Part 12 - Epistemology of the Rāmānuja School according to Meghanādāri and others

Veṅkaṭanātha, in his Nyāya-pariśuddhi, tries to construct the principles of Logic (Nyāya or Nīti) on which Rāmānuja’s system of philosophy is based. He was not a pioneer in the field, but he followed and elaborated the doctrines of Viśiṣṭā-dvaita logic as enunciated by Nāthamuni, the teacher of Yāmuna, in his work called Nyāya-tattva, and the works of Parāśara bhaṭṭa on the subject.

Regarding the system of Nyāya propounded by Gotama, Venkata’s main contention is that though Gotama’s doctrines have been rejected by Bādarāyaṇa as unacceptable to right-minded scholars, they may yet be so explained that they may be made to harmonize with the true Vedāntic doctrines of Viśiṣṭā-dvaita. But the interpretations of Gotama’s Nyāya by Vātsyāyana take them far away from the right course and have therefore to be refuted. At any rate Veṅkaṭa, like Viṣṇucitta, is not unwilling to accept such doctrines of Gotama as are not in conflict with the Vedānta view. Thus, there may be a divergence of opinion regarding the sixteenfold classification of logical categories. There can be no two opinions regarding the admission of the fact that there are at least certain entities which are logically valid ; for if logical validity is denied, logic itself becomes unfounded.

All our experiences assume the existence of certain objective factors on which they are based. A general denial of such objective factors takes away the very root of experience. It is only when such objective factors are admitted to be in existence in a general manner that there may be anv inquiry regarding their specific nature. If everything were invalid, then the opponent’s contention would also be invalid. If everything were doubted, then also it would remain uncontradictory. The doubt itself cannot be doubted and the existence of doubt would have to be admitted as a decisive conclusion. So, even by leading a full course of thoroughgoing doubt, the admission of the possibilitv of definite conclusion becomes irresistible^[1]. Therefore, the contention of the Buddhists that there is nothing valid and that there is nothing the certainty of which can be accepted, is inadmissible. If, therefore, there are things of which definite and valid knowledge is possible, there arises a natural inquiry about the means or instruments by which such valid knowledge is possible.

The word pramāṇa is used in two senses. Firstly, it means valid knowledge; secondly, it means instruments by which valid knowledge is produced. pramāṇa as valid knowledge is defined by Veṅkaṭa as the knowledge which corresponds to or produces a behaviour leading to an experience of things as they are (yathā-vasthita-vyavahārā-nu-guṇam)^[2]. The definition includes behaviour as an indispensable condition of pramāṇa such that, even though in a particular case a behaviour may not actually be induced, it may yet be pramāṇa if the knowledge be such that it has the capacity of producing a behaviour which would tally with things as they are^[3].

The definition of pramāṇa as knowledge leading to a behaviour tallying with facts naturally means the inclusion of valid memory within it. An uncontradicted memory is thus regarded as valid means of knowledge according to the Rāmānuja system^[4]. Veṅkaṭa urges that it is wrong to suppose the illicit introduction of memory as the invariable condition of illusion, for in such illusory perception as that of yellow conch-shell, there is manifestly no experience of the production of memory. The conch-shell directly appears as yellow. So in all cases of illusions the condition that is invariably fulfilled is that one thing appears as another, which is technically called anyathā-khyāti. But it may as well be urged that in such an illusion as that of the conch-shell-silver, the reason why the conch-shell appears as the silver is the non-apprehension of the distinction between the subconscious image of the silver seen in shops and the perception of a shining piece before the eyes, technically called akhyāti . Thus, in all cases of illusion, when one thing appears as another there is this condition of the non-apprehension of the distinction between a memory image and a percept.

If illusions are considered from this point of view, then they may be said to be primarily and directly due to the aforesaid psychological fact known as akhyāti . Thus, both these theories of illusion have been accepted by Rāmānuja from two points of view. The theory of anyathā-khyāti appeals directly to experience, whereas the akhyāti view is the result of analysis and reasoning regarding the psychological origin of illusions^[5]. The other theory of illusion (yathārtha-khyāti), which regards illusions also as being real knowledge, on the ground that in accordance with the pañcl-karaṇa theory all things are the result of a primordial admixture of the elements of all things, is neither psychological nor analytical but is only metaphysical, and as such does not explain the nature of illusions. The illusion in such a view consists in the fact or apprehension of the presence of such silver in the conch-shell as can be utilized for domestic or ornamental purposes, whereas the metaphysical explanation only justifies the perception of certain primordial elements of silver in the universal admixture of the elements of all things in all things.

