Wisdom Library Logo

Indian Pluralism

Chapter XXVIII - Madhva Logic

Perception.

Pramāna has already been defined as true correspondence with objects, and it has also been mentioned that it is divided into two kinds, kevala-pramāṇa and anu-pramāṇa. Kevala-pramāṇa is that by which direct and immediate intuition of objects of cognition is made; in fact it is both the intuitive process and the intuition. Four kinds of such direct intuition are admitted in the Madhva school of thought, viz., God’s intuition, intuition of His consort Lakṣmī, intuition of sages (Yogins), intuition of ordinary persons[1]. God’s intuition is always correct, independent (svatantram), beginningless and eternal, perfectly clear and has its scope or field everywhere (sarvārtha-viṣayakam). Lakṣmī’s intuition is dependent on Īśvara and inferior in clearness to His knowledge; it is equally beginningless, eternal, and correct, and has for its object everything except the entire extent of God Himself.

The specially efficient knowledge attained by yoga is that which belongs to Yogins: these are of three kinds. The first is of those straight sages (ṛju-yogin) who deserve Brahmahood. Excepting that this kind knows Īśvara and Lakṣmī only partially, it knows everything; this knowledge increases with the increase of yoga, until mukti is attained. These sages know of God more than other individual souls can do. Next to these comes the knowledge of Gods (tāttvika-yogi-jñānaṃ)\ it is inferior in scope to the knowledge of Yogins. Next comes the knowledge of ordinary persons, and of these also there are three classes in a descending order of merit; first, those that deserve liberation, secondly those that suffer rebirth, thirdly those who are in a still lower state of existence. Pramāṇa as intuition (kevala) is to be distinguished from anu-pramāṇa, as means of such intuition, which may be of three kinds, perception, inference, and testimony of the scriptures (āgama). The contact of any faultless sense-organ with a faultless object. Objects become faulty through excessive remoteness, excessive nearness, excessive smallness, intervening obstruction, being mixed up with things similar to them, being manifested, and being similar to other things (sādṛśya). Cognitive senses are of two kinds, the intuitive faculty of the cognitive agent which is identical with himself, and the ordinary cognitive senses of smell, taste, eye, touch, ear and manas; by the power of the intuitive faculty are perceived the self and its qualities, ignorance, manas and its faculties, and all sense-knowledge, pleasure, pain, etc., time and space[2]. The visual organ is supposed to perceive large objects having colour, and manas is the superintendent of all sense-organs and the faculty of memory. The faults of manas, in consequence of which errors are committed, are the passions and attachments, and those of the other senses are diseases like jaundice, etc., and the distracting influence of intervening medium, such as glass, etc. The ordinary cognitive senses produce the states of manas. The sense-organs are like so many instruments which have contact with the objects of cognition. The intuitive faculty also by virtue of its functions (existing as identical with itself and yet separately by virtue of viśeṣa) may be considered to be in contact. The verdict of intuitive faculty need not necessarily always be objectively valid, though it is always capable of correctly intuiting the contents of sense-observations. In God and Yogins it is both subjectivity and objectivity in agreement with facts; in ordinary persons it may or may not in any particular case be in agreement with the objective parts, or, in other words, its contents may or may not correspond to objective facts, but it is always correct in intuiting what is brought to it by the senses[3].

Jaya-tīrtha dispenses with the necessity of sixfold contact as advocated by the followers of the Nyāya[4]. This has to be so, because the samavāya relation is not admitted in the system of Madhva, nor is it admitted that there is any difference between things and their qualities (guṇa-guṇy-abheda). Sense-contact therefore takes place according to Jaya-tīrtha as one event; on the one hand, because there is no difference between qualities and things, on the other because the self and its qualities are directly perceived by the intuitive entity and there is no necessity of admitting the contact of manas, and hence no need to admit a sixfold contact as is proposed by the followers of the Nyāya.

Again, we know that the Nyāya draws a distinction between indeterminate (nirvikalpa) and determinate (savikalpa) knowledge; according to this system, indeterminate knowledge means the simple cognition of the object in itself without any of the eightfold conceptual determinations

  1. as regards substance-concept (dravya-vikalpo yathā daṇḍī), as “the possessor of a stick,”
  2. as regards quality-concept (guṇa-vikalpo yathā śuklaḥ), as “white”,
  3. as regards action-concept (kriyā-vikalpo yathā gacchati), as “he goes”,
  4. as regards class-concept (jāti-vikalpo yathā gauḥ), as “cow”,
  5. as regards ultimately distinguishing characteristic (viśeṣa-vikalpo yathā viśiṣṭaḥ paratnāṇuḥ), as “the atoms have ultimate characteristics by virtue of which the sages can distinguish one atom from another”,
  6. as regards the concept of relation of inseparable inherence (samavāya-vikalpo yathā paṭa-samavāyavantās tantavaḥ), as “the threads in a piece of cloth”,
  7. as regards the concept of name (nāma-vikalpo yathā Devadatta), as “the man Devadatta”,
  8. as regards the concept of negation (abhāva-vikalpo yathā ghaṭā-bhāvavad bhū-talam), as in “there is no jug on the ground”.

But Jaya-tīrtha says that none of these distinctions between determinate and indeterminate perceptions can be accepted, as they are based on the assumption of the two categories of specific ultimate characteristics (viśeṣa) and the relation of inseparable inherence (samavāya), both of which are invalid. The name of a percept is also known by memory operating at a later moment, and the negation of an entity is known to depend on the memory of the entity itself. Though not all these concepts are produced at the first moment of perception, yet, since some of the concepts, such as substance, quality, action, etc., are grasped at the first moment of perception, there is no reason to suppose the existence of indeterminate perception (nirvikalpa pratyakṣa). All perception is determinate. The Nyāya view that the feeling of usefulness of an object or of its being undesirable is the result of perception is not correct: for these are obtained by inference[5]. When a man avoids a thorn, it is because of his past experience that he judges that it would cause him pain; when he turns to something which is desirable, it is from the inference of the experience of it as having felt desirable in the past.

 

Inference (Anumāna).

The cause of inference is a faultless reason (through which by virtue of its association anything can be ascertained). The nature of this association or concomitance is described by Jaya-tīrtha as being inseparable concomitance (avinābhāva). Vyāsa-tīrtha urges in the Tarka-tāṇḍava that this inseparable concomitance ought really to mean contradiction of experience leading to inadmissible assumption or implication (anupapatti). When anything experienced in a particular space-time relation must be invalid except on the assumption of some other thing, in some other space-time relation, it must be admitted that such a particular relation subsisting between the two is a relation of concomitance (vyāpti), leading to the inference of the latter through the former[6].

