Verse 1.26 [Differentiation of Virtue and Vice]

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

कर्मणां च विवेकार्थं धर्माधर्मौ व्यवेचयत् ।
द्वन्द्वैरयोजयच्चैमाः सुखदुःखादिभिः प्रजाः ॥ २६ ॥

karmaṇāṃ ca vivekārthaṃ dharmādharmau vyavecayat |
dvandvairayojayaccaimāḥ sukhaduḥkhādibhiḥ prajāḥ || 26 ||

For the due discrimination of actions, he differentiated Virtue and Vice; and he connected these creatures with such pairs of opposites as Pleasure-Pain and the like.—(26)

 

Medhātithi’s commentary (manubhāṣya):

‘He differentiated Virtue and Vice’—He fixed their character by due distinction, i.e., as distinct from each other; in such form—‘this is Virtue, that is Vice.’

Objection:—“In reality however, there is no such hard and fast distinction; there are several actions that partake of the nature of both and are both virtuous and vicious (sinful); for instance, they say that the actions (of sacrifice) laid down in the Veda are of mixed character, being accomplished, as they are, by means of animal-slaughter; the sacrifice for instance, is by itself a virtuous or meritorious act, but by reason of animal-slaughter forming one of its factors, it is vicious or sinful.”

It is in view of this objection that the text has added the phrase—‘For the due discrimination of actions’;—the term ‘action’ here stands for the actual process, the performance of actions; as a matter of fact, the same act, if performed in a different manner, acquires an entirely different character; i.e., an act which is virtuous (when done in one way) becomes vicious (when done in another way), and vice versâ; e.g. the act of animal-slaughter itself; animal-slaughter, when done apart from a sacrificial performance, is vicious, sinful,—forming as it does the subject of such Vedic prohibitions as ‘One should not kill any animals’; but when done within the sacrificial altar, during the Agnīṣomīya offering, it in virtous, meritorious—being an act that forms the subject of injunctions. Similarly, Austerity (in itself) is virtuous; but when it is performed through hypocrisy, or by a person unfit for performing it, it is vicious. Similarly again, for women, intercourse with the husband’s younger brother is sinful; but when under orders from her elders, a woman desiring children has intercourse with her brother-in-law, who is besmeared with clarified butter &c. (as laid down in the scriptures), it is virtuous. Thus then, even though the action be one and the same, there is a distinction based upon the way in which it is actually performed. The sameness of the action however is only apparent; in view of other sources of knowledge the acts (done in different ways) are different.

Further, the term ‘action’ may be taken as standing for the effects of the actions,—the cause being figuratively spoken of as the effect. Thus the meaning comes to be as follows:—‘He differentiated actions for the due discrimination of the effects of actions.’

In view of the question as to what is the ‘discrimination of the effects of actions,’ it is added—‘he connected them with pairs of opposites, in the shape of Plensure-Pain and the like’;—‘Pleasure’ being the effect of ‘Virtue’ and ‘Pain’ of ‘Vice.’ It is thus that people performing both kind of actions become associated with these pairs of opposites; by performing virtuous acts they become associated with pleasure, and by performing vicious acts they become connected with pain.

The term ‘dvanḍva’, ‘Pair of opposites,’ is, by usage, applied to such mutually contradictory sources of pain as ‘Heat-Cold,’ ‘Rain-Hot weather,’ ‘Hunger-Satiation,’ and so forth.

The phrase ‘and the like’ refers to the general and special forms of the said sources of pain. For instance, the terms ‘Pleasure-Pain,’ in their general form are denotative either of ‘Heaven-Hell,’ or of ‘excessive joy and sorrow’; while in their special form, they stand for the ‘obtaining of heaven, of landed property, of sons, of cattle and so forth (‘Pleasure’) and the ‘being deprived of these’; all these being implied by the terms ‘Ādi,’ ‘and the like.’

The creation of Actions having been described before (in Verse 18 et seq.), what is described in the present verse is that Prajāpati brought about the distinction in their actual performance, as also the discrimination of their effects; thus there is a difference between what was said before and what is said now.—(26)

 

Explanatory notes by Ganganath Jha

The term ‘dharma’, as Burnell rightly remarks, stands for a man’s whole duty, including both secular and religious duty.’

The other ‘Dvandvas’ are Kāma (Desire)—Krodha (Anger)—Rāga (Attachment)—Dveṣa (Hatred)—‘Kṣut (Hunger) —Pipāsā (Thirst)—Harṣa (joy)—Viṣāda (Sorrow)’ and so forth.