A History of Indian Philosophy Volume 2

by Surendranath Dasgupta | 1932 | 241,887 words | ISBN-13: 9788120804081

This page describes the philosophy of philosophy of the prakatartha-vivarana (a.d. 1200): a concept having historical value dating from ancient India. This is the twenty-second part in the series called the “the shankara school of vedanta (continued)”, originally composed by Surendranath Dasgupta in the early 20th century.

Part 22 - Philosophy of the Prakaṭārtha-vivaraṇa (a.d. 1200)

The Prakaṭārtha-vivaraṇa (as the writer himself calls it in the colophon of the work— prārabhyate vivaraṇaṃ prakatārtham etat) is an important commentary still in manuscript on Śaṅkara’s commentary on the Brahma-sūtra, which the present writer had an opportunity of going through from a copy in the Adyar Library, Madras, through the kind courtesy of the Librarian, Mr T. R. Chintamani, who is intending to bring out an edition. The author, however, does not anywhere in the work reveal his own name and the references which can be found in other works are all to its name as Prakatar or to the author of the Prakaṭārtha (prakatārtha-kāra), and not to the author’s personal name[1].

This work has been referred to by Ānandajñāna, of the thirteenth century (Muṇḍaka, p. 32; Kena , p. 23; Ānandāśrama editions a.d. 1918 and 1917), and it may well be supposed that the author of the work lived in the latter half of the twelfth century. He certainly preceded Rāmādvaya, the author of the Vedānta-kaumudī, who not only refers to the Prakaṭārtha, but has been largely influenced in many of his conceptions by the argument of this work[2]. The author of the latter holds that the indefinable māyā in association with pure consciousness (cinmātra-sambandhinī) is the mother of all existence (bhūta-prakṛti).

Through the reflection of pure consciousness in māyā is produced īśvara (God), and by a transformation of Him there arises the creator Brahmā, and it is by the reflection of the pure consciousness in the infinite parts of this Brahmā that there arise the infinite number of individual souls through the veiling and creating functions of the māyā. Māyā or ajñāna is not negation, but a positive material cause, just as the earth is of the jug (ajñānam nābhāva upādānatvān mṛdvat). But, being of the nature of veiling (āvaraṇatvāt) and being destructible through right knowledge (prakāśa-heyatvāt), it cannot be known as it is: still it may well be regarded as the positive cause of all illusions[3]. The well-known Vedāntic term svaprakāśa is defined in the Prakaṭārtha as illumination without the cognition of its own idea (sva-saṃvin-nairapekṣeṇa sphuraṇam).

The self is to be regarded as self-revealing ; for without such a supposition the revelation of the self would be inexplicable[4]. The author of the Prakaṭārtha then criticizes the Kumārila view of cognition as being a subjective act, inferable from the fact of a particular awareness, as also the Nyāyā-Vaiśeṣika and Prabhākara views of knowledge as an illumination of the object inhering in the subject (ātma-samavāyī viṣaya-prakāśo jñānam) , and the Bhāskara view of knowledge as merely a particular kind of activity of the self; and he ultimately holds the view that the mind or manas is a substance with a preponderance of sattva, which has an illuminating nature, and that it is this manas which, being helped by the moral destiny (adṛṣṭādi-sahakṛtam), arrives at the place where the objects stand like a long ray of light and comes in contact with it, and then as a result thereof pure consciousness is reflected upon the object, and this leads to its cognition.

Perceptual cognition, thus defined, would be a mental transformation which can excite the revelation of an object (manaḥ-pariṇāmaḥ samvid-vyañjakojñānam)[5]. In the case of inference, however, the transformation of manas takes place without any actual touch with the objects; and there is therefore no direct excitation revealing the object; for the manas there, being in direct touch with the reason or the linga, is prevented from being in contact with the object that is inferred. There is here not an operation by which the knowledge of the object can be directly revealed, but only such a transformation of the manas that a rise of the idea about the object may not be obstructed[6]. The author of the Prakaṭārtha accepted the distinction between māyā and ajñāna as conditioning Īśvara and jīva.

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

The colophon of the work runs as follows:

jñātvāpi yasya bahu-kālam acintanena
vyākhyātum akṣamatayā paritāpi cetaḥ
tasyopatāpa-haraṇāya mayeha bhāṣye
prārabhyate vivaraṇam prakaṭārtham etat.

      MS. No. I, 38. 27, Govt. MSS. Library, Madras.

[2]:

Vedānta-kaumudī, MS. transcript copy, p. 99.

[3]:

āvaraṇatvāt prakāśa-ḥeyatvād vā tamovat-svarūpeṇa pramāṇa-yogyatve ’py abhāva-vyāvṛtti-bhrama-kāraṇatvādi-dharma-viśiṣṭasya prāmāṇikatvaṃ na viru-dhyate.
      MS. p. 12.

[4]:

ātmā sva-prakāśas tato ’nyathā’nupapadyamānatve sati
prakāśamānatvān na ya evaṃ na sa evaṃ yathā kumbhaḥ.
      Prakaṭārtha
MS.

[5]:

MS. p. 54.

[6]:

upalabḍha-sambandhārtha kāreṇa pariṇatam mano
’nāvabhāsa-vyāvṛtti-mātraphalam, na tu saṃvid-vyañjakam
ligādi-samvid-vyavadhāna-pratibandhāt.
      MS. p. 54.

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