Vyāsa-tīrtha urges that this view of. inference has also been supported by Madhva in his Pramāṇa-lakṣaṇa, where he says that the residual method (pariśeṣa) is the essential method in all cases of valid inference[7]. Reduction to absurdity in regard to any valid experience is what necessitates the supposition in an act of inference.[8] Jaya-tīrtha in his Pramāṇa-paddhati has indeed defined concomitance (vyāpti) as inseparability (avinā-bhāva); this inseparable concomitance cannot be described as being in all cases agreement in absence, i.e., the absence of the reason, hetu, in all cases of the absence of the probandum (sādhya), or the inferred entity; for there are cases where, in spite of the absence of such negative instances, inference is possible, e.g., sound is expressible on account of its being an object of knowledge; now here no such negative instance is available where there would be no expression; hence in such cases of impossible-negative (kevalānvayi) inferences the above definition of concomitance, which requires the existence of negative instances for the ascertainment of concomitance, would not apply. Also no kind of spatial association of the reason and consequence (sādhya) can be urged as being an indispensable condition of concomitance: for there can be the inference of rain in the upper part of a country from perceiving a rise of water in the river in the lower part, and there is no spatial contiguity between the reason and consequence. So the main point in concomitance determining inference is the reduction of an incontrovertible experience into an impossibility, which necessitates the assumption of the inferred entity. It is this which has also been described as the law of unconditional and invariable association (sāhacarya-niyama). In the well-known example of fire and smoke what is described as the unconditional and invariable coexistence of the absence of smoke in all cases of the absence of fire is also a case of reductio ad absurdum (anupapatti). It would apply with equal force in the cases of impossibfe-negatives (kevalānvayi) ; for there also the impossible absence of the consequence would render the reason absurd; and hence the assumption of the consequence is necessary.

Vyāsa-tīrtha refutes at great length the definition of inference given by Gaṅgeśa in his Tattva-cintāmaṇi, where he explains concomitance as the coexistence of consequence and reason as qualified by the fact of the absence of the latter in each case of the absence of the former. Had it not been for the fact that in inferences of the type of impossible-negatives (kevalānvayi) no negative instances are available where we might have been acquainted with cases of absence of the consequence being also cases of absence of the reason (sādhyābhāvavad-avṛttitvam), Gaṅgeśa would have been glad to define concomitance (vyāpti) as unconditional and invariable non-existence of the reason in all cases of the non-existence of the consequence (sādhyābhāvavad-avṛttitvam). But owing to the above difficulty Gaṅgeśa was forced to define concomitance as coexistence (sāmānādhikaraṇya) of the consequence and reason where the reason is also qualified as the repository of the negation of all possible conditions which could invalidate its unconditional and invariable relation to the consequence (sādhya)[9]. The insight of Gaṅgeśa in formulating such a definition consists in this, that he thinks that universal existence of the reason in case of the consequence is alone sufficient for an inference of the latter from the former, provided that the reason is pure and unmixed by the presence of any other entity. It is the presence of other entities mixed with the reason that may invalidate its universal coexistence with the consequence; so, if that could be eliminated, then mere universal existence of the reason in cases of the consequence would be sufficient to establish a relation of concomitance between the former and the latter.

Vyāsa-tīrtha, however, points out that the existence of the reason in cases of the consequence is not universally valid in all cases of inference. Thus in the inference of rain in the upper regions from perceiving a rise of water in the river in the lower regions there is no spatial coexistence of the reason in the consequence; so also in the inference that the constellation Rohiṇī will shortly rise in the east because the constellation Kṛttikā has already risen. In all such cases and in all cases of inference the view of reductio ad absurdum (anupapatti) can always define concomitance in the best possible way and therefore can also serve as the best ground for all kinds of inference, including the class known as impossible-negatives (kevalānvayi). For in the example given of that class, “this is expressible because it is an object of knowledge”, we can argue that the denial of non-expressibility is a necessary postulate for the validity of the incontrovertible experience of its being an object of knowledge[10]. An objection may be raised that, non-expressibility being as fictitious an entity as a round square, there would be no meaning in further denying it. To this Vyāsa-tīrtha’s reply is that negation may apply even to the fictitious and the non-existent (aprāmāṇika)[11].

It is evident that this view of concomitance is a later development of theory by Vyāsa-tīrtha. For Jaya-tīrtha, in his Pramāṇa-paddhati, describes concomitance as being inseparable existence (avinābhāva), which he explains as invariable coexistence (sāhacarya-niyama) and also as invariable relation (avyabhicaritaḥ saṃbandhaḥ)[12]. Janārdana, however, in his commentary on the Pramāṇa-paddhati, holds that this sāhacarya-niyama of Jaya-tīrtha must be interpreted to mean the reductio ad absurdum of Vyāsa-tīrtha; otherwise it would be evident to all that his view of concomitance has been intended by the above definition of Jaya-tīrtha; and he supports his view by pointing out that both in the Pramāṇa-lakṣaṇa and in his commentary on the Pramāṇa-lakṣaṇa Jaya-tīrtha has included inference by residues (pariśeṣa) and implication (arthāpatti) within inference, as he thought that the methods of these are practically methods of inference itself[13]. But this only proves that pariśeṣa and arthāpatti are also kinds of inference and not that the method of anupapatti involved in them should be regarded as being the only possible form of inference. Had he thought this to be so, he would certainly have mentioned it and would not have limited his definition of concomitance to invariable coexistence (sāhacarya-niyama). Chalari-śeṣācārya, who faithfully follows the footprints of Jaya-tīrtha, often repeating his language also, explains this invariable coexistence of Jaya-tīrtha as “where there is smoke, there is fire”; but he remarks that this invariable coexistence means only the existence of an invariable relation of the reason to the consequence (atra sāhacaryaṃ hetoḥ sādhyena saṃbandha-mātraṃ vivakṣitam), and not merely existence in the same place (sāmānādhikaraṇya). Coexistence therefore is said to mean here unfailing relation to the consequence (avyabhicarita-sādhya-saṃbandho vyāptiḥ), and this is vyāpti [14]. He also refers to Gaṅgeśa’s definition of vyāpti, noted above, and points out that this definition of vyāpti would be inapplicable in those instances of inference where there is no spatial coexistence (e.g., the inference of rain in the upper regions from the rise of water in the river in the lower regions)[15]. He points out on the strength of such instances that concomitance cannot be defined as coexistence (sāmānādhikaraṇya), but is an unfailing relation which may hold between a cause and an effect existing in different places. On the strength of these instances Chalari-śeṣācārya argues in favour of concomitance without coexistence (vyadhikaraṇa-vyāpti) as being possible, and therefore advocates the dropping of the coexistence as a necessary condition of concomitance. Vyāsa-tīrtha seems to have profited by these remarks and, instead of remaining content with “unfailing relation” of Chaḷari-śeṣācārya, explained this “unfailing relation” as being the definite relation of reductio ad absurdum (anupapatti)[16].

 

Tarka (Ratiocination).