In refuting the ātma-khyāti theory of illusion of the Buddhists, Veṅkaṭa says that if the idealistic Buddhist can admit the validity of the different awarenesses as imposed on the one fundamental consciousness, then on the same analogy the validity of the perceived objects may also be admitted. If the different subjective and objective awarenesses are not admitted, then all experiences would be reduced to one undifferentiated consciousness, and that would be clearly against the Buddhistic theory of knowledge. The Buddhist view that entities which are simultaneously apprehended arc one, and that therefore knowledge and its objects which are apprehended simultaneously are one, is wrong. Knowledge and its objects are directly apprehended as different, and therefore the affirmation of their identity is contradicted in experience. The Mādhyamika Buddhists further hold that, just as in spite of the falsehood of the defects (doṣa), illusions happen, so in spite of the falsehood of any substratum or any abiding entity, illusions may appear as mere appearances without any reality behind them.

Against such a view, Veṅkaṭa savs that whatever is understood by people as existent or non-existent has always a reference to a reality, and mere phenomena without any basis or ground on reality are incomprehensible in all our experience. Hence the pure phenomenalism of the Mādhyamika is wholly against all experience^[6]. When people speak of non-existence of any entity, they always do it with some kind of spatial or temporal qualification. Thus, when they say that the book does not exist, they always qualify this nonexistence with a “here” and a “there” orwith a “now” ora “then.” But pure unqualified non-existence is unknown to ordinary experience^[7]. Again all positive experience of things is spatiallv limited (e.g. there is a jug “here”); if this spatial qualification as “here” is admitted, then it cannot be held that appearances occur on mere nothing (nir-adhiṣṭḥāna-bhramā-nupapattiḥ). If, however, the limitation of a “here” or “there” is denied, then no experience is possible (pratīter apahnava eva syāt).

Criticizing the a-nirvacanīya theory of illusion of the Vedāntists Veṅkaṭanātha says that when the Śaṅkarites described all things as indefinable (a-nirvacaniya), the word “indefinable” must mean either some definite trait, in which case it would cease to be indefinable, or it might mean failure to define in a particular manner, in which case the Śaṅkarites might as well accept the Rāmānuja account of the nature of the universe. Again when the Śaṅkarites are prepared to accept such a self-contradictory category as that which is different both from being and non-being (sad-asad-vyatirekaḥ), why cannot they rather accept things as both existent and non-existent as they are felt in experience? The self-contradiction would be the same in either case. If, however, their description of the world-appearance as something different from being and non-being is for the purpose of establishing the fact that the world-appearance is different both from chimerical entities (tuccha) and from Brahman, then Rāmānujists should have no dispute with them.

Further, the falsity of the world does not of itself appeal to experience; if an attempt is made to establish such a falsity through unfounded dialectic, then by an extension of such a dialectic even Brahman could be proved to be self-contradictory. Again the assertion that the world-appearance is non-existent because it is destructible is unfounded; for the Upaniṣads speak of Brahman, the individual souls and the prakṛti as being eternal. The Śaṅkarites also confuse destruction and contradiction (nacai’kyaṃ nāśa-bādhayoḥ)^[8].

The followers of Patañjali speak of an illusory comprehension through linguistic usage in which we are supposed to apprehend entities which have no existence. This is called nirviṣaya-khyāti. Thus, when we speak of the head of Rāhu, we conceive Rāhu as having an existence apart from his head, and this apprehension is due to linguistic usage following the genitive case-ending in Rāhu, but Veṅkaṭa urges that it is unnecessary to accept a separate theory of illusion for explaining such experience, since it may well be done by the ākhyāti or anyathā-khyāti theory of illusion, and he contends that he has already demonstrated the impossibility of other theories of illusion.

