Part 8 - The nature of the world-appearance, phenomena

The world-appearance is not however so illusory as the perception of silver in the conch-shell, for the latter type of worldly illusions is called prātibhāsika, as they are contradicted by other later experiences, whereas the illusion of world-appearance is never contradicted in this worldly stage and is thus called vyavahārika (from vyavahāra , practice, i.e. that on which is based all our practical movements). So long as the right knowledge of the Brahman as the only reality does not dawn, the world-appearance runs on in an orderly manner uncontradicted by the accumulated experience of all men, and as such it must be held to be true. It is only because there comes such a stage in which the world-appearance ceases to manifest itself that we have to say that from the ultimate and absolute point of view the world-appearance is false and unreal.

As āgainst this doctrine of the Vedānta it is sometimes asked how, as we see the reality (sattva) before us, we can deny that it has truth. To this the Vedānta answers that the notion of reality cannot be derived from the senses, nor can it be defined as that which is the content of right knowledge, for we cannot have any conception of right knowledge without a conception of reality, and no conception of reality without a conception of right knowledge. The conception of reality comprehends within it the notions of unalterability, absoluteness, and independence, which cannot be had directly from experience, as this gives only an appearance but cannot certify its truth. Judged from this point of view it will be evident that the true reality in all our experience is the one self-luminous flash of consciousness which is all through identical with itself in all its manifestations of appearance.

Our present experience of the world-appearance cannot in any way guarantee that it will not be contradicted at some later stage. What really persists in all experience is the being (sat) and not its forms. This being that is associated with all our experience is not a universal genus nor merely the individual appearance of the moment, but it is the being, the truth which forms the substratum of all objective events and appearances (ekenaiva sarvānugatena sarvatra satpratītik). Things are not existent because they possess the genus of being (sat) as Nyāya supposes, but they are so because they are themselves but appearance imposed on one identical being as the basis and ground of all experience. Being is thus said to be the basis (adhiṣṭhāna) on which the illusions appear. This being is not different with different things but one in all appearances. Our perceptions of the world-appearance could have been taken as a guarantee of their reality, if the reality which is supposed of them could be perceived by the senses, and if inference and śruti (scriptures) did not point the other way.

Perception can of course invalidate inference, but it can do so only when its own validity has been ascertained in an undoubted and uncontested manner. But this is not the case with our perceptions of the world-appearance, for our present perceptions cannot prove that these will never be contradicted in future, and inference and śruti are also against it. The mere fact that I perceive the world-appearance cannot prove that what I perceive is true or real, if it is contradicted by inference. We all perceive the sun to be small, but our perception in this case is contradicted by uiference and we have hence to admit that our perceptions are erroneous. We depend (upajīvya) indeed for all our transactions on perception, but such dependence cannot prove that that on which we depend is absolutely valid. Validity or reality can only be ascertained by proper examination and enquiry (parīkṣā), which may convince us that there is no error in it.

True it is that by the universal testimony of our contemporaries and by the practical fruition and realization of our endeavours in the external world, it is proved beyond doubt that the world-appearance before us is a reality. But this sort of examination and enquiry cannot prove to us with any degree of satisfaction that the world-appearance will never be contradicted at any time or at any stage. The Vedānta also admits that our examination and enquiry prove to us that the world-appearance now exists as it appears; it only denies that it cannot continue to exist for all times, and a time will come when to the emancipated person the world-appearance will cease to exist.

The experience, observation, and practical utility of the objects as perceived by us cannot prove to us that these will never be contradicted at any future time. Our perception of the world-appearance cannot therefore disprove the Vedānta inference that the world-appearance is false, and it will demonstrate itself to be so at the time when the right knowledge of Brahman as one dawns in us. The testimony of the Upaniṣads also contradicts the perception which grasps the world-appearance in its manifold aspect.

Moreover we are led to think that the world-appearance is false, for it is not possible for us to discover any true relation between the consciousness (dṛk) and the objects of consciousness (dṛśya). Consciousness must be admitted to have some kind of connection with the objects which it illumines, for had it not been so there could be any knowledge at any time irrespective of its connections with the objects. But it is not possible to imagine any kind of connection between consciousness and its objects, for it can neither be contact (saṃyoga) nor inherence (samavāya); and apart from these two kinds of connections we know of no other.

We say that things are the objects of our consciousness, but what is meant by it is indeed difficult to define. It cannot be that objectivity of consciousness means that a special effect like the jñātatā of Mīmāṃsā iff produced upon the object, for such an effect is not admi&rble or perceivable in any way; nor can objectivity also mean any practical purpose (of being useful to us) associated with the object as Prabhākara thinks, for there are many things which are the objects of our consciousness but not considered as useful (e.g. the sky).

