A History of Indian Philosophy Volume 1
by Surendranath Dasgupta | 1922 | 212,082 words | ISBN-13: 9788120804081
This page describes the philosophy of the four pramanas of nyaya: a concept having historical value dating from ancient India. This is the fifteenth part in the series called the “the nyaya-vaisheshika philosophy”, originally composed by Surendranath Dasgupta in the early 20th century.
Part 15 - The four Pramāṇas of Nyāya
We know that the Cārvākas admitted perception (pratyakṣa) alone as the valid source of knowledge. The Buddhists and the Vaiśeṣika admitted two sources, pratyakṣa and inference (anumāna)[1]. Sāṃkhya added śabda (testimony) as the third source; Nyāya adds a fourth, upamāna (analogy). The principle on which the four-fold division of pramāṇas depends is that the causal collocation which generates the knowledge as well as the nature or characteristic kind of knowledge in each of the four cases is different. The same thing which appears to us as the object of our perception, may become the object of inference or śabda (testimony), but the manner or mode of manifestation of knowledge being different in each case, and the manner or conditions producing knowledge being different in each case, it is to be admitted that inference and śabda are different pramāṇas, though they point to the same object indicated by the perception. Nyāya thus objects to the incorporation of śabda (testimony) or upamāna within inference, on the ground that since the mode of production of knowledge is different, these are to be held as different pramāṇas[2].
Footnotes and references:
[1]:
The Vaiśeṣika sūtras tacitly admit the Vedas as a Pramāṇa. The view that Vaiśesika only admitted two Pramāṇas, perception and inference, is traditionally accepted,
“pratyakṣamekaṃcārvākāḥ kaṇādasugatau punaḥ anumānañca taccāpi, etc.”
Praśastapāda divides all cognition (buddhi) as vidyā (right knowledge) and avidyā (ignorance). Under avidyā he counts saṃśaya (doubt or uncertainty), viparyaya (illusion or error), attadkyavasāya (want of definite knowledge, thus when a man who had never seen a mango, sees it for the first time, he wonders what it may be) and svapna (dream). Right knowledge (vidyā) is of four kinds, perception, inference, memory and the supernatural knowledge of the sages (ārṣa). Interpreting the Vaiśeṣika sūtras I. i. 3, vi. i. 1, and vi. i. 3, to mean that the validity of the Vedas depends upon the trustworthy character of their author, he does not consider scriptures as valid in themselves. Their validity is only derived by inference from the trustworthy character of their author. Arthāpatti (implication) and anupalabdhi (non-perception) are also classed as inference and upamāna (analogy) and aitihya (tradition) are regarded as being the same as faith in trustworthy persons and hence cases of inference.
[2]:
Sāmagrībhedāt phalabhedācca pyramāṇabhedaḥ
Anye eva hi sāmagrīphale pratyakṣaliṅgayoḥ
Anye eva ca sāntagrīphale śabdopamānayoḥ.
Nyāyamañjarī, p. 33.