Meghanādāri, however, defines pramāṇa as the knowledge that determines the objects without depending on other sources of knowledge such as memory^[9].

Though knowledge is self-revealing (sva-mūrtāv api svayam eva hetuḥ), and though there is a continuity of consciousness in sleep, or in a state of swoon, yet the consciousness in these stages cannot reveal objects of cognition. This is only possible when knowledge is produced through the processes known as pramāṇa. When we speak of the self-validity of knowledge, we may speak of the cognition as being determined by the objects that it grasps (artha-paricchinnaṃ pramāṇam). But when we speak of it from the perceptual point of view or from the point of view of its determining the objects of knowledge, we have to speak of knowledge as determining the nature of objects (artha-paricchedaka) and not as being determined by them.

Knowledge may thus lie looked at from a subjective point of view in self-validity of cognition (svataḥ-prāmāṇya). Then the self-validity refers to its content which is determined by the objects of comprehension. It has also to be looked at from the objective point of view in all cases of acquirement of knowledge and in our behaviour in the world of objects, and then the knowledge appears as the means by which we determine the nature of the objects and measure our behaviour accordingly. The definition of knowledge as that which measures the nature of objects (artha-pariccheda-kāri jñānaṃ pramāṇam), as given by Meghanādāri is thus somewhat different from that given by Yeṅkata, who defines it as that which corresponds to or produces a behaviour leading to an experience of things as they are (yathā-vasthita vyavahārā-nuguṇam). In the case of Yeṅkata, knowledge is looked at as a means to behaviour and it is the behaviour which is supposed to determine the nature of correspondence.

In Meghanādāri’s definition the whole question of behaviour and of correspondence is lost sight of, or at least put in the background. The emphasis is put on the function of knowledge as determining the objects. The supposition probably is that in case of error or illusion also the real object is perceived, and the illusion is caused through the omission of other details, a correct perception of which would have rendered the illusion impossible. We know already that according to the yathārtha-khyāti theory of Rāmānuja there are elements of all things in all things, according to the Upaniṣadic theory of “trivṛt-karaṇa” and its elaboration in the pañcī-karaṇa doctrine. What happens therefore in illusion (e.g. the conch-shell -silver) is that the visual organ is in contact with the element of silver that forms one of the constituents of the conch-shell. This element of silver no doubt is infinitesimally small as compared with the overwhelmingly preponderating parts—the conch-shell. But on account of the temporary defect of the visual organ or other distracting circumstances, these preponderating parts of the conch-shell are lost sight of.

The result is that knowledge is produced only of the silver elements with which the sense-organ was in contact; and since the conch-shell element had entirely dropped out of comprehension, the silver element was regarded as being the only one that was perceived and thus the illusion was produced. But even in such an illusion the perception of silver is no error. The error consists in the non-perception of the preponderating part— the conch-shell. Thus, even in illusory perception, it is undoubtedly a real object that is perceived. The theory of anyathā-khyāti is that illusion consists in attributing a quality or character to a thing which it does not possess. In an indirect manner this theory is also implied in the yathārtha-khyāti theory in so far that here also the characters attributed (e.g. the silver) to the object of perception (purovarti vastu) do not belong to it, though the essence of illusion does not consist in that, and there is no real illusion of perception. Meghanādāri thus holds that all knowledge is true in the sense that it has always an object corresponding to it, or what has been more precisely described by Anantācārya that all cognitive characters (illusory or otherwise) universally refer to real objective entities as objects of knowledge^[10].

We have seen that Yeṅkata had admitted three theories of illusion, namely,

1. anyathā-khyāti,
2. ākhyāti
3. and yathārtha-khyāti,

from three different points of view. This does not seem to find any support in Meghanādāri’s work, as he spares no effort to prove that the yathārtha-khyāti theory is the only theory of illusion and to refute the other rival theories. The main drift of Meghanādāri’s criticism of anyathā-khyāti consists in the view that since knowledge must always refer to an object that is perceived, it is not possible that an object should produce a knowledge giving an entirely different content, for then such a content w'ould refer to no object and thus would be chimerical (tuccha). If it is argued that the object is present elsewhere, then it might be contended that since the presence of the object can be determined only by the content of knowledge, and since such an object is denied in the case of illusory perception where we have such a knowledge, what is the guarantee that the object should be present in other cases? In those cases also it is the knowledge that alone should determine the presence of the object. That is to say, that if knowledge alone is to be the guarantor of the corresponding object, it is not right to say in two instances where such knowledge occurs that the object exists in one case and not in the other^[11].

