Verse 2.189

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

व्रतवद् देवदैवत्ये पित्र्ये कर्मण्यथर्षिवत् ।
काममभ्यर्थितोऽश्नीयाद् व्रतमस्य न लुप्यते ॥ १८९ ॥

vratavad devadaivatye pitrye karmaṇyatharṣivat |
kāmamabhyarthito'śnīyād vratamasya na lupyate || 189 ||

During a performance in honour of gods and in honour of ancestors, he may, when invited, eat freely, like an ascetic, in due accordance with his observances. by this his observances do not suffer.—(189)

 

Medhātithi’s commentary (manubhāṣya):

This verse provides an exception, under certain conditions, to the rules regarding subsisting on alms.

‘In honour of Gods’;—i.e., when Brāhmaṇas are fed in honour of the gods; and also when they are fed in honour of the fathers;—if he is ‘incited,’ requested—‘he may eat freely’—the food given by one person. But he himself should not ask for it.

This again should be ‘in due accordance with his observances’; i.e., he should avoid honey and meat, which are inconsistent with his observances. The two phrases—‘in due accordance with his observances’ and ‘like an ascetic’—express the same meaning; and it does not mean that in a village he is to eat ‘in accordance with his observances,’ while in the forest he is to eat ‘like an ascetic.’ It is with a view to filling up the metre that the two phrases have been used. [There is another reason why the phrase ‘like an ascetic’ should not he taken separately]—‘Ascetic’ here stands for the hermit, so if the student were permitted to eat ‘like the hermit,’ the eating of meat also would become allowed for him; as the hermit is permitted to eat meat, by such rules as ‘he may eat the flesh of dead animals’ (Gautama, 3.31).

‘In honour of Gods’;—i.e., those rites of which gods are the deities; i.e., the feeding of Brāhmaṇas laid down as to be done at the performance of the Agnihotra, the Darśa-Pūrṇamāsa and the other sacrifices offered to the gods; as we find in such injunctions as ‘at the Āgrahāyaṇa and other sacrifices one should feed Brāhmaṇas and make them pronounce “svasti.”’ It is in connection with these that we have the present permission for the religious student.

Others explain the term ‘performance in honour of the gods’ to mean that feeding of Brāhmaṇas which is done in honour of the Sun-god on the seventh day of the month, and so forth.

This however is not right. For the act of eating has no connection with the gods,—being, as it is, not instrumental in the accomplishment of any sacrifice. Further, the mere fact of an act being done with reference to a god, does not make the latter the ‘deity’ of that act; if it did, then the Teacher would have to be regarded as the ‘deity’ when one gives a cow to him, and the room will have to be regarded as the ‘deity’ when one sweeps it. Then again, it is with the eater that the act of eating is directly connected; and the Sun-god has no active function in the fulfilment of that act (as the Teacher is in the former case); nor is he the thing aimed at (as the room is in the latter case); as the eating is not for his sake. Further, the accusative ending (in the term denoting food) denotes that it is meant for the eater, not that it is meant for the Sun-god. Nor has it been enjoined anywhere that ‘one should feed Brāhmaṇas for the sake of (with reference to) the Sun-god.’

It might be argued that on the basis of usage we assume the existence of such an injunction.

But this cannot be; because there is always some scriptural basis found for such assumption of injunctions.

“In the present case also we have such basis in the shape of the ‘external’ Smṛtis.”

If there were such a Smṛti-rule, its meaning would be that ‘one should please the gods by feeding Brāhmaṇas.’ And it would not be right to assume such a meaning; as scriptural injunctions are aimed, not at pleasin the Gods, but at accomplishing what is prescribed by the injunctions. Then again, if such were the meaning of the Injunction, its connection with the Sun-god and others intended to be deities could not be based either upon an object, or upon a desired result; nor again could they be the purpose, as in the case of the act of piercing; nor are they desired for their own sake, like cattle and other desirable things, for the simple reason that they are not something to be enjoyed. If it were the satisfaction of the Sun-god that were desired,—that also, will need a proof for its own existence; and there is no such proof available. Such a thing as the ‘satisfaction of the Sun-god’ is not known by Perception or other means of knowledge,—in the way that cattle, etc., are,—whereby it could be desired and connected with the performance of sacrifices.

