Part 3 - Brahman, Paramātman, Bhagavat and Parameśvara

The opening verse of the Bhāgavata is an adoration of the ultimate (param) truth (satya). The word para however is explained by Śrīdhara as meaning God (parameśvara). The essential (svarūpa) definitive nature of God is said to be truth (satya). Truth is used here in the sense of reality; and it is held that by virtue of this supreme reality even the false creation appears as real, and that on account of this abiding reality the entire world of appearance attains its character of reality. Just as illusory appearances (e.g. silver) appear as real through partaking of the real character of the real object (e.g. the conch-shell) or the substratum of the illusion, so in this world-appearance all appears as real on account of the underlying reality of God. The fact that the world is produced from God, is sustained in Him and is ultimately dissolved in Him, is but an inessential description of an accidental phenomenon which does not reveal the real nature of God.

God is called by different names, e.g. Brahman, Paramātman and Bhagavat, but, by whatever name He may be called, His pure essence consists of pure formless consciousness (arūpasya cidāt-manaḥ)^[1]. He creates the world by His māyā- power, consisting of the three guṇas. Underlying the varied creations of māyā, He exists as the one abiding principle of reality which bestows upon them thfir semblance of reality. The māyā represents only His external power, through which He creates the world with Himself as its underlying substratum. But in His own true nature the māyā is subdued, and as such He is in His pure loneliness as pure consciousness. Śrīdhara in his commentary points out that God has two powers called vidyā-śakti and avidyā-śakti. By His vidyā-śakti God controls His own māyā-śakti in His own true nature as eternal pure bliss, as omniscient and omnipotent. The jīva or the individual soul can attain salvation only through right knowledge obtained through devotion. On this point Śrīdhara tries to corroborate his views by quotations from Viṣṇusvāmin, who holds that Īśvara a being, intelligence, and bliss (saccid-ānanda īśvara) is pervaded with blissful intelligence (hlādinī samvit), and that the māyā is under his control and that his difference from individual souls consists in the fact of their being under the control of māyā. The individual souls are wrapped up in their own ignorance and are therefore always suffering from afflictions (kleśa)^[2]. God in His own nature as pure consciousness transcends the limits of māyā and prakṛti and exists in and for Himself in absolute loneliness; and it is this same God that dispenses all the good and bad fruits of virtue and vice in men under the influence of māyā^[3]. That God in His own true nature is pure consciousness and absolutely devoid of all duality and all distinctions is emphasized again and again in numerous passages in the Bhāgavata. In this He is ultimate and transcendent from all: the individual souls also lie dormant, and in this stage all the guṇa reals exist only in their potential forms; and it is by His own power that He rouses the prakṛti which is His māyā by which the individual souls are being always led into the experience of diverse names and forms. God in His own nature is therefore to be regarded as absolutely formless pure consciousness; by His power of consciousness (cic-chakti) He holds the individual souls within Him and by His power of materiality He spreads out the illusion of the material world and connects it with the former for their diverse experiences ^[4].