In refuting the anirvacanīya-khyāti Meghanādāri says that if it is supposed that in illusions an indefinable silver is produced which is mistaken for real silver, then that is almost the same as the anyathā-khyāti view, for here also one thing is taken as another. Moreover, it is difficult to explain how the perception of such an indefinable silver would produce the real desire for picking it up which is possible only in the case of the perception of real silver. A desire which can be produced by a real object can never be produced by a mere illusory notion. Nor can there be any similarity between a mere illusory notion and the real shining entity, viz. silver^[12]. The so-called indefinable silver is regarded either as being of the nature of being and non-being, or as different from being and non-being, both of which are impossible according to the Law of Contradiction and the Law of Excluded Middle. Even if it be admitted for the sake of argument that such an extra-logical entity is possible, it would be difficult to conceive how it could have any similarity with such a positive entity as ordinary silver. It cannot be admitted that this complex of being and non-being is of the nature of pure vacuity, for then also it would be impossible to conceive any similarity between a vacuum entity and real silver^[13].

Again it is said that the illusory silver is called indefinable (anirvacanīya) because it is different from pure being such as the self which is never contradicted in experience (ātmano bādhā-yogāt) and from non-being such as the chimerical entities like the hare’s horn which can never be objects of knowledge (khyāty-ayogāt). But in reply to this it may very well be urged that the being of the self cannot itself be proved, for if the self were the object of knowledge it would be as false as the world appearance; and if it were not it could not have any being. It cannot also be said to have being because of its association with the class concept of being, for the self is admitted to be one, and as such cannot be associated with class concept^[14]. Again want of variability cannot be regarded as a condition of reality, for if the cognitive objects are unreal because they are variable, the knower himself would be variable on account of his association with variable objects and variable relations, and would therefore be false. Again being (sattā) is not as universal as it is supposed to be, for it is different from the entities (jug, etc.) to which it is supposed to belong and also from negation in the view that holds negation to be a positive category^[15]. If the self is regarded as self-luminous, then it may also be contended that such self-luminosity must be validly proved; and it may also be urged that unless the existence of the self has already been so proved its character cannot be proved to be self-luminous.^[16]

Again the akhyāti view is liable to two different interpretations, in both of which it may be styled in some sense as yathārtha-khyāti. In the first interpretation the illusion is supposed to be produced in the following manner: the visual organ is affected by the shining character of something before the eyes, and this shining character, being of the same nature as that of the silver, the shining character of the silver is remembered, and since it is not possible to distinguish whether this shining character belongs to silver or to something else, and since the object in front is associated with such an undiscriminated shining character, the shining character cannot be treated as a mere self-ejected idea, but has to be taken as having its true seat in that something before the eye; thus, the notion of silver is a result of a true perception. It would have been a false perception if the conch-shell had been perceived as silver, but in such a perception it is not the conch-shell, but “this” in front, that is perceived as silver.

The general maxim is that the idea which corresponds to any particular kind of behaviour is to be regarded as a true representation of the object experienced in such a behaviour (yad-artha-vyavahārā-nuguṇā ya dhīfi sā tad-artha). This maxim has its application here inasmuch as the “this” in front can be experienced in practical behaviour as such, and the silvery character has also a true reference to real silver. So the notion “this silver” is to be regarded as a complex of two notions, the “this” and the “silver.” Thus, the perception involved in the above interpretation is a true perception according to the akhyāti view. In the above explanation it is contended that just as the two different notions of substance and quality may both appear in the same concept, so there cannot be any difficulty in conceiving of a legitimate unity of two different notions in one illusory perception as “this silver.” Such a fusion is possible on account of the fact that here two notions occur in the same moment and there is no gap between them. This is different from the anyathā-khyāti view, in which one thing is supposed to appear as another.