If the motive of the man be held to be the idea that “the Sun-god is my lord and he will endow me with a fruit desired by me”;—this also cannot be accepted, as there is no proof for this either. There is no Injunction in support of this idea. It is only an Injunction that prompts to activity the person who is related to a certain well-known result, which also serves to single out the man so prompted; but it does not point to the presence of the result. What the Injunction points to is the fact that a certain act known by other means of knowledge as leading to a particular desirable result is related to the performance as his qualifying factor.

If it be held that the offering is a kind of ‘sacrifice,’ and the feeding is a kind of disposal of it,—our answer is that that may be so regarded, if such is the usage of cultured people. But the feeding cannot be shown to have any direct connection with the deity; and as for connection through the intervening agency of the sacrife, that we do not object to. Then again, as a matter of fact, when people undertake the performance of such acts, they have no idea that they are performing a sacrifice; the only idea that they have is that when the Brāhmaṇas have been fed, the particular deity would be satisfied. From all this it is clear that the Deity has no sort of action conducive to the act of feeding, nor is it the qualifying factor of any other thing that has such action. Thus then, the Deity is neither the object of the act, nor has it any connection with it. Nor again is it possible for the Sun-god and the rest to be regarded ns aimed at by the act; for in the act of feeding, it is the person fed that is aimed at; and it is the Brāhmaṇas that are fed. Further, the mere fact of being aimed at does not make one the ‘deity’; for in that case, when one gives a cow to the Teacher, or sweeps the room, the Teacher and the room would have to be regarded as ‘deities.’

“How then is there to be Brāhmaṇa-feeding at a performance in honour of ancestors? There also the fathers could not be the ‘deities’ of the act. The offerings made into the Fire could not be regarded as made in honour of the ancestor; as other deities are found to be mentioned in connection with them. And just as the ‘satisfaction of the Sun-god,’ so the ‘satisfaction of ancestors also, cannot be regarded as the result to be accomplished, by the act; for the very same reason that the connection of such satisfaction with the Injunction is not cognisable by any other means of knowledge.”

To this some people make the following answer:—The ‘satisfaction of Ancestors’ is clearly recognised (as the result to be accomplished). That such beings as the ‘Fathers’ do exist is proved by the fact of souls being imperishable; and it is only through their deeds that they become connected with physical bodies. The feeding of these ‘Ancestors’ is the principal business, of which the reward has been described in the passage—‘feeding them, one obtains ample reward.’ This reward could only consist in the satisfaction of the Ancestors; this ‘satisfaction’ again could only be in the form of happiness, mental contentment; it could not be in the form of physical gratification which follows, in the case of men, from the act of eating. This pleasure may sometimes accrue to the fathers during the different conditions of life in which they happen to be born under the influence of their own past deeds. The verbal root ‘tṛp’ denotes only satisfaction; physical gratification is something different, and can be known only by other means of knowledge.

Against this the following objection might be raised:—“In as much as the Son is the nominative agent in the act of feeding, how could the result, which should accrue to the agent, accrue to the Ancestors,—as people versed in law do not regard actions as bringing rewards to persons other than the actual doers.”

Such an objection cannot be rightly taken. Because in this case the Ancestors themselves are the accredited agents; by the mere act of begetting the child, the father has done all this (that the son does on his behalf); in fact the son is begot for the sole purpose that he will confer on the Father benefits, seen as well as unseen. Tims then, just as in the Sarvasvāra sacrifice—where the performer offers his own life and is thus absent when the subsequent details are performed,—some other persons continue to be regarded as the ‘performer,’ by virtue of his having died after having requested the Brāhmaṇas to finish the sacrifice for him, by means of the words

‘O Brāhmaṇas, please finish the sacrifice for me’;—so would it also be in the case in question. The only difference between the two cases is tbat in the case of the Sarvasvāra, the actual doers are the hired priests doing the act with the totally different motive of earning a living, while in the case in question the doer is the son, who has been prompted by tbat same Injunction. Just as the Father performs the sacraments for his son, being prompted to it by the Injunction of begetting sons, which Injunction extends up to the final admonition addressed to the son (after Upanayana),—similarly the Śrāddha and other rites are performed, for the father by the son. Just as the maintaining of the living father is a necessary duty of the son, as laid down in (11.10A), so is it with the dead father also.