The determining oscillation constituent in a mental process leading to inference is called tarka or ūha[17]. Gautama, in his Nyāya-sūtra, describes it as being ratiocination with a view to knowledge of truth, involving attempt at determination of any fact as possessing a particular character, based on a proper enquiry regarding the cause of such a determination. Thus there is a desire to know the truth about the nature of selves as knowers. Are they produced or are they uncreated? If they were created, they would suffer destruction, like all created things, and would not suffer or enjoy the fruits of their own deeds. If they are uncreated, they may very well continue to exist for ever to suffer or enjoy the fruits of their deeds and undergo rebirth. So the self which undergoes rebirth and enjoys or suffers the fruits of all its deeds must necessarily be uncreated[18]. Vātsyāyana says that tarka is neither included within the accepted pramāṇas nor is it a separate pramāṇa, but is a process which helps the pramāṇas to the determination of true knowledge[19]. KeśavaMiśra, in his Tarka-bhāṣya, is inclined to include it under doubt[20]. But Annam bhaṭṭa, in his Tarka-dīpikā, says that, though tarka should properly be counted under false knowledge (viparyaya), yet, since it helps the pramāṇas, it should be separately counted[21]. The usefulness of tarka in inference consists in assuring the mind of the absence of any cases of failure of existence of the reason in the consequence and thereby helping the formation of the notation of the concomitance of the reason and the consequence[22]. Viśvanātha says that tarka clears away the doubts regarding the possible cases of failure (vyabhicāra) of the reason (e.g., if smoke existed in any instance where there was no fire, then fire would not be the cause of smoke), and thereby renders the knowledge of concomitance infallible and so helps the work of inference not in a direct, but in an indirect way (pāramparayā)[23]. Viśvanātha further adds that such a tarka is of five kinds, namely consideration of the fallacy of self-dependence (ātmāśraya, e.g., if the knowledge of this jug is produced by the knowledge of this jug, then it should be different from it), mutual dependence (anyonyāśraya, e.g., if this jug is the object of the knowledge as produced by the knowledge, then it should be different from this jug), circle (cakraka, if this jug is produced by something else produced by this jug, then it should be different from anything produced by something else produced by this jug), vicious infinite (anavasthā, e.g., if the class concept “jug” refers to all jugs, it cannot refer to things produced by the jug), contradictory experience (pramāṇa-bādhitārthaka-prasaṅga, e.g., if smoke exists where there is no fire, then it could not be produced by fire, or if there was no fire in the hill, there would be no smoke in it)[24].

Mathurānātha, in explaining the function of tarka in the formation of the notion of concomitance (vyāpti), says that, even when through noticing the existence of smoke in all known cases of fire and the absence of smoke in all those places where there is no fire, one decides that smoke is produced by fire or not, it is there that tarka helps to remove all legitimate doubts. As Gaṅgeśa shows, such a tarka would proceed thus: Either smoke is produced by fire or it is not produced there. So, if smoke is produced neither by fire nor by not-fire, it is not produced at all. If, however, there are the doubts whether smoke is from not-fire, or whether it can sometimes be where there is no fire, or whether it is produced without any cause (ahetuka), then none of us can have the notion of inseparable existence of fire in all cases of smoke so as to lead us to action (sarvatva sva-kriyā-vyāghātaḥ)[25]. A course of thought such as is called tarka is helpful to the formation of the notion of concomitance only when a large number of positive and negative cases has been actually perceived and a provisional certainty has been reached. Even when the provisional certainty is reached, so long as the mind is not cleared by the above tarka the series of doubts (sarkśaya-dhārā) might continue to rise[26]. It cannot be urged, says Gaṅgeśa, that, even when by the above method the notion of concomitance has been formed, there might still arise doubts whether fire might not be the cause of smoke or whether smoke might be without any cause; for, had it been so, you would not always (niyata) make fire when you wanted smoke, or eat when you wanted to satisfy your hunger, or use words to carry your ideas to others. Such regular attempts themselves show that in such cases there are no doubts (śaṅkā); for, had there been doubts, these attempts would not be so invariable. It is not possible that you would be in doubt whether fire is the cause of smoke and yet always kindle fire when you try to get smoke. The existence of doubt in such cases would contradict your invariable attempt to kindle fire whenever you wanted smoke; doubts can be admitted only so long as one’s actions do not contradict (sva-kriyā-vyāghāta) them[27].

Śrīharṣa, however, arguing from the Vedānta point of view, denies the power of tarka to dispel doubt. He urges that, if it is said that tarka necessarily dispels doubts in all cases and helps the formation of any particular notion of concomitance, then this statement must itself depend on some other notion of concomitance, and so on, leading us to a vicious infinite (anavasthā). Moreover, the fact that we know the universal coexistence of fire and smoke, and do not perceive any other element universally abiding in the fire which is equally universally coexistent with fire, does not prove that there is no such element in it which is really the cause of smoke (though apparently fire may appear as its cause). Our perception can certify only the existence or non-existence of all that is visible under the normal conditions of visual perception; it cannot say anything regarding the presence or absence of entities not controlled by these conditions, or we could only say that in the absence of fire there is absence of a specific kind of smoke; we could not say that there would be absence of all kinds of smoke; for it is just possible that there is some other kind of cause producing some special kind of smoke which we have not yet perceived; mere non-perception would not prove that such a special kind of smoke does not exist at all, since perception applies only to entities that are perceptible and is guided by its own conditions, and cannot therefore apply to entities which cannot be brought under those conditions[28]. The tarka which is supposed to dispel doubt by the supposition of contradiction of experience and which would thus support concomitance , not being itself grounded on concomitance, would naturally fail to do its part; for, if such groundless tarka could be supposed to establish concomitance, that would itself be contradiction (vyāghāta). Udayana had said that, if even when no doubt is present you suppose that doubt might arise in the future, that can only be due to inference, so inference is valid. No doubts need be entertained regarding the concomitance underlying tarka, as that would lead to the contradiction of our own actions; for we cannot say that we believe fire to be the cause of smoke and still doubt it. Śrīharṣa had replied to this by saying that, where there is experience of failure of coexistence, that itself makes the supposition of concomitance doubtful; when there is no experience of failure of coexistence, there is no end of indefinite doubts lurking about; for these unknown doubts are only put an end to when a specific failure of coexistence is noticed; so under no circumstances can doubts be dispelled by tarka[29]. The main point of the dispute consists in this, that, while Śrīharṣa is afraid to trust tarka because of the supposed doubts, Udayana thinks that, if we are so pessimistic, then we should have to stop all our actions. None of them, however, discusses the middle course of probability, which may lead us to action and may yet not be considered as proved valid inference. Vardhamāna, however, in commenting on the above verse of Udayana, refers to Gaṅgeśa as holding that tarka does not lead to the formation of the notion of concomitance[30].

Vyāsa-tīrtha, however, in his Tarka-tāṇḍava, urges that tarka is not an indispensable condition of the notion of concomitance; by faith in trusty persons, or from inherited tendencies, as a result of experiences in past life, or through acquiescence in universally accepted views, we may have a notion of concomitance without going through the process of tarka. He seems, however, to be largely in agreement with the view of tarka as held by Gaṅgeśa according to the above statement of Vardhamāna, in holding that tarka does not lead directly to the establishment of concomitance. For he says that tarka does not directly lead us to the establishment of concomitance, since concomitance is directly grasped by a wide experience (bhūyo-darśana) of coexistence, qualified by a knowledge of absence of failure of coexistence[31]. Vācaspati also holds more or less the same view when he says that it is the sense-organ, aided by the memory of wide experience, that grasps this natural relation of concomitance[32]. Vyāsa-tīrtha says that the determination of absence of vitiating conditions (upādhi), which is a function of tarka, becomes necessary only in some kinds of inference; it is not always awaited. If it were always necessary, then tarka being required for all notions of concomitance and concomitance being the basis of tarka, there would be a vicious infinite[33]. If failures of coexistence are not known, then from cases of coexistence the self may immediately form the notion of concomitance[34].