The objections against this view are: firstly, that a defect cannot possibly transmute one thing into another; secondly, if illusions be regarded as the appearance of one thing as another, then there is scope for such a fear, even in those cases which are regarded as correct perception; for all knowledge would be exposed to doubt, and this would land us in scepticism. If, therefore, it is suggested that illusion is due to a non-comprehension of the difference between the presence of a conch-shell and the memory-image of silver, that also would be impossible. For if “difference” means only the different entities (becdo rastu-srurū-pam-eza), then non-comprehension of difference (which is regarded as the root-cause of illusion in the present view) would mean the comprehension of the identity of the memory-image and the percept, and that would not account for the qualified concept where one notion (e.g. the silver) appears as qualifying the other notion (the “this” before the eye).

Moreover, if two independent notions which are not related as substance and quality be miscomprehended as one concept, then any notion could be so united with any other notion, because the memory-images which are stored in our past experiences are limitless. Again the silver that was experienced in the past was experienced in association with the space in which it existed, and the reproduction of the silver and memory would also be associated with that special spatial quality. This would render its mis-association with the percept before the perceiver impossible on account of the spatial difference of the two. If it is contended that through the influence of defects the spatial quality of the memory-image is changed, then that would be the anyathā-khyāti theory, which would be inadmissible in the ākhyāti view.

Again since all sensible qualities must be associated with some kind of spatial relation, even if the original spatial quality be transmuted or changed, that would be no reason why such a spatial image should be felt as being in front of the perceiver. It must also be said that the distinctive differences between the memory-image and the percept are bound to be noted; for if such a distinctive difference were not noted, the memory-image could not be distinguished as “silver-image.” It cannot also be said that though the percept can be distinguished from the memory-image the latter cannot be distinguished from the former, for the discriminative character is a constituent of both, and it is nothing but the white shining attribute. If it is urged that the spatial and other distinctive qualities are not noted in the memory-iinage and it appears merely as an image, then it may well be objected that any and every memory-image may be confused with the present percept, and even a stone may appear as silver.

Since both the a-nirvacaniya-khvāti and the ākhyāti are in some sense yathārtha-khyāti, Meghanādāri refuted these two theories of illusion and attempted to show that the yathārtha-khyāti would be untenable in these views. Now he tries to show that all other possible interpretations of yathārtha-khyāti are invalid. The fundamental assumption of yathārtha-khyāti is that all knowledge must correspond to a real object like all right knowledge^[17]. Thus, in other interpretations, the yathārtha-khyāti or the correspondence theory, might mean that cognition is produced by a real object or by the objective percept or that it means uncontradicted experience.

The first alternative is untenable because even in the illusion of the conch-shell-silver the notion of silver has been produced by a real object, the conch-shell; the second view is untenable, for the object corresponding to the illusory percept of silver is not actually present in the conch-shell according to other theories; and so far as the operation of the memory impression of the silver as experienced in the past is concerned (pūrvā-nubhūta-rajata-sarnskāra-dvārā) its instrumentality is undeniable both in right and in illusory cognitions.

The third alternative is untenable because contradiction refers to knowledge or judgment and not to things themselves. If it is said that the cognition refers to the illusory appearance and hence it is the illusory entity existing outside that is the object of perception, the obvious objection would be that perception refers to a non-illusory something in front of the perceiver, and this cannot be obviated. If non-illusory something is a constituent in the cognition, then it would be futile to say that the mere illusory perceptual form is all that can be the object of perception.

It cannot also be said that the illusory perception has no object (nirviṣaya-khyāti) and that it is called cognition, because, though it may not itself be amenable to behaviour as right cognitions are, it is similar to them by producing an impression that it also is amenable to behaviour, just a& autumn clouds, which cannot shower, are also called clouds. The illusory cognition has for its content not only the illusory appearance but also the non-illusory “this” to which it objectively and adjectively refers. The truth, however, is that it is not indispensable for constituting the objectivity of a cognition that all the characters of the object should appear in the cognition; if any of its characters are manifested, that alone is sufficient to constitute the objectivity of an entity with regard to its cognition. The position, therefore, is that all cognitions refer and correspond to certain real entities in the objective world, and this cannot be explained on any other theory than on the supposition of a metaphysico-cosmological theory akin to the theory of homoiomeriae.