Objectivity also cannot mean that the thing is the object of the thought-movement (jñānakāraṇa') involved in knowledge, for this can only be with reference to objects present to the perceiver, and cannot apply to objects of past time about which one may be conscious, for if the thing is not present how can it be made an object of thought-movement ? Objectivity further cannot mean that the things project their own forms on the knowledge and are hence called objects, for though this may apply in the case of perception, it cannot be true of inference, where the object of consciousness is far away and does not mould consciousness after its own form. Thus in whatever way we may try to conceive manifold things existing separately and becoming objects of consciousness we fail. We have also seen that it is difficult to conceive of any kind of relation subsisting between objects and consciousness, and hence it has to be admitted that the imposition of the world-appearance is after all nothing but illusory.

Now though all things are but illusory impositions on consciousness yet for the illumination of specific objects it is admitted even by Vedānta that this can only take place through specific sense-contact and particular mental states (vṛtti) or modes; but if that be so why not rather admit that this can take place even on the assumption of the absolute reality of the manifold external world without ?

The answer that the Vedānta gives to such a question is this, that the phenomenon of illumination has not to undergo any gradual process, for it is the work of one flash like the work of the light of a lamp in removing darkness; so it is not possible that the external reality should have to pass through any process before consciousness could arise; what happens is simply this, that the reality (sat) which subsists in all things as the same identical one reveals the object as soon as its veil is removed by association with the vṛtti (mental mould or state). It is like a light which directly and immediately illuminates everything with which it comes into relation. Such an illumination of objects by its underlying reality would have been continuous if there were no veils or covers, but that is not so as the reality is hidden by the veil of ajñāna (nescience).

This veil is removed as soon as the light of consciousness shines through a mental mould or vṛtti, and as soon as it is removed the thing shines forth. Even before the formation of the vṛtti the illusory impositions on the reality had still been continuing objectively, but it could not be revealed as it was hidden by ajñāna which is removed by the action of the corresponding vṛtti; and as soon as the veil is removed the thing shines forth in its true light. The action of the senses, eye, etc. serves but to modify the vṛtti of the mind, and the vṛtti of the mind once formed, the corresponding ajñāna veil which was covering the corresponding specific part of the world-appearance is removed, and the illumination of the object which was already present, being divested of the veil, shows itself forth.

The illusory creations were there, but they could not be manifested on account of the veil of nescience. As soon as the veil is removed by the action of the vṛtti the light of reality shows the corresponding illusory creations. So consciousness in itself is the ever-shining light of reality which is never generated but ever exists; errors of perception (e.g. silver in the conch-shell) take place not because the doṣa consisting of the defect of the eye, the glaze of the object and such other elements that contributed to the illusion, generated the knowledge, but because it generated a wrong vṛtti. It is because of the generation of the wrong vṛtti that the manifestation is illusory. In the illusion “this is silver” as when we mistake the conch-shell for the silver, it is the cit, consciousness or reality as underlying the object represented to us by “this” or “idam” that is the basis (adhiṣṭhāna) of the illusion of silver.

The cause of error is our nescience or non-cognition (ajñāna) of it in the form of the conch-shell, whereas the right knowledge is the cognition of it as conch-shell. The basis is not in the content of my knowledge as manifested in my mental state (vṛtti), so that the illusion is not of the form that the “knowledge is silver” but of “this is silver.” Objective phenomena as such have reality as their basis, whereas the expression of illumination of them as states of knowledge is made through the cit being manifested through the mental mould or states. Without the vṛtti there is no illuminating knowledge.

Phenomenal creations are there in the world moving about as shadowy forms on the unchangeable basis of one cit or reality, but this basis, this light of reality, can only manifest these forms when the veil of nescience covering them is temporarily removed by their coming in touch with a mental mould or mind-modifica-tion (vṛtti). It is sometimes said that since all illumination of knowledge must be through the mental states there is no other entity of pure consciousness apart from what is manifested through the states. This Vedānta does not admit, for it holds that it is necessary that before the operation of the mental states can begin to interpret reality, reality must already be there and this reality is nothing but pure consciousness.

Had there been no reality apart from the manifesting states of knowledge, the validity of knowledge would also cease; so it has to be admitted that there is the one eternal self-luminous reality untouched by the characteristics of the mental states, which are material and suffer origination and destruction. It is this self-luminous consciousness that seems to assume diverse forms in connection with diverse kinds of associations or limitations (upādhi). It manifests ajñāna (nescience) and hence does not by itself remove the ajñāna, except when it is reflected through any specific kind of vṛtti.