It is thus seen that God is admitted to have three distinct powers, the inner power as forming His essence (antaraṅga-svarūpa-śakti), the external power (bahiraṅga-śakti) as māyā and the power by which the individual souls are manifested. This conception however may seem to contradict the view already explained that Brahman is one undifferentiated consciousness. But the interpreters reconcile the two views by the supposition that from the ultimate point of view there is no distinction or difference between “power” and “possessor of power” (śakti and śaktimān). There is only one reality, which manifests itself both as power and possessor of power^[5]. When this one ultimate reality is looked at as the possessor of power, it is called God; when, however, emphasis is laid on the power, it is called the great power which is mythologically represented as Mahā lakṣmī^[6]. Thus the terms Brahman, Bhagavat and Paramātman are used for the same identical reality according as the emphasis is laid on the unity or differencelessness, the possessor of power, or the transcendent person. The antaraṅga, or the essential power, contains within it the threefold powers of bliss (hlādinī), being (sandhirtī) and consciousness (saṃvit), of which the two latter are regarded as an elaboration or evolution or manifestation of the former (the hlādinī power, or bliss). This threefold power is also called cic-chakti or ātma-māyā (essential māyā), and, as such, is to be distinguished from God’s external power of māyā (bahiraṅga-māyā), by which He creates the world. His other power, by which He holds the individual souls (which are but parts of Himself) within Himself and yet within the grasp and influence of His external power of māyā, is technically called taṭastha-śakti. The individual souls are thus to be regarded as the parts of God as well as manifestations of one of His special powers (taṭastha-śakti). Though the individual souls are thus contained in God as His power, they are in no way identical with Him, but are held distinct from Him as being the manifestations of one of His powers. The unity or oneness (advaya-tattva) consists in the facts that the ultimate reality is self-sufficient, wholly independent, and standing by itself; and that there is no other entity, whether similar (e.g. the individual souls) or dissimilar to it (e.g. the matrix of the world, the prakṛti), which is like it; for both the prakṛti and the jīvas depend upon God for their existence, as they are but manifestations of His power. God exists alone with His powers, and without Him the world and the souls would be impossible^[7]. The nature of His reality consists in the fact that it is of the nature of ultimate bliss (parama-sukha-rūpatva), the ultimate object of all desires (parama-puruṣārthatā) and eternal (nitya). It is this ultimate eternal reality which has formed the content of all Vedānta teachings. Thus the Bhāgavata-purāṇa points out that it is this reality which is the cause of the production, maintenance and destruction of all; it is this that continues the same in deep sleep, dreams and in conscious life; it is this that enlivens the body, senses, life and mind, yet in itself it is without any cause. It is neither born, nor grows, nor decays, nor dies, yet it presides over all changes as the one constant factor—as pure consciousness; and even in deep sleep, when all the senses have ceased to operate, its own self-same experience continues to be just the same^[8].

Now this reality is called Brahman by some, Bhagavat by some and Paramātman by others. When this reality, which is of the nature of pure bliss, is experienced by sages as being identical with their own selves, and when their minds are unable to grasp its nature as possessing diverse powers, and when no distinction between itself and its powers is realized, it is called Brahman. In such experiences this reality is only grasped in a general featureless way in its abstractness^[9]. But when this reality is realized by the devotees in its true nature as being possessed of diverse powers in their distinction from the former, He is called by the name Bhagavat. In this it is the pure bliss which is the substance or the possessor, and all the other powers are but its qualities. So, when the reality is conceived in its fulness in all its proper relations, it is called Bhagavat: whereas, when it is conceived without its specific relations and in its abstract character, it is called Brahman^[10]. So far as this distinction between the concepts of Brahman and Bhagavat is concerned it is all right. But in this system philosophy is superseded at this point by mythology. Mythologically Kṛṣṇa or the lord Bhagavān is described in the Purāṇas as occupying His throne in the transcendent Heaven (Vaikuṇtha) in His resplendent robes, surrounded by His associates. This transcendent Heaven (Vaikuṇtha) is non-spatial and non-temporal; it is the manifestation of the essential powers (svarūpa-śakti) of God, and as such it is not constituted of the guṇas which form the substance of our spatio-temporal world. Since it is non-spatial and non-temporal, it is just as true to say that God exists in Vaikuṇtha as to say that He Himself is Vaikuṇtha. Those who believed in this school of religion were so much obsessed with the importance of mythological stories and representations that they regarded God Himself as having particular forms, dress, ornaments, associates etc. They failed to think that these representations could be interpreted mythically, allegorically or otherwise. They regarded all these intensely anthropomorphic descriptions as being literally true. But such admissions would involve the irrefutable criticism that a God with hands, feet, and d??? would be destructible. To avoid this criticism they held that God’s forms, abode, etc., were constituted of non-spatial and non-temporal elements of His non-material essential power. But forms involve spatial notions, and non-spatial forms would mean non-spatial space. They had practically no reply to such criticism, and the only way in which they sought to avoid it was by asserting that the essential nature of God’s powers were unthinkable (acintya) by us, and that the nature of God’s forms which were the manifestations of this essential power could not therefore be criticized by us on logical grounds, but must be accepted as true on the authoritative evidence of the Purāṇas.