What is necessary therefore is to dispel the doubts as to failure of coexistence (vyabhicāra-śaṅkā-nivṛtti-dvāra). But such doubts come only occasionally (kvacitkaiva) and not always; and such occasional doubts require to be dispelled by only an occasional recourse to tarka. It cannot be argued that the possibility of doubts may remain in all cases and hence in all cases there is necessity for the exercise of the tarka; for it may well be asked, do such doubts arise of themselves in our minds or are they raised by others? On the first supposition one may have doubts even as to the perception of one’s hands and feet, or one might even have doubts in regard to one’s doubts, which would render even the doubts invalid. If it is held that doubts arise only when other possible alternatives are suggested, then it has to be agreed that there will be many cases where no such alternatives would be suggested or the probability of one of them might be so strongly suggested that there will be no occasion for doubts. So it must be admitted that in many cases we have a natural belief in certain orders of coexistence, where no doubts arise of themselves (sva-rasika-viśvāsasyāvaśyakatvān na sarvata śaṅkā)[35]; no one is seen going through a never-ending series of doubts all his life (na cāvirala-lagna-śaṅkā-dhārā anubhūyate). On the second supposition also, no one can suggest that doubts may always arise: in the relation of smoke and fire one cannot suggest that there may still be some other entity, different from fire, which causes smoke; for, if this were a sensible entity, it would have been perceived, and, if it were non-sensible, there would be no proof at all that a non-sensible entity existed or could exist. For, if Śrīharṣa should be so doubtful of all things, it might be suggested that in all the proofs in favour of monism (advaita) there may be a thousand faults and in the arguments of the dualists there may be a thousand good points, and so in consequence of these doubts you could not come to any conclusion establishing your doctrine of monism[36].

If a belief in a concomitance arises, the mere indefinite possibility of doubt does not shake one off his natural conviction of the concomitance as valid[37]. If you yourself would eat whenever you had hunger to appease, you cannot say that you have still doubts that eating may not after all be the cause of appeasing of hunger. Moreover, what is gained by urging that possibility of doubts always remains? Is it meant to destroy the validity of all inference or of all notions of concomitance? No one who wishes to admit the usefulness of inference would think of destroying the means—the notion of concomitance—by which it is established. If concomitance is not established, the Vedāntist will find that it is impossible to understand the meanings of those Vedic monistic words by which he wishes to establish monism. Again, if inference is to be valid, that can only be established by inference and not by perception. Without inference the Vedāntist could neither establish anything nor refute any assertions made by his opponents, contradicting his own doctrines. It seems therefore that Śrīharṣa would carry out an inference as if there were no fear of the supposed doubts and yet, merely for the sake of saying it, say that there is a possibility of the existence of doubts in all inferences[38].

The main points that arise from the above discussion are that, while Śrīharṣa would argue that tarka cannot remove the doubts threatening the validity of any notion of concomitance and while the Naiyāyikas would hold that tarka, on account of its function of removing doubts from notions of concomitance, is a necessary factor of all inferential process, Vyāsa-tīrtha argues that, though the power of tarka in removing doubts is admitted, yet, since in many of our inferences no doubts requiring the help of tarka would arise, it is not true that tarka is a necessary factor in all inferences[39]. From what has been said above it will appear that there is some subtle difference of opinion in the Nyāya school regarding the real function of tarka. But the general tendency seems to be to restrict the function of tarka to removing doubts and thereby paving the way for the formation of the notion of concomitance; but it does not directly produce the notion of concomitance (na tu vyāpti-grāhaka) nor does it verify particular inductions by the application of general principles of uniformity of nature[40].

So far Vyāsa-tīrtha has been using the word tarka in the accepted Nyāya sense and, using it in that sense, he has been showing that the removal of doubts is not indispensable for the formation of the notion of concomitance. Tarka consists according to him, however, in the necessary awakening of the knowledge of absence of the reason owing to absence of the consequence; taken from this point of view, it becomes identical with inference (anumāna). Jaya-tīrtha also says in his Pramāṇa-paddhati that tarka means the necessary assumption of something else (consequence), when a particular character or entity (reason) is perceived or taken for granted (kasyacid dharmasyāṅgīkare’rthāntarasyāpādanaṃ tarkaḥ)[41]. Granted that there is no fire in the hill, it must necessarily be admitted that there is no smoke in it; this is tarka and this is also inference[42]. Tarka is thus the process by which the assumption of one hypothesis naturally forces the conclusion as true. This is therefore a pramāṇa, or valid source of knowledge, and should not be considered as either doubt or false knowledge, as some Nyāya writers did, or, as other Nyāya writers considered it to be, different from both doubt and decision (nirṇaya). Thus according to Vyāsa-tīrtha tarka has a twofold function, one as the dispeller of doubts and a help to other pramāṇas, and the other as inference. The main point that Vyāsa-tīrtha urges against Udayana (who holds the function of tarka to be merely the removal of undesirable assumptions) and against Vardhamāna (who holds that the function of tarka is merely the removal of doubt of the absence of the consequence) is that, if tarka does not take account of the material discrepancy or impossibility of facts involved in the assumption of the absence of the consequence (fire) when the smoke is present, then even the doubts or undesirable assumptions will not be removed; and, if it does take account thereof, then it yields new knowledge, is identical with inference, and is a pramāṇa itself[43]. Tarka may be treated as a negative inference, e.g., “had it been without fire, it would have been without smoke; but it is not so”. Being such a negative inference, it stands as an independent inference, and, as it may also be used to strengthen a positive inference, it may also be considered in that case an additional support to it (pramāṇānām anugrāhaka), just as what is known by perception may again be strengthened by inference[44]. Its function in removing doubts in other cases remains just as it has been shown before; but everywhere the root principle involved in it is necessary supposition rendering other alternatives impossible (anyathānupapatti), which is the principle also in inference[45].

 

Concomitance (Vyāpti).

The word vyāpti in Sanskrit is a noun formed from the root vyāp, “to pervade”. The consequence (e.g., fire) pervades all cases of smoke, i.e., the circle of the consequence is not smaller than the circle of smoke and encloses it; consequence is therefore called the pervader (vyāpaka) and the reason (e.g. smoke) as the object of this action of pervading is called the pervaded (vyāpya). Thus in the case of smoke and fire there is an unfailing relation (avyabhicāritā-sambandha) between them and the former is called vyāpya and the latter vyāpaka. This unfailing relation may however be of four kinds. First, the two circles might coincide (samavṛtti), in which case the reason may be treated as consequence and inferred from the consequence treated as reason and vice versa. Thus one may argue both ways: it is sinful because it is prohibited in the Vedas and it is prohibited in the Vedas because it is sinful; here the two circles coincide. Secondly, when one circle is smaller than the other, as in the case of smoke and fire (nyūnādhika-vṛtti); the circle of fire is larger than the circle of smoke and so one could infer smoke from fire, but not fire from smoke— vyāpya is smaller than the vyāpaka. Thirdly, where the two circles are mutually exclusive (paraspara-parihāreṇaiva vartate), e.g., the class-concept cow (gotva) and the class-concept horse (aśvatva) ; where there is one, there is not the other. There is a relation of exclusion here, but not the relation of a vyāpya and vyāpaka. Fourthly, where the two are sometimes mutually exclusive, yet sometimes found to be coincident ; thus cooking is done by women, yet there are men who cook; cook and males are mutually exclusive, though there may be some males who cook (kvacit samāviṣṭa api kvacit paraspara-parihā-reṇaiva vartate). The circle of cooking is divided between males and females. Here also there is a relation between cooking and males, but it is not unfailing (avyabkicāritā); unfailing relation means that, where there is one, there must be the other also.