The performance of the act in question is not purely voluntary, like the Vaiśvānara sacrifice, in connection with which we read—‘On the birth of a son, one should offer the Vaiśvānara cake baked on twelve pans;—he upon whose birth this offering is made becomes glorious, an enjoyer of food and endowed with efficient organs.’ Here we find that the Father comes to perform the Yaiśvānara sacrifice when he desires certain results for his son; and it is not compulsory, like the Tonsure and other sacramental rites. As regards the act under consideration, on the other hand, we have the direction that ‘the rite in honour of the Fathers should he performed till one’s death,’ which shows that the rite is to be performed throughout one’s life.

As regards the objection that the result of the act, according to this view, does not accrue to the doer of the act,—this is explained in a different manner: just as in the case of the Vaiśvānara sacrifice, the result, in the shape of having a highly qualified son, accrues to the father, who is the doer of the act,—so in the case in question also, the result, in the shape of the ‘Father’s satisfaction,’ accrues to the son, the doer of the act. So that in both ways—whether the result accrue to the father or to the performer of the rite,—there is no incongruity at all. For as regards the father also, a result like the one in question is one that is desired by him in the very act of begetting the child; so that the father also does not obtain a reward not desired by him.

“If the ancestors are not the ‘deities’ of the Śrāddha-rite, how can it be called ‘paitra’ (in honour of ancestors), which term has been formed by the adding of the affix denoting the deity?’”

What we say in answer to this is that the Fathers are regarded as deities on the ground of their being, like deities, the entities with reference to whom the offerings are made. The ancestors are referred to in some such form as ‘this feeding of Brāhmaṇas is done for the purpose of benefiting you.’ In the offering called the ‘Piṇḍapitṝ-Yajña,’ the ancestors are actually ‘deities but of śrāddhas, the ancestors have not been regarded as ‘deities.’ As for this feeding of Brāhmaṇas, it is on the same footing as the offerings tbat are made into the fire of portions of clarified butter, cake and such other things. And in this way the Brāhmaṇas themselves occupy the position of ancestors. Hence at the time that the food is served to them, one should think of it being offered to his ancestors, with some such expression in his mind—‘this is offered to you, it is no longer mine.’ The Brāhmaṇas thus fed attain the position of the ‘Āhavanīya fire’ (into which libations are poured); the only difference being that into the Āhavanīya the offering is actually thrown, while it is only placed near the Brāhmaṇas, and they take it up themselves.

Nor will it be right to argue that “Śrāddhas cannot be regarded as sacrifice, as in them the syllable ‘svāhā’ is not pronounced with reference to the gods.” Because we find the same in the case of the ‘Sviṣṭakṛt’ offerings (which are regarded as sacrifice). Thus then, the Śrādḍha, even though of the nature of a ‘sacrifice,’ can be offered to Ancestors. Nor is there any incongruity in the Ancestors being the ‘deities’ (of the offering) and also the recipients of the result. We are going to explain more about this matter, which is not directly mentioned in the text, under Chapter III.

From all this it becomes established that the Sun and the other gods arc not ‘deities’ in the feeding of Brāhmaṇas.

“The definition of ‘deity’ as one who is aimed at in a sacrifice is too narrow; because as a matter of fact, we find the name ‘deity’ applied even in cases where there is no connection with any sacrifice; e.g., in such statements as—(a) ‘the worshipping of deities,’ ‘one should approach the deities.’ But neither worship, nor going forward (which is what is expressed by approaching), is possible with regard to deities.”

There is no force in this; as the worship may be taken as enjoined in connection with those cases where the deity is actually enjoined; or, it may refer to the deities as related to the Agnihotra and other sacrifices.