This notion of the supra-logical, incomprehensible or unthinkable (acintya) is freely used in this school to explain all difficult situations in its creeds, dogmas, and doctrines. Acintya is that which is to be unavoidably accepted for explaining facts, but which cannot stand the scrutiny of logic (tarkāsahaṃ yaj-jñānaṃ kāryānyathānupapatti-pramāṇakam), and which can account for all happenings that may be deemed incomprehensible or impossible (durghaṭa-ghaṭakatvam). How the formless Brahman may be associated with the three powers by which it can stay unchanged in itself and yet create the world by its external power of māyā or uphold the individual souls by its other power is a problem which it is attempted to explain by this concept of incomprehensibility (acintya)^[11]. The māyā which is the manifestation of the external power of God is defined in the Bhāgavata as that which cannot manifest itself except through the ultimate reality, and which yet does not appear in it, i.e. māyā is that which has no existence without Brahman and which, nevertheless, has no existence in Brahman^[12]. This māyā has two functions, viz. that with which it blinds the individual souls, called jīva-māyā, and the other by which the world transformations take place, called the guṇa-māyā.

Jīva Gosvāmī argues in his Sarva-saṃvādinī, which is a sort of a running commentary on Tattva-sandarbha, that the followers of Śaṅkara consider ultimate reality to be pure consciousness, one and undifferentiated. There exists no other entity similar or dissimilar to it, and it is this fact that constitutes its infinitude and its reality. According to them such a reality cannot have any separate power or even any power which may be regarded as its essence (svarūpa-bhūta-śakti). For, if such a power were different from reality, it could not be its identical essence; and if it were not different from reality, it could not be regarded as being its power. If such an essential power, as distinct from reality, be admitted, such a power must be of the same nature as reality (i.e. of the nature of pure consciousness); and this would make it impossible to conceive of this power as contributing God’s diverse manifestations, His transcendent forms, abode and the like, which are admitted to be the principal creed of the Vaiṣṇavas. But against the views of the followers of Śaṅkara it may be urged that even they have to admit that the Brahman has some power by which the world-appearance is manifested; if the world is wholly a creation of māyā and Brahman has nothing to do in it, there is no good in admitting its existence, and the māyā would be all in all. This power cannot be different in nature from the reality that possesses it, and, since the nescience or avidyā cannot exist without Brahman, it is an additional proof that the avidyā is also one of his powers. The power of any entity always exists in it as its own self even when it is not manifested. If it is argued that the Brahman is self-shining and that it does not require any power, it may be replied that the very reason by virtue of which it is self-shining may be regarded as its power. In this way Jīva follows some of the fundamental points in Rāmānuja’s argument in favour of the doctrine that ultimate reality, the Brahman, is not formless and qualityless, but a qualified being, having its powers and qualities. In attempting to prove this view Jīva follows briefly the central argument of Rāmānuja. But Jīva introduces the notion that the relation of the qualities and powers of ultimate reality is supra-logical, inexplain-able on logical grounds, and that therefore in a mysterious manner the powers are different from reality and yet one with it; so that in spite of the manifestation of ultimate reality as concrete God with human forms, dress etc., He is, at the same time, unchanged in His own changeless existence as Brahman. The introduction of the mystic formula of incomprehensibility seems to discharge the Vaiṣṇavas of this school from all responsibility of logically explaining their dogmas and creeds, and, thus uncontrolled, they descend from the domain of reason to the domain of the purāṇic faith of a mythological character.