When a man observes the coexistence of fire and smoke, he naturally revolves in his mind

“is it in this place that fire and smoke are seen together, while in other places and at other times the presence of one excludes the presence of the other, or are they always found together”;

then by observing in several instances, he finds that, where there is smoke, there is fire, and that, where there is no fire, there is no smoke, and that in some cases at least there is fire, but no smoke.

These observations are followed by a consideration such as this:

“since, though in many cases fire coexists with smoke, in some cases at least fire is found where there is no smoke, does smoke, although in all the cases known to me it exists with fire, ever remain without it, or does it always coexist with fire?”

Then again the consideration arises that the relation of smoke to fire is determined by the presence of wet wood (ādrendhana), which may be called a vitiating condition (upādhi), i.e., had this condition not been there, there would have been unqualified coexistence of fire with smoke, and vice versa. This vitiating condition (upādhi) exists in all cases of smoke, but not in all cases of fire[46]. Where the coexistence is not determined by any such vitiating condition, the coexistence is universally mutual. There are some qualities which are common to both fire and smoke (e.g., both of them are objects of knowledge: yathā prameyatvam), and these cannot determine the connection. There are other qualities which do not belong either to smoke or fire, and these also cannot determine the connection. It is only the vitiating condition of the presence of wet wood which by its absence can dissociate fire from smoke, but cannot dissociate smoke from fire. If there were any such condition which was present in all cases of fire, but not in all cases of smoke, then the inference of fire from smoke would have been faulty as the inference of smoke from fire is faulty. Now, so far as we have observed, there is no such condition which is present in all cases of fire, but not in all cases of smoke; the fear that there may be some vitiating conditions which are too subtle for our senses is illegitimate; for, if it is neither perceived nor known by any other sources of knowledge (pramāṇāntara-vedya), the doubt that it may still somehow exist cannot arise. So, when we are satisfied that there are no vitiating conditions, there arises the notion of invariable concomitance (avinābhāva-pramitiḥ)[47].

So the invariable concomitance is grasped by perception aided by wide experience, associated with absence of any knowledge of exception to coexistence and ascertainment of absence of vitiating conditions, operating as accessories. When once the mutual invariable relation between smoke and fire is grasped, then, wherever smoke is perceived, fire is inferred[48]. This description of the formation of the notion of concomitance seems to be more or less the same as the Nyāya view; there also the perceiving of coexistence, associated with the knowledge of absence of exception, is said to lead to the formation of the notion of concomitance[49].

 

Epistemological Process in Inference.

The Nyāya holds that, when a person acquainted with the relation of concomitance existing between smoke and fire sees smoke on a hill, he remembers the relation of concomitance (vyāpti-smaraṇa), that this smoke is invariably and unconditionally connected with fire[50]; then the two ideas are connected, namely, that the smoke which has unconditional invariable relations with fire is in che hill. It is this third synthesis of knowledge that leads us to the inference of fire in the hill. Vyāsa-tīrtha, following the Nyāya-sudhā, argues that this view may be true in all those cases where a concomitance (vyāpti) is remembered on seeing the reason (hetu), but, where the concomitance is remembered without seeing the reason, the threefold synthesis cannot be admitted. Prabhākara, however, holds that all inference proceeds from two distinct propositions, and no synthesis is required. The two propositions are “smoke is pervaded by fire” and “the hill is smoky.” Prabhākara holds that, since knowledge as formulated in the above two propositions must invariably and unconditionally precede all inference, there is no necessity for believing their synthesis to be the cause of inference, since no such synthesis really happens. Vyāsa-tīrtha, however, argues that such a synthesis is a real psychological state in inference and other mental operations, such as recognition, etc. Moreover, if the identity of the smoke (with which fire was found invariably present) with the smoke now perceived in the hill were not established by the synthesis of the two propositions, it would be a syllogism of four terms and hence invalid[51]. Moreover, the movement of thought involved in inference requires such a synthesis, without which the two propositions would be unrelated and statical (nirvyāpāka) and no inference would follow.

 

Various Considerations regarding Inference.

Inference is of three kinds:

  1. of cause from effect (kāryānumāna), as the inference of fire from smoke,
  2. of effect from cause (kāraṇānumāna), as the inference of rain from gathering clouds,
  3. inference of a different order from cause-effect types (akārya-kāraṇānumāna), as the inference of colour from taste (rase rūpasya).

From another point of view inference is of two kinds:

  1. dṛṣṭa, where the inferred object is perceivable (pratyakṣa-yogya), as of fire from smoke, and
  2. sāmānyato-dṛṣṭa, where it is not perceivable (pratyakṣāyogya), as of the existence of the sense of vision from the perception of colours.

This division of inference into dṛṣṭa and adṛṣṭa may be made from another point of view. Thus, when an inference is made on the basis of the concomitance directly observed between two entities (e.g., fire and smoke), it is called dṛṣṭa ; but, when an inference is made on the basis of similarity or analogy, it is called sāmānyato-dṛṣṭa, as the inference that, just as ploughing, etc., lead to the production of crops, so sacrifices also produce heavenly enjoyments, since they have this similarity that both are results of effort.

Inference may again be considered as being of two kinds:

  1. inference of one right knowledge from another right knowledge (sādhanānumāna), e.g., of fire from smoke,
  2. the inference of false knowledge (dūṣaṇānumāna), e.g., “this cannot prove its conclusion, since it is contradicted by experience.”

Again, some hold that inference is of three kinds:

  1. by absolute agreement in presence (where no case of absence is possible),
  2. by absolute absence (where no outside positive instance is possible), and
  3. by combination of agreement in presence and absence;

in accordance with this it is

  1. kevalānvayi (impossible-negation),
  2. kevala-vyatireki (impossible-position)
  3. and anvaya-vyatireki (joint positive-negative).

Thus the proposition “all objects of knowledge are expressible” is an example of the first type of inference, since no negative instance is possible of which we could say that this is not an object of knowledge and is not also expressible; the proposition “all living bodies are endowed with souls, since they have lives” is an example of inference of the second type. This can only be proved by an appeal to negative instances such as “all those who are not endowed with souls are not living”; for, since the proposition comprehends all positive instances, no positive instances apart from the proposition under consideration are available. The third type is the ordinary one of inference where concomitance is experienced through both positive and negative instances.