“Even so, the difficulty does not cease. The deity can never be the object of worship; as that would deprive it of the very character of ‘Deity’ (which has been defined as consisting in being aimed at in a sacrifice); for if it were the object of worship, it could not be the recipient of the sacrifice. It h as been declared that ‘the active agent of one act cannot be an active agent of another.’ The ‘active agent’ is a particular kind of force, and this force varies with each particular act; and as the presence of such force can be indicated only by its effects, we can reasonably assume only that much of diversity in it as there may be effects. From this it follows that what is the ‘recipient of a gift’ must remain the recipient, it cannot become the object.—‘How then do we have such expressions as give this to the cooker, where the nominative of the action of cooking becomes the recipient,—or having his body wounded by arrows, he went away helplessly, being looked upon by the glances of his beloved, [where the object of the act of looking becomes the nominative of the act of going ].’—The answer to this has already been explained:—such expressions become justified by the difference between the efficiency and the efficient being regarded as secondary and figurative; as is found to be the case in such expressions as ‘having eaten, he goes.’ Thus then, if the aot in question is meant to be a worship, then its object cannot have the character of the ‘Deity’; while if the Sun and the rest are ‘deities,’ then the act enjoined cannot be regarded as ‘worship.’ Nor can it be held that the Sun being well known as a ‘deity,’ the present injunction lays down its worship. Because the term ‘deity’ is not a common name of the Sun and other gods, in the way in which the term ‘go’ (cow) is of the ‘śabaleya’ and other bovine varieties.”

To the above we make the following reply:—It is quite true that the Sun and others are not, in their own form, ‘deities’; the term ‘deity’ is a relative term; and it is only from an injunction that we can learn that a certain being is the ‘deity’ of an act; the fact being that when a certain offering is enjoined with reference to a being, this latter is the ‘deity’ of that offering. It is for this reason that Agni is not the ‘deity’ of any other offering save that ‘dedicated to Agni.’ [All this is quite true] but no injunction of ‘worship’ is possible without the object to be worshipped; and deities are found to be mentioned as objects of worship. Now if the act of ‘worship’ is not possible when the term ‘deity’ is taken in its primary sense, then the ‘worship’ may be taken as being of the nature of ‘sacrifice.’ But, in the absence of any mention (in the injunction of feeding Brāhmaṇas) of the substance to be offered and the deity to whom it is to be offered, the act in question cannot acquire the character of true ‘sacrifice’; so that the text iu question may be regarded as a descriptive reference for the purpose of prescribing the ‘forenoon’ as the proper time for it; the sense being that ‘all acts in honour of the gods should be done during the forenoon.’

“Why is it said that the deity is not directly mentioned?”

For the simple reason that there is no word directly signifying any deity. The term ‘deity’ that is actually found is the common name of all deities; so that the injunction refers to the worshipping of Agni, Āditya, Rudra, Indra, Viṣṇu, Sarasvatī and so forth; and during the worship there is offering of incense, light, garland, presents and such other things. In the case of Agni; the connection with the act of worship offered is always direct; as regards Āditya (the Sun-god) since he is far off, his worship consists in the placing of sandal-paste, flowers, etc., on a clean spot; and as regards Indra and the other gods, since they are not visible, their worshipping is done by the placing of flower, etc., accompanied by a reference to their names. Though in the act of worship, the beings worshipped form the predominant factor, yet inasmuch as they are subservient to the act to be done, it is the act of worship that comes to be recognised as what should be done. If the substance offered were the predominant factor, then the Deity could never form the subject of the injunction. All this is made clear in Jaimim’s Mīmānsā-Sūtra, 2.1.6 and 7. The view put forward on the other hand is perfectly reasonable, the case being analogous to that of the Hymns and Eulogies. The Hymn is not made for the sake of the hymn itself; so the worship also is not for the sake of the worshipped. If might be argued that Hymns and Eulogies are not mentioned here by name. But the answer to this has already been given. The accusative has the sense of the instrumental, as in the expression ‘juhoti,’ where ‘saktūn’ has been taken as ‘saktubhiḥ.’

Similarly the sentence ‘mṛdam gām daivatam pradakṣiṇāni kurvīta,’—‘one should have the clay, the cow, the deity to his right,’—lays down the use of the right hand; the sense being that all acts done in honour of the gods should be done with the right hand; the passage cannot mean that the deities ensouling the clay, etc., should be actually placed on the right; for the simple reason that the deities have no physical form.

The same holds good regarding the injunction ‘one should move up to the gods.’ Since it is not possible for one to go near the gods by walking on foot, and since the root ‘gam’ (as in ‘abhigāccet’) signifies knowledge, why should ‘abhigamana’ differ from Remembrance? The sense thus is that during the act one should think of the gods; i.e., he should avoid all anxiety or distraction of the mind. In this way this Smrti is found to be one whose basis is actually found in the Vedic Injunction, which says—‘One should think in his mind of that deity to whom he may be offering the libation.’