In describing the special excellences of God, Jīva follows Rāmānuja in holding that He has none of the evil qualities that are found in the world, but possesses all the excellent characters that we can conceive of. In the light of the concept of incomprehensibility (acintya) all these excellent characters are regarded as somehow manifestations of His essential power and therefore identical with Him. The introduction of the supra-logical concept of acintya enables Jīva and other interpreters of the Bhāgavata of his school to indulge in eclecticism more freely than could otherwise have been possible; and thus it is that, though Jīva follows Rāmānuja in admitting ultimate reality to be qualified, he can in the same breath assert that ultimate reality is formless and characterless. Thus he says that, though the followers of Rāmānuja do not accept the view of Brahman as characterless, yet admission of characters naturally presupposes the admission of the characterless also^[13]. The idea of introducing the concept of the supra-logical in order to reconcile the different scriptural texts which describe reality as characterless (nirviśeṣa), qualified (viśiṣṭa) and many, can be traced to the introduction of the concept of viśeṣa in the philosophy of Madhva, already described in a previous chapter, by which Madhva tried to reconcile the concept of monism with that of plurality. The Bengal school of Vaiṣṇavism, introduced by Caitanya, is based principally on the Bhāgavata-purāṇa, and of the many writers of this school only two are prominent as authors of philosophical treatises, Baladeva Vidyābhūṣaṇa and Jīva Gosvāmī. Of these Baladeva has again and again referred to the indebtedness of this school to the philosophy of Madhva, and to the initiation of Caitanya as an ascetic by a follower of the Madhva school of Vaiṣṇavism. Though he was a junior contemporary of Jīva Gosvāmī and a commentator of the latter’s Tattva-sandarbha, yet he often reverts to Madhva’s doctrine of viśeṣa in reconciling the monistic position with the positions of qualified monism and pluralism. Had he adhered to Jīva’s concept of the supra-logical, the concept of viśeṣa would have been entirely unnecessary. Baladeva, however, uses not only the concept of viśeṣa, but also the concept of the supra-logical (acintya), and he characterizes the concept of viśeṣa as being itself the concept of the supra-logical. Thus in his Siddhānta-ratna he says that the qualities of consciousness, bliss, etc., do not differ .from the nature of Brahman, and yet Brahman is consistently described as possessing these different qualities because of the supra-logical functions of viśeṣa (acintya-viśeṣa - mahimnā). This assertion does not involve the doctrine that reality is from a particular point of view different from its qualities and from another point of view identical with them (na caivam bhedabhedau syātām), and the only solution of the difficulty is to assume the doctrine of the supra-logical (tasmād avicintyataiva śaraṇam). In this connection Baladeva further says that the doctrine of viśeṣa must be accepted as something which even in the absence of difference can explain the phenomena of difference^[14]. This concept of viśeṣa, however, is to be applied only in reconciling the simultaneous plurality and unity of ultimate reality. But so far as the relation between reality and individual souls is concerned, their difference is well known, and therefore the application of the principle of viśeṣa would be unjustifiable. The principle of viśeṣa is, however, applied not only in reconciling the unity of Brahman with the plurality of his qualities and powers, but also with his divine body, divine dress, his divine abode and the like, so that though these appear to be different from him they are at the same time identical with him^[15].

Speaking on the same topic, Jīva holds that God Viṣṇu’s power of consciousness (cic-chakti) is identical with His own essence. When this essence is on the way to produce effects, it is called power (sva-rūpam eva kāryyonmukhaṃ śakti-śabdena uktam). Now this special state of reality cannot be regarded as different from it, and can have no separate existence from it, since it can never be regarded (cintayituṃ aśakyatvād) as different from the essence of reality; since moreover difference itself cannot be regarded as being in any way different, the difference between the power and its possessor is unthinkable, incomprehensible and supra-logical. This view is not that of Rāmānuja and his followers, who regard the power as different from its possessor; yet, since they also believe that God’s powers are essentially contained in Him, there is a good deal of similarity between the Rāmānuja school and the Bengal school of Vaiṣṇavism^[16]. Arguing against the followers of Śaṅkara, Jīva says that even in the Upaniṣad passage on pure consciousness, bliss, the Brahman (vijñānam ānandaṃ Brahma), the consciousness and the bliss cannot be identical, for then the two words would be mere repetition; they cannot be different, for then Brahman would have two conflicting qualities within himself. If the two words vijñāna and ānanda mean the negation of ignorance and of sorrow, then these two negations, being two different entities, are coexistent in Brahman. If the two negations mean one entity, how can one entity be the negation of two different things? If it is said that only agreeable consciousness is called bliss, then again the quality of agreeableness stands out as a separate quality. Even if these words stood merely as negations of ignorance or sorrow, then these also would be specific characters; if it is urged that these are not specific characters, but represent only special potencies (yogyatā) by virtue of which ignorance and sorrow are negated, then nonetheless those special potencies would be special characters. Thus the theory that ultimate reality is characterless is false. The characters of Brahman are identically the same as his powers, and these are all identical with his own self.

