A History of Indian Philosophy Volume 2

by Surendranath Dasgupta | 1932 | 241,887 words | ISBN-13: 9788120804081

This page describes the philosophy of the ultimate entity: a concept having historical value dating from ancient India. This is the second part in the series called the “the philosophy of the yogavasishtha”, originally composed by Surendranath Dasgupta in the early 20th century.

The third book of the Yoga-vāsiṣṭha deals with origination (utpatti). All bondage (bandha) is due to the existence of the perceptible universe (dṛśya), and it is the main thesis of this work that it does not exist. At the time of each dissolution the entire universe of appearance is destroyed, like dreams in deep sleep (suṣupti). What is left is deep and static (stimita-gambhīra), neither light nor darkness, indescribable and unmanifested (anākhyam anabhivyaktam), but a somehow existent entity. This entity manifests itself as another (svayam anya ivollasan); and through this dynamic aspect it appears as the ever-active mind {manas) —like moving ripples from the motionless ocean. But in reality whatever appears as the diversified universe is altogether non-existent; for, if it was existent, it could not cease under any circumstances[1]. It does not exist at all. The ultimate indefinite and indescribable entity, which is pure extinction (Nirvāṇa-mātra), or pure intelligence (paro bodhaḥ), remains always in itself and does not really suffer any transformations or modifications.

Out of the first movement of this entity arises ego (svatā), which, in spite of its appearance, is in reality nothing but the ultimate entity. Gradually, by a series of movements (śpanda) like waves in the air, there springs forth the entire world-appearance. The ultimate entity is a mere entity of pure conceiving or imagining (saṃkalpa-puruṣa)[2]. The Muni held that what appears before us is due to the imagination of manas, like dreamland or fairyland (yathā saṃkalpa-nagaraṃ yathā gandharva-pattanam). There is nothing in essence except that ultimate entity, and whatever else appears does not exist at all—it is all mere mental creations, proceeding out of the substanceless, essenceless mental creations of the ultimate entity. It is only by the realization that this world-appearance has no possibility of existence that the false notion of ourselves as knowers ceases, and, though the false appearance may continue as such, there is emancipation (mokṣa).

This manas , however, by whose mental creations everything springs forth in appearance, has no proper form, it is merely a name, mere nothingness[3]. It does not exist outside or subjectively inside us; it is like the vacuity surrounding us everywhere. That anything has come out of it is merely like the production of a mirage stream. All characteristics of forms and existence are like momentary imaginations. Whatever appears and seems to have existence is nothing but manas , though this manas itself is merely a hypothetical starting-point, having no actual reality. For the manas is not different from the dreams of appearance and cannot be separated from them, just as one cannot separate liquidity from water or movement from air. Manas is thus nothing but the hypothetical entity from which all the dreams of appearance proceed, though these dreams and manas are merely the same and it is impossible to distinguish between them[4].

are thus but synonyms for the same concept[5]. It is the perceiver that appears as the perceived, and it is but the perceptions that appear as the perceiver and the perceived. The state of emancipation is the cessation of this world-appearance. There is in reality no perceiver, perceived or perceptions, no vacuity (śūnya), no matter, no spirit or consciousness, but pure cessation or pure negation, and this is what we mean by Brahman[6]. Its nature is that of pure cessation (śānta), and it is this that the Sāmkhyists call puruṣa, the Vedāntins call “Brahman,” the idealistic Buddhists call “pure idea” (vijñāna-mātra) and the nihilists “pure essencelessness” (śūnya)[7]. It is of the nature of pure annihilation and cessation, pervading the inner and the outer world[8]. It is described as that essencelessness (śūnya) which does not appear to be so, and in which lies the ground and being of the essenceless world-appearance (yasmin śūnyaṃ jagat sthitam), and which, in spite of all creations, is essenceless[9].

The illusory world-appearance has to be considered as absolutely non-existent, like the water of the mirage or the son of a barren woman. The ultimate entity is thus neither existent nor non-existent and is both statical and dynamical (spandāspandātmaka)[10]; it is indescribable and un-nameable (kimapy avyapadeśātmā) and neither being nor nonbeing nor being-non-being, neither statical being nor becoming (na bhāvo bhavanaṃ na ca). The similarity of the philosophy of the Yoga-vāsiṣṭha to the idealistic philosophy of the Laṅkāvatārasūtra is so definite and deep that the subject does not require any elaborate discussion and the readers are referred to the philosophy of the Laṅkāvatāra in the first volume of the present work. On Vedānta lines it is very similar to Prakāśānanda’s interpretation of the Vedānta in later times, called dṛṣṭi-sṛṣṭi-vāda, which can probably be traced at least as far back as Gaudapāda or Maṇḍana. Prakāśātman refers to the Yoga-vāsiṣṭha as one of his main authorities.

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

Yoga-vāsiṣṭha, III. 3.

[2]:

sarveṣāṃ bhūta-jātānāṃ saṃsāra-vyavahāriṇām
prathamo ’sau pratispandaś citta-dekaḥ svatodayaḥ
asmāt pūrvāt protispandād ananyaitat-svarūpiṇī
iyaṃ pravisṛtā sṛṣṭiḥ spanda-sṛṣṭir ivānilāt.
      III. 3. 14, 15

[3]:

rāmasya manaso rūpaṃ na kiṃcid api dṛśyate
nāma-mātrād ṛte vyomno yathā śūnya-jaḍākṛteḥ.
      III. 4. 38.

 

[4]:

pūrṇe pūrṇaṃ prasarati śānte śāntaṃ vyavasthitam
vyomany evoditaṃ vyoma brahmaṇi brahma tiṣṭhati
na dṛśyam asti sad-rūpaṃ na draṣṭā na ca darśanaṃ
na śūnyaṃ na jaḍaṃ no cic chāntam evedam ātatam.
      III. 4. 69, 70

[5]:

III. 4. 46

[6]:

III.5. 6-7.

[7]:

nāśa-rūpo vināśātmā.
     III. 5. 16.

[8]:

III. 7. 22.

[9]:

III. 9. 59.

[10]:

III. 9. 49.

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