Inference is said again to be of two kinds: first svārtha, where the knowledge of the reason with its concomitance rises in one’s own mind of itself, and secondly parārtha, where such a knowledge is for the instruction of others. As regards the constituent propositions (avayava) of inference, Vyāsa-tīrtha discusses the ten-proposition view of older Nyāya writers (jaran-naiyāyika), also the five-proposition view of the later Nyāya writers[52], the three-proposition view of the Mīmāṃsā, and also the two-proposition view of example and the application of reason (udāharaṇopanayaṛ) of the Buddhists. Vyāsa-tīrtha urges that, since the value of these constituent propositions consists in reminding persons of a particular concomitance or in rousing an enquiry in those who did not know it before, there is necessity only for as many propositions as are necessary for the purpose, in accordance with the circumstances under which the inference is being made or the state of mind of the person who makes it—so that there may be cases where only the enunciating proposition, reason and example are necessary, there may be cases where only the enunciating proposition combined with the reason is necessary (agni-vyāpta-dhūmavān parvato’gnimān iti hetu-garbha-pratijñā), or, when in certain cases the discussion presupposes the enunciating proposition, only the reason may be necessary, and so on[53]. So there is no fixed rule as to the number of constituent propositions necessary for inference; it all depends upon the nature of the case whether two, three or more propositions are necessary.

Both Jaya-tīrtha and Vyāsa-tīrtha devote a long discussion to the division of fallacies (upapatti-doṣa) and criticize the Nyāya division of the same; but, as these have but little philosophical bearing, I feel inclined to omit them[54].

 

Testimony.

Madhva and his followers admitted only three kinds of means of knowledge, namely, perception, inference, and the testimony of the Vedas. All other kinds of means of knowledge (pramāṇa) admitted in other systems, such as arthāpatti, sambhava, etc., are shown to be but modes of inference[55]. The Vedas are regarded as having by themselves independent force of knowledge. They are uncreated (apauruṣeya) and eternai (nitya). They are valid means of knowledge, and yet, since their validity is not derived from the speech of any person, they must be regarded as uncreated[56]. No attempt, however, was made to prove that the Vedas were valid means of knowledge; but, as their validity was not questioned by any of the Hindu schools, that was taken as accepted, and then it was argued that, since they were not uttered by anyone, they were uncreated and eternal. It was sought to establish this uncreatedness of the Vedas as against the Nyāya view that they were created by God (Īśvara). Vyāsa-tīrtha argues that it is better to accept the direct validity of the Vedas on the ground of their being uncreated, than to do it in an indirect way through the admission of an omniscient being as their author; for there is no certainty that even such authors would not try to deceive mankind by false statements. Buddha himself is an incarnation of God, and yet he deceived the people by false teachings. Tradition also does not ascribe any author to the Vedas. If they had been created, they would be of the same kind as the holy scriptures of the Buddhists or Jains. If the importance of scriptures were to be judged by the number of people who followed them, then the Mahomedan scriptures would have a superior place. God may be regarded as the great teacher of the Vedas, being the first person who uttered and taught them[57]. He did not create them and He remembers them always; so that there is no chance of the Vedic order of words being destroyed. Ordinarily the claim of facts to validity is prior to that of the words which express them, and the latter depends on the former; but in the case of the Vedas the words and passages have a validity which is prior to facts and independent of them. The Madhva view thus combines the Nyāya and the Mīmāṃsā views of the Vedas without agreeing with either.

first previous index next last

- Footnotes:

1.

īśvara-jñānaṃ lakṣmī-jñānaṃ yogi-jñānaṃ ayogi-jñānaṃ ceti.
      Nyāya-paddhati,
p. 16.

2.

indriya-śabdena jñānendriyaṃ gṛhyate, tad dvi-vidhaṃ, pramātṛ-svarūpaṃ prākṛtaṃ ca tatra svarūpendriyaṃ sākṣīty ucyate; tasya viṣaya ātma-svarūpaṃ tad-dharmaḥ avidyā-manas-tad-vṛttayaḥ bāhyendriya-jñāna-sukhādayaḥ kālavyā-kṛtākāśaś ca.
      Pramāṇa-paddhati,
p. 22.

3.

Ibid. p. 26.

4.

See A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. I (first edition), p. 334.

5.

Nyāya-mañjarī, pp. 67-71.

6.

yad-deśa-kāla-saṃbaddhasya yasya yad-deśa-kāla-saṃbaddhena yena vinānupapattis tasyiva tena saha vyāptiḥ.
      Tarka-tāṇḍava
(MS., p. 1).

7.

pariśeṣo’rthāpattir amumānam ity aviśeṣaḥ.
      Pramāṇa-lakṣaṇa

      and Pramāṇa-lakṣaṇa-ṭīkā, p. 27.

8.

anumānam api āvaśyakānupapattyaiva gamakam.
      Tarka-tāṇḍava
(MS.,p. 2).

9.

pratiyogy-asamānādhikaraṇa-yat-samānādhikaraṇātyantābhāva-pratiyogitā-vacchedakāvacchinnaṃ yan na bhavati tena samaṃ tasya sāmānādhikaraṇyaṃ vyāptiḥ.
      Tattva-cintāmaṇi,
Part II, p. 100 (ed. 1888, Bibliotheca Indica).

10.

idaṃ vācyaṃ jñeyatvāt kevalānvayi anumānam.

11.

tatra sādhyābhāvasya asattvād eva sādhyābhāve sati sādhanasya yopapattis tad-abhāva-rūpānupapatteḥ sattvāt; manmate’prāmāṇikasyāpi niṣedha-prati-yogitvāt.
      Tarka-tāṇḍava
(MS., p. 6).

12.

Pramāṇa-paddhati, p. 30.

13.

anupapatter vyāptitvaṃ ca pramāṇa-lakṣaṇe pariśeṣārthāpattiḥ anumā-viśeṣa ity atrārthāpattir iva anumānam api āvaśyakānupapattyaiva gamakam ity uktatvāt.
      Tarka-tāṇḍava
(MS., pp. 1-2).
      Also Pramāṇa-lakṣaṇa-ṭīkā, pp. 5-7.

14.

Cf. Gaṅgeśa’s alternative definition of vyāpti in the section on Viśeṣa-vyāpti:

yat-saṃbandhitāvacchedaka-rūpavattvaṃ yasya tasya sā vyāptiḥ.
      Tattva-cintāmaṇi,
Part II, p. 156.

15.

na tu samāṇādhikaraṇyam eva.
      Pramāṇa-candrikā
, p. 8 a.

16.

Pramāṇa-candrikā, pp. 8a, 9.

17.

ūhatvaṃ ca mānasatva-vyāpyo jāti-viśeṣaḥtarkayāmi’’ ity anubhava-siddhaḥ.
      Viśvanātha-vṛtti,
I, p. 40.