On the subject of the nature of self, Jīva says that individual selves are not pure consciousness, but entities which are characterized by self-consciousness as “ego” or “I.” Individual souls are on no account to be regarded as being identical with God or Paramātman, and each individual self is different from every other^[17]. These individual souls are of atomic size and therefore partless. The atomic self resides in the heart, whence it pervades the whole body by its quality of consciousness, just as sandal paste pervades the whole neighbourhood by its sweet smell. Just so, individual selves are atomic, but they pervade the bodies in which they are located by their power of consciousness. Consciousness is called a quality of the self because it is always dependent on that and serves its purpose (nitya-tad-āśrayatva-tac-cheṣatva-nibandhanaḥ)^[18]. Again, consciousness, being thus dependent on the self, expands and contracts in order to pervade the different bodies in which it may be operating at the time. Being thus different from God, individual selves, even in emancipation, remain separate and distinct. They are thus produced from the highest self (Paramātman or God), and they are always under His absolute control and pervaded by Him. It is on this account that God is called Paramātman as distinguished from individual souls (ātman). They are like rays emanating from Him and are therefore always entirely dependent on Him and cannot exist without Him^[19]. They are also regarded as God’s disengaged power (taṭastha-śakti), because, though they are God’s power, yet they are in a way disengaged and separately situated from Him, and therefore they are under the delusion of God’s other power, māyā, which has no influence on God Himself; and therefore, though individual selves are suffering under the blinding operation of ignorance (avidyā), the highest self (paramātman) is absolutely untouched by them. As individual souls are the powers of God, they are sometimes spoken of as identical with Him and sometimes as different from Him. Of these individual selves some are always naturally devoted to God, and others are dominated by ignorance and are turned away from Him; it is the latter that are the denizens of this world and suffer rebirth.

^[20] (note is lost in this page)

Māyā, the external power (bahiraṅga-śakti) has two functions, creative (nimitta) and passive (upādāna) ; of these, time (kāla), destiny (daiva), and actions (karma) represent the former, and the three guṇas the latter. Individual selves contain within them as integral parts elements of both these functions of māyā. The creative function of māyā has again two modes, which operate either for the bondage or for the liberation of man. This creative māyā also typifies the cosmic knowledge of God, His will and His creative operation^[21]. Knowledge of God is also regarded as twofold —that which is His own self-knowledge and which forms a part of His essential power (svarūpa-śakti), and that which is turned towards cosmical operation for the good of the individual selves. It is this cosmic knowledge of God that falls within the creative function of His power of māyā. This cosmic knowledge is again twofold—that which abides in God as His omniscience, His desire of creation, and his effort of creation (otherwise called time (kāla)); and that which He passes over to individual selves as their desire for enjoyment or liberation from their works (karma), etc.; these in their turn are regarded as their ignorance (avidyā) and wisdom (vidyā)^[22]. Māyā according to this view does not mean ignorance, but power of manifold creation (mīyate vicitraṃ nirmiyata anayā iti vicitrārtha-kara-śakti-vacitvam eva), and therefore the world is to be regarded as a transformation of Paramātman (paramātma-pariṇāma eva)^[23]. By the supra-logical power of God, He remains unchanged in Himself and is yet transformed into the manifold creations of the world. According to Jīva, pariṇāma does not mean the transformation of reality (na tattvasya pariṇāma), but a real transformation (tattvato pariṇāmaḥ)^[24]. The manifestation of God in Himself in His own essential power (svarūpa-śakti) remains however always untouched by His transformations through His supra-logical māyā power unto the world. This does not mean that God has two distinct forms, but merely that what appears contradictory to our ordinary reason may yet be a transcendental fact; and in the transcendental order of things there is no contradiction in supposing God as unchanged and as at the same time changeable by the operation of His two distinct powers. Māyā in this system is not something unreal or illusory, but represents the creative power of God, including His omniscience and omnipotence, the entire material substance of the world in the form of the collocation and combination of the guṇas, and also the totality of human experience for good and for evil in all its diverse individual centres of expression. But in spite of all these transformations and manifestations of Himself through His supra-logical power of māyā, He remains entirely complete and unchanged in the manifestations of His supra-logical essential power. On the one side we have God as the creator and upholder of the universe, and on the other we have the God of religion, the object of the mystic raptures of His devotees. The world is produced by the māyā power of God and is therefore not identical with Him. The gross and the impure selves and the world, all that is conscious and unconscious, the cause and the subtle pure element of the self—none of them are different from God, because the subtler ones are of the nature of His power, and the grosser ones are the modification or effects of His power; and though the world is one with Him, yet the defects and impurities of the world do not affect Him in the least, for in spite of these transformations He is untouched by them; such is the supra-logical character of His power^[25].