There is of course no difference, no inner and outer varieties between the reality, the pure consciousness which is the essence, the basis and the ground of all phenomenal appearances of the objective world, and the consciousness that manifests itself through the mental states. There is only one identical pure consciousness or reality, which is at once the basis of the phenomena as well as their interpreter by a reflection through the mental states or vṛttis.

The phenomena or objects called the drśya can only be determined in their various forms and manifestations but not as to their ultimate reality; there is no existence as an entity of any relation such as saṃyoga (contact) or samavāya (inherence) between them and the pure consciousness called the drk ; for the truth is this, that the drk (perceiver) and the drśya (perceived) have one identical reality; the forms of phenomena are but illusory creations on it.

It is sometimes objected that in the ordinary psychological illusion such as “this is silver,” the knowledge of “this” as a thing is only of a general and indefinite nature, for it is perceived as a thing but its special characteristics as a conch-shell are not noticed, and thus the illusion is possible. But in Brahman or pure consciousness there are neither definite nor indefinite characteristics of any kind, and hence it cannot be the ground of any illusion as the piece of conch-shell perceived indefinitely as a mere “this” can be.

The answer of Vedānta is that when the Brahman stands as the ground (adhiṣṭhāna) of the world-appearance its characteristic as sat or real only is manifested, whereas its special character as pure and infinite bliss is never noticed; or rather it may be said that the illusion of world-appearance is possible because the Brahman in its true and correct nature is never revealed to us in our objective consciousness; when I say “the jug is,” the “isness,” or “being,” does not shine in its purity, but only as a characteristic of the jug-form, and this is the root of the illusion.

In all our experiences only the aspect of Brahman as real shines forth in association with the manifold objects, and therefore the Brahman in its true nature being unknown the illusion is made possible. It is again objected that since the world-appearance can serve all practical purposes, it must be considered as real and not illusory. But the Vedānta points out that even by illusory perceptions practical effects are seen to take place; the illusory perception of a snake in a rope causes all the fear that a real snake could do; even in dreams we feel happy and sad, and dreams may be so bad as to affect or incapacitate the actual physical functions and organs of a man.

So it is that the past impressions imbedded in us continuing from beginningless time are sufficient to account for our illusory notions, just as the impressions produced in actual waking life account for the dream creations. According to the good or bad deeds that a man has done in previous lives and according to the impressions or potencies (saṃskāra) of his past lives each man has a particular kind of world-experience for himself and the impressions of one cannot affect the formation of the illusory experience of the other.

But the experience of the world-appearance is not wholly a subjective creation for each individual, for even before his cognition the phenomena of world-appearance were running in some unknowable state of existence (svena adhyastasya saṃskārasya viyadādyadhyāsajanakatvopapatteḥ tatpratītyabhāvepi tadadhyāsasya pūrvam sattvāt kṛtsnasyāpi vyavahārikapadārtliasya ajñātasattvābhyupagamāt).

It is again sometimes objected that illusion is produced by malobserved similarity between the ground (adhi-ṣṭhāna) and the illusory notion as silver in “this is silver,” but no such similarity is found between the Brahman and the world-appearance. To this Vedānta says that similarity is not an indispensable factor in the production of an illusion (e.g. when a white conch is perceived as yellow owing to the defect of the eye through the influence of bile or pitta). Similarity helps the production of illusion by rousing up the potencies of past impressions or memories; but this rousing of past memories may as well be done by adṛṣṭa —the unseen power of our past good or bad deeds.

In ordinary illusion some defect is necessary but the illusion of this world-appearance is beginningless, and hence it awaits no other doṣa (defect) than the avidyā (nescience) which constitutes the appearance. Here avidyā is the only doṣa and Brahman is the only adhiṣṭhāna or ground. Had there not been the Brahman, the self-luminous as the adhiṣṭhāna, the illusory creations could not have been manifested at all. The cause of the direct perception of illusion is the direct but indefinite perception of the adhiṣṭhāna. Hence where the adhiṣṭhāna is hidden by the veil of avidyā, the association with mental states becomes necessary for removing the veil and manifesting thereby the self-luminous adhiṣṭhāna. As soon as the adhiṣṭhāna, the ground, the reality, the blissful self-luminous Brahman is completely realized the illusions disappear. The disappearance of the phenomena means nothing more than the realization of the self-luminous Brahman.