Tarka is used in the sense of ūha by Jayanta also in the Nyāya-mañjarī, p. 586. Jayanta says that its function as ūha consists in weakening the chances of the weak alternative, thereby strengthening the probability of the stronger alternative and so helping the generation of a valid knowledge of the certainty of the latter alternative. The meaning of tarka here must be distinguished from the meaning “inference” (anumāna), which it has in Brahma-sūtra, II. 1. 12 (tarkā-pratiṣṭhānāt...), and also from its use as the science of logic (ānvīkṣikī), one of the fourteen subjects of learning (vidyā-sthāna). Yājñavalkya-smṛti, I. 3; also Nyāya-mañjarī, pp. 3-4. Ūha is with Sāṃkhya a quality of buddhi and with the Mīmāṃsakas it is a process of application of recognized linguistic maxims for the determination of the sense of words or of sentences (yuktyā prayoga-nirūpaṇam ūhaḥ), ibid. p. 588. Here ūha is used practically in the sense of “inference” and is such a pramāṇa. But here in the Nyāya ūha or tarka stands between right knowledge and doubt.

Thus Jayanta says:

tad eṣa mīmāṃsaka-kalpyamāno nohaḥ pramāṇa-vyatirekam eti pramāṇa-sandehadaśāntarālavartī tu tarkaḥ kathito’tra śāstre (p. 590).

18.

Nyāya-sūtra, I. 1. 40 and Vātsyāyana’s Vṛtti on it.

19.

tarko na pramāṇa-saṃgṛhīto na pramāṇāntaram;
pramāṇānām anugrāhakas tattva-jñānāya parikalpyate.
Vātsyāyana-bhāṣya,
I. 1. 1.

20.

Tarka-bhāṣya, p. 44.   

21.

vyabhicāra-jñānābhāva-saṃpādakatvena tarkasya vyāpti-grahe upayogaḥ.
      Bhavānandi on Dīdhiti, quoted in Nyāya-kośa, footnote, p. 292.

22.

Tarka-dīpikā, p. 88.

23.

tathā ca dhūmo yadi vahni-vyabhicārī syāt vahni-janyo na syāt ity anena vyabhicāra-śaṅkā-nirāse niraṅkuśena vyāpti-jñānena anumitir iti paraṃparayā evāsya upayogaḥ.
Viśvanātha-vṛtti, I. 1. 40.

24.

Each of the first three has three varieties, according as it refers to knowledge (jñapti), production (utpatti) and existence (sthiti).

Thus the threefold example of ātmāśraya would be

  1. etad-ghaṭa-jñānaṃ yady etat-ghaṭa-janyaṃ syāt etad-ghaṭa-bhiimaṃ syāt,
  2. ghato’yam yady etad-ghaṭa-janakaḥ syāt, etad-ghaṭa-bhinnaḥ syāt,
  3. ayaṃ ghaṭo yady etad-ghaṭa-vṛttiḥ syāt, tathātvena upalabhyeta.

Example of anyonyāśraya in jñapti: ayaṃ ghaṭo yady etad-ghaṭa-jñāna-janya-jñāna-viṣayaḥ syāt etad-ghaṭa-bhinnaḥ syāt.

Example of cakraka in utpatti: ghaṭoyaṃ yady etad-ghaṭa-janya-janya-janyaḥ syāt tadā etad-ghata-janya-janya-bhinnaṃ syāt.

Mādhava, in his Sarva-darśana-saṃgraha, speaking of older Nyāya tradition, adds seven others,

  • vyāghāta (contradiction),
  • pratibandhi-kalpanā (irrelevant thesis),
  • lāghava (minimum postulation),
  • gaurava (too much postulation),
  • utsarga (general rule),
  • apavāda (exception),
  • vaijātya (class-difference).

But Viśvanātha, whose list of these varies somewhat from the above, as he drops vyāghāta and has prathamopasthitatva, and vinigamana-viraha for pratibandhi-kalpanā, apavāda and vaijātya, holds that these are not properly tarka, but are so called only because they help as accessories to pramāṇas

(pramāṇa-sahakāritva-rūpa-sādharmyāt tathā vyavahāraḥ).
      Viśvanātha-vṛtti,
I. 1. 40.

25.

Gaṅgeśa on tarka and Mathurānātha’s commentary thereon.
      Tattva-cintāmaṇi, Part 11, pp. 219-28.

26.

Ibid. p. 220; see also Kāmākhyānātha’s note, also p. 228.

27.

tad eva hy āśaṅkyate yasminn āśaṅkyamāne sva-kriyā-vyāghāto na bhavatīti; na hi saṃbhavati svayaṃ vahny-ādikaṃ dhumādi-kāryyārthaṃ niyamata upādatte tat-kāraṇaṃ tan netyāśaṅkyate ca.
      Ibid.
p. 232.

28.

tad-adarśanasya āpātato hetv-antara-prayojyāvāntara-jāty-adarśanena ayo-gyatayā avikalpyatvād apy upapatteḥ; yadā tu hetv-antara-prayojyo dhūmasya viśeṣo draksyate tadāsau vikalpiṣyate iti saṃbhāvanāyā durnivāratvāt.
     
Śrīharṣa’s Khaṇḍana-kkaṇḍa-khādya, p. 680.

29.

Udayana’s verse ran as follows:

śaṅkā ced anumāsty eva na cec chaṅkā tatastarām
vyāghātāvadhir āśaṅkā tarkaḥ śaṅkāvadhir mataḥ.
      Kusumāñjali,
III. 7.

Śrīharṣa gave his reply to this by slightly changing Udayana’s words as follows:

vyāghāto yadi śaṅkāsti na cec chaṅkā tatastarām
vyāghātāvadhir āśaṅkā tarkaḥ śaṅkāvadhiḥ kutaḥ.
      Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khādya,
p. 693.

Gaṅgeśa suggests that the word vyāghāta in Śrīharṣa means failure of coexistence (sahānavasthāna-niyama), while in Udayana it means contradiction of one’s own actions (sva-kriyā-vyāghātaḥ). But, as Vyāsa-tīrtha shows, the word may be taken in the latter sense even in Śrīharṣa.
      Tarka-tāṇḍava
(MS., p. 25).

30.

atrāsmatpitṛcaranāḥ, tarko na vyāpti-grāhakaḥ kintu
vyabhicāra-jñānābhāva-saharkṛtaṃ sahacāra-darśanam.
      Prakāśa,
III, p. 26.

31.

api ca tarko na sākṣād vyāpti-grāhakaḥ bhūyo-darśana-vyabhicārādarśana-sahakṛta-pratyakṣeṇaiva taḍ-grahaṇāt.
      Tarka-tāṇḍava
(MS., p. 20).

32.

bhūyo-darśana-janita-saṃskāra-sahitam indriyam eva svābhāvika-saṃban-dha-grāḥi.
      Tātparya-ṭīkā.

33.

This has already been pointed out above in dealing with Śrīharṣa’s objections.

34.

adrṣṭe vyabhicāre tu sādhakaṃ tad ati sphuṭaṃ
jñāyate sākṣiṇaivāddhā mānavadho na tad bḥavet.
      Tarka-tāṇḍava
(MS., p. 21).

35.

Tarka-tāṇḍava, pp. 22-3.

36.

Ibid. p. 24.