Jīva then proceeds to show that the ultimate substance of the gross physical world, of the five elements and their modifications, is none other than the highest self, Paramātman or God. There is nothing in gross physical objects which can explain their appearance of unity as concrete wholes. For these wholes cannot be wholes in the same sense as forests made up of trees; these latter, indeed, cannot properly be called wholes, for, if one pulls a tree, the forest is not pulled; whereas in the case of a concrete object, when one pulls at one end, the object itself is pulled. If it is argued that there is a whole distinct from the parts, then its relation to the latter would be incomprehensible, for it is never experienced as entirely different from the parts; if the whole is supposed to be connected with each of the parts, then even a finger may be felt as a whole body; if it is supposed that a whole exists in parts only, in parts, then the same difficulty will again arise, and there will be a vicious infinite. So no concrete whole as distinct from the parts can be admitted to exist, and for the same reason the separate concrete existence of the elements may be denied. If the existence of wholes is denied in this way, then the existence of parts must also be denied; for, if there are no wholes, then there cannot be any parts, since it is only the wholes that are directly experienced, and parts are only admitted to account for the experience of the wholes. So the only assumption that remains is that God is the ultimate substance. Jīva refers to the Bhāgavata-purāṇa, 111. 6.1-3, which seems to hold that the discrete elements of God’s own powers form the twenty-three Sāṃkhya categories, which are combined and united into wholes through the element of time, which is but another name for His transcendent effort. The curious doctrine here put forth is rather very new in the history of Indian philosophy, though it is unfortunate that it has not been further developed here. It seems to maintain that the discrete elements of the substantial part (upādānāṃśa) of māyā derive their appearance of reality from God, and that through God’s elan or activity as time these elements are held together and produce the notion of wholes, since there is no other whole than God. How time is responsible for the combination of atoms into molecules and of molecules into wholes is not explained.

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

Bhāgavata-purāṇa, I. 3. 30.

[2]:

Ibid. I. 7. 6 (Śrīdhara’s comment):

tad uktaṃ viṣṇu-svāminā
hlādinyā saṃvidāśliṣṭaḥ sac-cid-ānanda īśvaraḥ
svāvidyā-saṃvṛto jtvaḥ saṃkleśa-nikarākaraḥ
tathā sa lso yad-vaśe māyā sajīvo yas tayārditaḥ, etc.

Jīva quotes the same passage and locates it in Sarvajña-śukti Ṣaṭ-sandarbha, p. 191.

[3]:

tvam ādyaḥ puruṣaḥ sākṣād īśvaraḥ prakṛteḥ paraḥ
māyāṃ vyudasya cic-chaktyā kaivalye sthita ātmani
sa eva jīva-lokasya māyā-mohita-cetaso
      vidhatse svena vīryeṇa śreyo dharmādi-lakṣaṇam. Ibid. I. 7. 23, 24.

[4]:

anantāvyakta-rūpeṇa yenedam akhilaṃ tatam
cid-acic-chakti-yuktāya tasmai bhagavate namaḥ.
      Bhāgavata, VII. 3. 34.

[5]:

atha ekam eva svarupaṃ śaktitvena śaktimattvena ca virājati.
      Ṣaṭ-sandarbha, p. 188 (Śyāmalāl Gosvāmī’s edition).