Anantācārya, in his Jñāna-yāthārthya-vāda, more or less repeats the arguments of Meghanādāri when he says that no cognition can be possible without its being based on a relation of correspondence to an objective entity. The content of knowledge must therefore have a direct correspondence with the objective entity to which it refers. Thus, since there is a perception of silver (in the illusory perception of conch-shell-silver), it must refer to an objective substratum corresponding to it^[18]. The Mīmāṃsā supposition that errors are produced through non-discrimination of memory-image and perception is also wrong, because in that case we should have the experience of remembering silver and not of perceiving it as an objective entity before us^[19]. Both Meghanādāri and Anantācārya take infinite pains to prove that their definition of error applies to all cases of illusions of diverse sorts, including dreams, into the details of which it is unnecessary for our present purposes to enter^[20].

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

vyavahāro hi jagato bhavaty ālmbane kvacit
na tat sāmānyato nāsti kathantā tu parīkṣyate
sāmānya-niścitā-rthena viśeṣe tu bubhutsitam
parīkṣā hy ucitā sve-ṣṭa-pramāṇo-tpādanā-tmikā.
.          .          .          .          .          .          .          .
sarvaṃ sandigdham iti te nipuṇasya sti niścayaḥ
saṃśayaś ca na sandigdhaḥ sandigdhā-dvaita-vādinaḥ.
     Nyāya-pariśuddhi, p. 31 (Chowkhamba edition).

[2]:

Nyāya-pariśuddhi, by Veṅkaṭanātha, p. 36.

[3]:

anugutia-padaṃ vyavahāra-janana-svariīpa-yogya-paraṃ tenā'janita-vyava-hāre yathā-rtha-jñāna-viśeṣe na vyāptiḥ.
     Śrīnivāsa’s Nyāya-sāra on Nyāya-pariśuddhi, p. 36.

[4]:

smṛti-mātrā-pramāṇatvaṃ na yuktam iti vakṣyate
abādhita-smṛiter loke pramāṇatva-parigrahāt.
     Nyāya-pariśuddhi, p. 38.

[5]:

idaṃ rajatam anubhavāmī’ty ekatvenai’va pratīyamānāyāḥ pratīter grahaṇa-smaraṇā-tmakatvam anekatvaṃ ca yuktitaḥ sādhyamānaṃ na pratīti-patham ārohati.
     Nyāya-sāra, p. 40.

[6]:

loke bhāvā-bhāva-śabdayos tat-pratītyoś ca vydyamānasyai’va vastunaḥ avasthā-viśeṣa-gocaratvasya pratipāditatvāt. prakārā-ntarasya ca loka-siddha-pramāṇā-viṣayatvād ity-arthaḥ.
     Nyāya-sāra, p. 46.

[7]:

sarvo’pi niṣedhaḥ sa-pratiyogiko niyata-deśa-kālaśca pratīyate. Nīrūpa-dhir niyata-deśa-kāla-pratiyogi-viśeṣaṇa-rahito niṣedho na pratīyate iti.
     Ibid. p. 46.

[8]:

Nyāya-pariśuddhi, pp. 48-51.

[9]:

“tatra nya-pramāṇā-napekṣam artha-paricchedakaṃ jñanaṃ pramāṇam, artha-paricchede’nya-pramāṇa-sāpekṣa-smṛtāv ativyāpti-parihāre’nya-pramāṇā-napekṣam iti.”
     Naya-dyu-maṇi, Madras Govt. Oriental MS.

[10]:

“Tat-tad-dharma-prakāraka-jñānatva-vyāpakaṃ tat-tad-dharmavad-viśes-yokatvam iti yathā'rthaṃ sarva-vijñānam iti.”
      Anantācārya, Jñāna-yāthārthya-vāda (MS.).

[11]:

na ca tadbajjñāne’stviti vācyaṃ. tad-ākārasya satyatve bhrāntitvā-nu-papattiḥ asattve tu na tasya jñānā-kāratā. tucchasya vastr-ākāratā-nupapatteḥ. tad-ākāratve ca khyātir eva tucche’ti śuktikādau na rajatā-rthi-pravṛttiḥ.
     Meghanādāri, Naya-dyu-maṇi (MS.).

