (from ‘milk’); each of these by itself would have a distinct colour and a distinct taste indicating its presence; and hence each would be a distinct substance.

“If this be so, then, when one drinks wine mixed with water, it should not entail the expiatory rite that has been prescribed for the drinking of wine; as the mixture would be a distinct substance from the mixture drunk.”

There is no force in this objection. Wine, like the bitter taste, entirely suppresses the taste of everything eke; so that, since in the case cited, the taste of wine will have been clearly felt, the said expiatory rite becomes necessary. When there is much water and only a little wine, the expiatory rite to be performed is that which has been prescribed for ‘contact with wine,’ as we shall explain in detail under Discourse 11.

From all this it follows that where the prohibition is of a certain thing by itself, it might involve that of its mixture also; e.g., when it is said that “māṣa -grains shall not be eaten,’ such grains also become eschewed as have māṣa mixed with them. But the prohibition that pertains to a mixture—on what grounds could it be applied to the unmixed thing by itself? E.g., when it is said—‘bring water from the confluence of the Gaṅgā and the Yamunā,’—the man thus directed does not bring water either from the Gaṅgā alone, or from the Yamunā alone. If usage be cited as the ground for such application,—theu such usage has got to be shown. [Thus, if the term ‘haviṣkṛtan’ of the text were taken as ‘havirmiśram,’ then the prohibition could not apply to the Haviṣ itself.]

‘He shall not expound the law to him.’—“The very first words of this text have forbidden the offering to a Śūdra of any advice on temporal or spiritual matters; and the expounding of law also becomes forbidden by the same words.”

True; but the prohibition has been repeated for the purpose of additional information; in the shape of special expiatory rites—laid down in connection with the expounding of the law to a Śūdra,—which we shall explain under 11.198.

Others have taken this additional prohibition to mean that ‘he shall not, in the craracter (character?) of an officiating priest, instruct the Śūdra regarding the details of procedure pertaining to the Pārvaṇa Śrāddha, the Pākayajña and such other rites.’

Some people urge the following objection here:—“If the expounding of law to the Śūdra is forbidden, from whence is the Śūdra to acquire his knowledge of the law? In the absence of such knowledge, he can perform no rites; so that the whole scripture dealing with the rites to be performed by the Śūdra would be pointless.”

This is not a right objection. It is just possible that the Brāhmaṇa, through avarice, may transgress the prohibition and teach the Śūdra. For instance, when the Brāhmaṇa accepts a gift from a Śūdra, he is urged to it. not by the Injunction relating to the ‘giving away of all one’s belongings’ (which has been prescribed for the Śūdra) in consequence of having killed a Brāhmaṇa; in fact, the motive is supplied by his avarice.

“Well, we have the direct declaration that ‘the Brāhmaṇa shall explain the law to others also.’”

But that refers only to the possible means of livelihood (open to the Śūdra). What the text says is—‘The Brāhmaṇa should know the means of livelihood open to all, and should explain it to others also’ (10.2).

Advice and teachings have to be certainly given to the Śūdra who is dependent upon oneself; for an ignorant person is sure to transgress injunctions and prohibitions; and association with such transgressers has been forbidden under 79 above.

Some people explain the text as follows:—

“The present text contains two injunctions forbidding the teaching of the text of the treatises dealing with Dharma or Law, and the expounding of its meaning: one forbids the teaching of the verbal text and the other that of its meaning. But the expounding of Law, without reference to text, is not forbidden by any.”

But for those who explain the text thus, the present Verse will be a mere repetition of the prohibition of consultation on matters relating to the scriptures.

The following might be urged here—“The term ‘law’ applies to Grammar and all those treatises that help in obtaining the knowledge of Law; but Grammar is not a ‘scriptural treatise,’ in the sense of expounding super-senseous (spiritual) things; hence the teaching of Grammar would not be included under the prohibition here put forward; and yet Grammar is of use in the understanding of Law; specially as the grammarian can, by a close analysis of the words, find out the meaning of the most difficult sentence. So that, since the prohibition relating to the ‘consultation’ (quoted above) pertains to the ‘Law-scriptures’ proper, it would not apply to Grammar; hence it is the teaching of Grammar that has been separately forbidden by the present text.”

All this would be quite right; only if no one urged that one who is not entitled to the primary thing (the Veda), can never be thought of as taking up its subsidiaries (the subsidiary sciences of Grammar, &c.) In the present instance, the Veda and this Smṛti texts constitute the ‘primary;’ and to the study of these the Śūdra is not entitled.

‘Nor shall he indicate to him any vrata or penance.’—The term ‘vrata,’ ‘penance,’ here stands for the kṛcchras; such being the sense in which the term has been used in 11.102 and other texts. These be shall not indicate to the Śūdra who is seeking to acquire prosperity by their means; in connection with expiatory rites, they have got to be indicated. As for the ‘vratas,’ ‘observances,’ prescribed for the ‘accomplished student,’ there is no possibility of these pertaining to the Śūdra; for the simple reason that he can never be an ‘accomplished student.’ Similarly, the imparting of the Sāvitrī to him is impossible, because he can never carry on Vedic Study; Vedic Study is not possible for him, because he has not been initiated; and Initiation is not possible for him, because it has been laid down for the three castes only.—(80).

 

Explanatory notes by Ganganath Jha

“Discrepancies between this verse and others in the work (9.125) are explained by the commentators, who say that the Śūdra mentioned in the other rules is the family servant.”—Hopkins.

This verse is quoted in Aparārka (p. 220), which explains ‘vratam’ as ‘prāyascittam’, ‘expiatory rite’;—and again on p. 1090, where it is pointed out that the giving of advice regarding ‘expiation’, that is forbidden here, refers to those cases where the Śūdra seeks advice without the mediation of a Brāhmaṇa.

It is quoted also in Mitākṣarā (on 3.262), which remarks that the prohibition refers to those cases where the Śūdra does not seek advice in a meek and suppliant attitude;—in Nṛsiṃhaprasāda (Saṃskāra, p. 71b);—and in Saṃskāramayūkha (p. 72), which says that what is forbidden here is ‘direct teaching.’

 

Comparative notes by various authors

(verses 4.80-81)

Āpastamba (21.2.22).—‘He shall not offer the leavings to a non-Brāhmaṇa;—if it is to he given to him, one should scoop the tusk (?), place the leavings in it and then offer it to him.’

Vaśiṣṭha (15.12-13).—[Reproduces Manu ]

Viṣṇu (72.48-52).—‘He shall not offer the leavings to the Śūdra; nor the leavings or the sacrificial materials; nor sesamum; he shall not expound to him the law; nor the penance.’