[6]:

yasya śakteḥ svarūpa-bhūtatvaṃ nirūpitaṃ tac-chaktimattva-prādhānyena virājamānam bhagavat-saṃjñām āpnoti tac ca vyākhyātam; tad eva ca śaktitva-prādhānyena virājamānaṃ lakṣmī-saṃjñām āpnoti.
      Ibid.

[7]:

advayatvaṃ ca asya svayaṃ-siddha-tādṛśātādṛśa-tattvāntarābhāvāt svaśaktyeka-sahāyatvāt, paramāśrayaṃ taṃ vinā tāsām asiddhatvāc ca.
      Tattva-sandarbha, p. 37.

[8]:

Bhāgavata-purāṇa, XI. 3. 35-39.

[9]:

tad ekam eva akhaṇḍānanda-rūpaṃ tattvaṃ...parama-haṃsānāṃ sādhana-vaśāt tādātmyam anupapamyaṃ satyām api tadīya-svarūpa-śakti-vaicitryāṃ tad-grahaṇa-sāmarthye cetasi yathā sāmānyato lakṣitaṃ tathaiva sphurad vā tad-vad eva avivikta-śakti-śaktimattābhedatayā pratipādyamānaṃ vā brahmeti śabdyate.
      Ṣaṭ-sandarbha, pp. 49-50.

[10]:

evaṃ ca ānanda-mātraṃ viśeṣyaṃ samastāḥ śaktayaḥ viśeṣaṇāni viśiṣṭo bhagavān ityāyātam. tathā caivaṃ vaiśiṣṭye prāpte pūrṇāvirbhāvatvena akhaṇḍa-tattva-rūpo’sau bhagavān brahma tu sphuṭam aprakaṭita-vaiśiṣṭyākāratvena tasyaiva asamyag-āvirbhāvaḥ.
      Ibid. p. 50.

[11]:

In che Viṣṇu-purāṇa these three powers are called parā, avidyā-karma-saṃjñā and kṣetrajñākhya. This parā māyā or the svarūpa-śakti is also sometimes called yoga-māyā.

[12]:

ṛte’rthaṃ yat pratīyeta tia pratīyeta cātmani
tad vidyād ātmatio māyāṃ yathābhāso yathā tamaḥ.
      Bhāgavata, II. 9. 33.

[13]:

yadyapi śrī-Rāmānujīyair nirviśeṣaṃ brahma na manyate tathāpi saviśeṣaṃ manyamānair viśeṣātiriktaṃ mantavyam eva.
      Jīva’s Sarva-saṃvādinī, p. 74 (Nityasvarūpa Brahmacārī’s edition).

[14]:

Siddhānta-ratna, pp. 17-22 (Benares, 1924).

[15]:

tathā ca vigrahādeḥ sva-rupānatireke’pi viśeṣād eva bheda-vyavahāraḥ. Ibid. p. 26.

[16]:

Sama-saṃvādinī, pp. 29, 30.

[17]:

tasmāt prati-kṣetraṃ bhinna eva jīvaḥ. Ibid. p. 87.

[18]:

Ibid. p. 94.

[19]:

tadīya-raśmi-sthānīyatve’pi nitya-tad-āśrayitvāt, tadvyatirekeṇa vyatirekāt.
      Ṣaṭ-sandarbha, p. 233.

[20]:

tad evaṃ śaktitve’pi anyatvam asya taṭasthatvāt, taṭasthatvaṃ ca māyāśakty-atītatvāt, asya avidyā-parābhavādi-rūpeṇa doṣeṇa paramātmano lopābhāvāc ca.
      Ibid. p. 234.

[21]:

nimittāṃśa-rūpayā māyākhyayaiva prasiddhā śaktis tridhā dṛśyate jñānecchā-kriyā-rūpatvena.
      Ibid. p. 244.

[22]:

Ṣaṭ-sandarbha, p. 244.

[23]:

Ibid. p. 247.

[24]:

tattvato’nyathā-bhāvaḥ pariṇāma ityeva lakṣaṇaṃ na tu tattvasya.
      Sarva-saṃvādinī, p. 121.

[25]:

Ibid. p. 251.