“But this thinking of the deity is already implied in the aiming (which has been put forward in the definition of the Deity),—which cannot be done without thinking.”

This objection has no force; as mere aiming can be done also by a man who is anxious and whose mind is distracted.

Thus then all suoḥ expressions as ‘the property of the gods,’ ‘the cattle of the gods,’ ‘the substance of the gods’ and the like are to be taken as referring to such cattle and things as hare been assigned to (dedicated to) the gods. Some people have held that in the seotion dealing with penalties to be inflicted upon persons stealing the ‘property of gods,’ it is the image of the god that is meant; as otherwise the regulations bearing upon the subject would become liable to he infringed. As regards the images upon whom the character of ‘gods’ has been imposed, things are called their ‘property’ on the basis of an assumed sense of ownership; and it is such property that is referred to as ‘property of the gods,’ in such passages as—‘the highest penalty is to be inflicted on the stealing of the property of Gods, Brāhmaṇas and Kings.’ In reality, gods can have no rights of ownership; and hence the literal sense of the expression being inadmissible, it is only right that we should accept the figurative one.

“In the present case what is the figurative sense? In every instance of figurative use, the presenoe of a common function (or quality) forms the basis; e.g., the expression ‘the Boy is Fire’ is used when the boy is found to possess the white resplendence of fire. Similarly in every case the figurative or secondary sense is recognised only where there is some common property present;—the presence of suoḥ property being cognised by means of perception and other means of cognition. In the case in question however, since the sense of the deity is recognisable only by the purpose served by it,—and the form of the deity cannot be ascertained through that purpose,—how could there be any recognition of common properties?”

Our answer is as follows:—We find particular forms of deities described in the Mantras and Arthavādas; and all these descriptions are interpreted as figurative. People who do not perceive any basis for such interpretation take the passages in their literal sense and regard Indra and the deities as actually possessing those forms; and the similarity of such forms they actually perceive in the images; and in this sense also it is only natural that the description should he regarded as figurative.

Some people have explained that the feeding of Brāhmaṇas at Śrāddha in honour of the Viśvedevas is what is described here as being ‘in honour of the gods.’ But such feeding, being part of what is done ‘in honour of ancestors,’ becomes included under the latter phrase, and the re-iteration of it would he entirely meaningless. Then again, since we have the generic term ‘gods,’ on what grounds could we restrict it to the Viśvedevas only P If such restriction be based upon the association of the term ‘pitrya’ ‘in honour of ancestors,’—then, since the acts thus spoken of would not he included in ‘those done in honour of ancestors,’—the two words could he justified on the analogy of the expression ‘go-balibarda,’ ‘bovine bull,’ which is used even when there is not much difference between what is denoted by the two terms.—(189)

 

Explanatory notes by Ganganath Jha

‘Ṛṣivat’—‘Like an ascetic; i.e. avoiding honey, meat and other forbidden food’ (Medhātithi and Kullūka);—‘eating only a little wild-growing rice and other food fit for the ascetic’ (Govindarāja, Nārāyaṇa and Nandana).

Medhātithi (p. 163, l. 17)—‘Mṛtasya kartṛtvam’—This refers to Mīmāṃsā Sūtra 10. 2. 55-56. The Sarvasvāra, a modification of the Jyotiṣṭoma sacrifice, has been prescribed for by one who desires his own death; and in course of this the sacrificer surrounds the Post with a new piece of cloth and having addressed the words—‘O Brāhmaṇas, please complete this sacrifce of mine,’—enters the fire. In connection with this it is argued that the performer of the sacrifice having perished, there can be no point in proceeding with it. But the final conclusion is that the sacrifice must be proceeded with to its very end, as the sacrifice as well as its completion is directly enjoined by the Śruti text,—the latter by the words laid down as to be addressed to the Brāhmaṇas.

This verse is quoted in Vidhānapārijāta (p. 498);—in Hemādri (Śrāddha, p. 424);—and in Saṃskāraratnamālā (p. 291), which explains the construction as ‘ubhyarthitaḥ kāmamaśnīyāt, abhyarthitaḥ meaning ‘requested,’ ‘invited’.

Buhler in his translation has omitted the sentence vratamasya na lupyate,

 

Comparative notes by various authors

(verses 2.188-189)

See Comparative notes for Verse 2.188.