37.

na hi grāhya-saṃśaya-mātraṃ niścaya-pratibandhakam; na ca utpannasya vyāpti-niścayasya balavad bādhakam asti yena autsargikaṃ prāmāṇyam apodyeta.
      Ibid.
p. 24.

38.

Ibid. pp. 25-31.

39.

It cannot, however, be said that the Nyāya would urge the necessity of tarka in all instances of inference. The older Nyāya writers do not say anything explicitly on the subject; but Viśvanātha, in his Muktāvalī, states that tarka is necessary only in those cases where there are doubts regarding the forming of the notion of concomitance. Where no doubts naturally arise, there is no necessity of tarka (yatra svata eva śaṅkā nāvatarati tatra na tarkāpekṣāpīti). Muktāvalī, 137.

Dinakara, however, in his commentary on the Muktāvalī 137, thinks that there are two kinds of tarka, clearance of doubts and the formation of concomitance (tarkaś ca divividho samśaya-pariśodhako vyāpti-grāhakaś ca). This however is directly opposed to the view of Vardhamāna cited above.

40.

The wording of Dr Seal’s brief references to the subject of tarka in A History of Hindu Chemistry by Dr P. C. Ray (p. 264) is inexact. He says there:

Tarka or Uha, then, is the verification and vindication of particular inductions by the application of the general principles of Uniformity of Nature and of Causality, principles which are themselves based on repeated observation (bhūyo-darśana) and the ascertainment of innumerable particular inductions of Uniformity or Causality (bhūyo-darśana-janita-saṃskāra-sahitam indriyam eva svābhāvika-saṃbandha-grāhi Vācaspati).”

Thus tarka also helps in dispelling doubt (saṅdeha).

On its function in clearing the way to the formation of the notion of concomitance:

mārga-sādhana-dvāreṇa tarkasya tattva-jñānārthatvam iha vivakṣitam.
      Nyāya-mañjarī,
p. 586.

Mathurānātha also points out that the function of tarka is to supply such grounds that doubts may not arise, but it is not vyāpti-grāhaka (tarkaḥ śaṅkānutpattau prayojakaḥ...). Mathurānātha on Tattva-cintāmaṇi, Part II, p. 240.

41.

Pramāṇa-paddhati, p. 36a. manmate tu aṅgīkṛtena sādhyābhāvena saha anaṅgīkṛtasya sādhanābhāvasya vyāpakatva-pramā vā sādhyābhāvāṅgīkāra-nimittaka-sādhanābhāvasyāṅgīkartavyatva-pramā vā tarkyate’nena iti vyutpattyā tarkaḥ.
      Tarka-tāṇḍava
(MS., p. 78).

42.

parvato nirdhūmatvenāṅgīkartavyaḥ niragnikatvena aṅgīkṛtatvād hradavat ity anumānam eva tarkaḥ.
      Ibid.
p. 84.

43.

kim ca para-mate tarkasya kiṃ viṣaya-pariśodhane upayogaḥ kiṃ Udayana-rītyā aniṣṭa-prasañjanatvamātreṇa upayogaḥ, kiṃ vā Varddhamānādi-rītyā sādhyābhāva-sandeha-nivarttanena.
      Ibid.
p. 92.

44.

sādhanānumānaṃ vinaiva yadi niragnikaḥ syāt tarhi nirdhūmaḥ syāt tathā cāyaṃ nirdhūma iti tarka-rūpānumānenaiva agnisiddheḥ.
      Ibid.
p. 90.

45.

sākṣād anyathānupapatti-pramāpaka-tarka-viṣaya-kṛta-virodhasya sattvāt.
      Ibid.
p. 89.

46.

This vitiating condition will therefore falsify an inference such as “There is smoke in the hill because there is fire.”

47.

Vyāsa-tīrtha remarks here that the ascertainment of the absence of vitiating conditions is necessary in most cases where there are doubts as to their possible existence, but should not be insisted upon as indispensable in all cases; for then, this ascertainment of absence of vitiating conditions being dependent on determination of concomitance and that on previous ascertainment of absence of vitiating conditions, there would be infinite regress (anavasthā):

yā tu Paddhatav upādhi-niścayasya sahakāritvoktiḥ sā tu upādhi-śaṅkāsthābhiprāyā na tu sārva-trikābhiprāyā anyathā upādhy-abhāva-niścayasya vyāpti-sāpekṣa-tarkādhīnatvenā-navasthāpātāt.
      Tarka-tāṇḍava
(MS., p. 22).

48.

Pramāṇa-paddhati, pp. 31-5.

49.

vyabhicāra-jñāna-viraha-sahakṛtaṃ sahacāra-darśanaṃ vyāpti-grāhakam.
      Tattva-cintāmaṇi,
p. 210.

Legitimate doubts regarding invariable concomitance may be removed by tarka, as has already been described above.

Vyāsa-tīrtha, following the Nyāya-sudhā,
defines vitiating conditions (upādhi) as sādhya-vyāpakatve sati sādhanāvyāpaka upādhir iti;
and he objects to Udayana’s definition of it as sādhya-sama-vyāptatve sati sādhanāvyāpaka upādhiḥ
and also to Gaṅgeśa’s definition of it as paryavasita-sādhya-vyāpakatve sati sādhanāvyāpaka upādhiḥ.

But the purport aimed at by these various definitions is the same, as has been explained above. The distinctions are more verbal and scholastic than logical or philosophical; it will therefore be an unnecessary digression to enter into these. See the whole discussion on upādhi in Vyāsa-tīrtha’s Tarka-tāṇḍava (MS., pp. 44-61).

50.

ayaṃ dhūmo vahni-vyāpya or vahni-vyāpya-dhūmavān ayam iti. Nyāya view.

51.

evaṃ ca kiṃcit prameyaṃ vahni-vyāpyaṃ paravataś ca prameyavān iti jñāna-dvayam iva kaścid dharmo vahni-vyāpyaḥ paruataś ca dhūmavān iti viśa-kalitaṃ paraspara-vartanābhijñaṃ jñāna-dvayam api nānumiti-hetuḥ.
      Tarka-tāṇḍava
(MS., p. 68).

52.

jijñāsā-saṃśaya-śakya-prāptiḥ prayojana-saṃśayanirāsāḥ pratijña-hetūdāha-raṇopanaya-nigamanāni iti daśāvayavā iti jaran-naiyāyikā āhuh.
      Tarka-tāṇḍava.

53.

vivādenaiva pratijñā-siddhau kutaḥ parvato’gnimān iti praśne agni-vyāpta-dhūmavattvād iti hetu-mātreṇa vā.
       Tarka-tāṇḍava
(MS., p. io).

54.

See Pramāṇa-paddhati, pp. 48-79; also Tarka-tāṇḍava (MS., pp. 114 et seq.).

55.

Pramāṇa-paddhati, pp. 86-90.

56.

pauruṣeya-śabdāpramāṇakatve sati sapramāṇakatvāt.
      Tarka-tāṇḍava
(MS., p. 100).

57.

īśvaro’pi hy asman-mate.... Veda-saṃpradāya-pravartakatvān mahopādhyāya eva.
      Ibid.
p. 122.

first previous index next last

Article published on

Last update on