The general drift of Meghanādāri’s theme may be summed up in the words of Anantācārya in his Jñāna-yāthārtliya-vāda (MS.) as follows:

“tathā ca rajatatvaṃ śukti-niṣṭha-viṣayatā-vacchedakatvā-bhāravat śukty-airttitvāt yo yad-arṛttiḥ sa tan-niṣṭha-dharma-nirūpitā-vacchedakatvā-bhāvavān iti sāmānya-vyāptau daṇḍa-niṣṭha-kāraṇatā-vacchedakatvā-bhāvavad daṇḍā-vṛtti ghaṭatrādikaṃ dṛṣṭāntaḥ.”

[12]:

“tasyā’nirvācya-raja tatayā grahaṇād viparīta-khyāti-pakṣa-pātaḥ. . . samyag-rajata-dhīr hi pravṛtti-hetuḥ. . . tasya pratīty-ātmaka-vastr-ātmakayor bhās-varatvā-di-sādṛśyā-bhāvāt”
     Ibid.

[13]:

ekasya yugapat sad-asadā-tmaka-viruddha-dharmavattvā-nupapatteḥ. tad-upapattāv api sādṛśyā-nupapatteśca. . . śūnya-vastuni pramāṇā-bhāvāt. tat-sad-bhāve’pi tasya rajata-sādṛśyā-bhāvācca tato na pravṛttiḥ.
     Ibid.

[14]:

tasya dṛśyatvā-nabḥyupaganie śaśa-viṣāṇā-dī-sāmyam. ātmanaḥ prameyatā ca ne'ṣṭe'ti, na tatas tat-sattā-siddḥiḥ. tad-abḥyupagatau ca pfapañcavanmithyāt-vaṃ. . . ātma-vyakter ekatvā-bhimānāt tad-vyatirikta-padārthasyā’sattvā-bhimān-ācca sattā-samavāyitvā-nupapatteḥ.
     Meghanādāri, Naya-dyu-maṇi.

[15]:

atha ghaṭa-paṭā-di-bhedānāṃ vyāvartamānatvenā’pāramārthyam. . . ātmano’pi ghaṭa-paṭādi-sarva-padārthebhyo vyāvartamānatvān mitḥyātvā-pattiḥ. . . ab-hivyañjakā-pāramārthye’bhivyañgyā-pāramārthyam. . . na ca sattvasyai’va sam-asta-padārtheṣv anuvartamānaṃ pāramārthyam. ghaṭādayo’pi tad-apekṣayā vyāvartante. . . abhāvasya padārthā-ntarbhāve’pi tatra sattā-nabhyupagamāt sarva-padārthā-nuvṛtty-abhāvāt.
     Ibid.

[16]:

na ca tasya svayaṃ-prakāśatvān na pramāṇā-pekṣe’ti svayaṃ-prakāśatvasyā’pi pramāṇā-dhīnatvāt pramāṇā-ntara-siddhā-tmanaḥ svayaṃ-prakāśatvasya sād-hyatvācca. na hi dharmy-aprasidhau dharma-sādhyatā.
     Ibid.

[17]:

vipratipannaḥ pratyciyo yatḥā-rthaḥ pratyatvāt, sampratipanna-pratyaya-vaditi.
     Naya-dyu-maṇi, p. 140 (MS.).

[18]:

tathā ca rajatatvaṃ śukti-niṣṭḥa-viṣayatā-vacchedakatvā-bhāvavat śukty-avṛttitvāt yo yad-avṛttiḥ sa tan-niṣṭḥa-dharma-nirūpitā-vacchedakatvā-bhāvavā-niti.
     Jñāna-yāthārthya-vāda (MS.).

[19]:

rajata-smaraṇe idaṃ-padārtha-grahaṇa-rīipa-jñāna-dvaya-kalpane rajataṃ smarāmī’ti tatrā’nubhaua-prasaṅgaḥ, na tu rajataṃ paśyāmīti, sākṣāt-kāratva-vyañjaka-viṣayatāyāḥ smaraṇe’bhāvāt.
     Ibid.

[20]:

(a) Ibid. (b) Meghanādāri, Naya-dyu-maṇi.