The Mandukya Upanishad with Gaudapada’s Karika and Shankara’s Commentary
Kārikā, verse 1.3-5
विश्वो हि स्थूलभुङ्नित्यं तैजसः प्रविविक्तभुक् ।
आनन्दभुक्तथा प्राज्ञस्त्रिधा भोगं निबोधत ॥ ३ ॥
viśvo hi sthūlabhuṅnityaṃ taijasaḥ praviviktabhuk |
ānandabhuktathā prājñastridhā bhogaṃ nibodhata || 3 ||
3. Viśva always experiences the gross (object), Taijasa the subtle and Prājña the blissful Know these to be the threefold experiences.
स्थूलं तर्पयते विश्वं प्रविविक्तं तु तैजसम् ।
आनन्दश्च तथा प्राज्ञं त्रिधा तृप्तिं निबोधत ॥ ४ ॥
sthūlaṃ tarpayate viśvaṃ praviviktaṃ tu taijasam |
ānandaśca tathā prājñaṃ tridhā tṛptiṃ nibodhata || 4 ||
4. The gross (object) satisfies Viśva, the subtle the Taijasa and the blissful the Prājña. Know these to be threefold satisfaction.
Verses 3 and 4 have already been explained.
त्रिषु धामसु यद्भोज्यं भोक्ता यश्च प्रकीर्तितः ।
वेदैतदुभयं यस्तु स भुञ्जानो न लिप्यते ॥ ५ ॥
triṣu dhāmasu yadbhojyaṃ bhoktā yaśca prakīrtitaḥ |
vedaitadubhayaṃ yastu sa bhuñjāno na lipyate || 5 ||
In the three states, namely, waking, etc., the one1, and the same object of experience appears in threefold forms as the gross, the subtle and the blissful. Further, the experiencer (of the three states) known (differently) as Viśva, Taijasa and Prājña has been described as one on account of the unity2 of consciousness implied in such3 cognition as ‘I am that’ (common to all conditions). as well as from the absence4 of any distinction in respect of the perceiver. He who knows the two (experiencer and the objects of experience), appearing as many in the form of subject and objects of experience, though enjoying them, is5 not affected thereby; because6 all objects (of experience) are experienced by one subject alone. As (the heat of the) fire7 does not increase or decrease by consuming wood, etc., so also nothing8 is added to or taken away (from the knowingness or awareness of the Ātman) by its experience of that which, is its object.
Ānandagiri’s Ṭīkā (glossary):
1 One and the same, etc.—It is because the experiences of the three states are only the different forms of thought or ideas.
2 Unity of, etc.—That the experiencer of the three states is one and identical is also known to the waking consciousness.
3 Such cognition, etc.—This cognition takes the following form: I, who now have been perceiving objects in the waking state, had. seen forms (ideas) in dream and experienced nothing in deep sleep.
4 Absence, etc.—There is nothing to suggest that the experiences of the three states are different.
5 Is not, etc.—He who knows that the three states are one and that their perceivers are also one, is not affected by the experiences of the states, nor does he identify himself with the (apparently separate) perceivers thereof. He is not affected because he clearly perceives that objects which appeared as real in the waking and dream states disappear again in the deep sleep. Therefore he is convinced of the unreality of dream and waking experiences. As a witness, he views unaffected the cropping up of these ideas of experience (in dream and waking) and also their disappearance in Suṣupti ).
6 Because—i.e., it is because one Ātman in three forms alternately perceives the emergence and disappearance of the experi-•encer and all objects of experience. Hence he knows them to be unreal.
7 Does not, etc.— The principle or character of heat remains the same irrespective of the quantity of wood it consumes.
8 Nothing, etc.—The self or Ātman, when it knows that it is the witness of the three states, is not subject to any modification by the experiencer of the objects thereof. Because he knows these objects (including their perceivers) as mere manaḥ spandanaṃ or his own thoughts, and hence unreal. An imaginary tiger or the one seen in the dream cannot harm its perceiver.
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