2.4. Perception according to Vācaspati Miśra

[Full title: 2. The Prācina-Naiyāyika Theory of Perception—Perception according to Vācaspati Miśra]

Vācaspati Miśra also interprets Gautama’s definition of perception in his work Nyāyavārttikatāparyaṭīkā. Gautama does not make any distinction between pratyakṣa as pramāṇa and pratyakṣa as pramiti. But Vācaspati Miśra makes distinction between the source of knowledge (pramāṇa) and valid knowledge (pramā). He in order to avoid the difficulty adds word yataḥ and hence, interpreted the phrase as pratyakṣa pramāṇa is that by which the knowledge which is dependent upon the sense object contact arises. Some commentators of Nyāyasūtra interpreted this definition in many ways. They maintain that indriyārtha sannikarṣotpannam jñānaṃ avyabhichāri pratyakṣaṃ composes the definition and the terms like avyapadeśyam and vyavasāyātmakam belong to the indeterminate and determinate stages of perception.^[1]

Firstly, Vācaspati Miśra justifies the word sannikarṣa mentioned in the definition. According to him, in order to insert all kinds of relation Gautama used the term sannikarṣa in place of saṃyoga or samavāya. He did so because if saṃyoga had been inserted, samavāya would have been excluded and vice versa. He also makes it clear that the word artha (object) is quite useful and has purpose. The purpose of term artha signifies that the object of perception should be knowable in their real nature. Some things like paramāṇu (atom) and ākāsā (ether) etc. are saṃyoga and are possible but they are not knowable in the same sense and thus they are not perceptible.^[2]

Vācaspati Miśra further talks about the term utpanna, this term indicates the fact that in bringing about perceptual knowledge, the contact of sense with the object work as a kind of instrument.^[3] As such that which conjoined with a conjunction is not perceptible. Otherwise a cloth etc. which is behind a wall but is conjoined with the eye, will be perceived.

He then further proceeds to explain the different kind of sannikarṣa of perception with examples.

The last three characteristics of Gautama’s definition of perception receive a lot of attention from the commentators. The last three characteristics include avyapadeśyam, avyabhicāri vyavasāyātmakam. According to Vācaspati Miśra, in Gautama’s definition of perception which includes indriyasannikarṣotpannam jñānaṃ avyabhichāri means uncontradicted knowledge generated by sense-object contact is the complete definition of perception and the two terms viz., avyapadeśyam and vyavasāyātmakam shows two stages of perception as nirvikalpaka (indeterminate) and savikalpaka (determinate).

Further, Vācaspati Miśra has provided three justifications for the insertion of the word avyabhicāri. According to him, on the basis of general characteristics, the erroneous cognition is eliminated from the sphere of perception although; the word avyabhicāri is stated to assign an authoritative sanction to it.^[4]

Additionally, it is important for other sources of knowledge like inference etc. also that it should be free from error. Perception is the basis of other sources of knowledge; hence the word avyabhicāri is essential for perception because if it is non-erroneous then automatically the other forms will be non-erroneous. It is the cause of nonerroneousness of other sources of knowledge.^[5]

The justification of the inclusion of the term vyavasāyātmaka in the definition of perception as provided by Vātsyāyana and Vācaspati Miśra is not at all holdable. According to Vātsyāyana the term vyavasāyātmaka is included in order to eliminate uncertain knowledge from the field of perception. The doubtful knowledge which is arised from the sense-object-contact cannot be described as perception as it is not certain (vyavasāyātmaka). According to Vācaspati Miśra uncertain knowledge has already been eliminated from perception with the inclusion of the term avyabhicāri and thus the term vyavasāyātmaka is included in the definition in order to contain determinate perception (savikalpakajñāna) in the definition of perception. Here, it may be argued that the word vyavasāyātmaka is not added to eliminate uncertain knowledge, because in the Nyāyasūtra, “pratyakṣānumānopramānaśabdaḥ pramāṇāni”^[6] it is stated that perception, inference, comparison and verbal testimony are the means of valid knowledge. In the Nyāyasūtra it is mentioned that perception is a source of valid cognition and thus a thing is truly known by the contact of sense organ with an object. There is no doubt of having deviated knowledge (vyabhicāri) of a thing and thus the word avyabhicāri is not beneficial in the definition of perception. Vyavasāyātmaka is explained as that cognition which can be expressed with the help of language. Since it is a kind of valid knowledge, it will always be valid and thus determinate. The validity of a piece of knowledge is proved by verification which can be happened in determinate perception only because the indeterminate perception being formless and unexpressed in language is incapable of verification. So, the word vyavasāyātmaka should not be inserted in the definition because of the fact that it is already taken as a form of pramā. Thus, the use of word vyavasāyātmaka is unnecessary and redundant.

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

D.N. Shastri, op.cit., p.431.

[2]:

arthagrahaṇenārthyamānatayā jñeyasvarūpayogyatā darśitā na cāsāvaṇvākāśādīnāmastīti satyapi saṃyogādau nāsāvarthasannikarṣa iti tajhudāsaḥ. Nyāyavārtīkatātparyaṭīkā , on Nyāyasūtra , 1.1.4.

[3]:

utpannagrahṇena ca sannikarṣasyotpādakatvaṃ sucitam. Nyāyavārtīkatātparyaṭīkā , on Nyāyasūtra , 1.1.4.

[4]:

siddhe satyārambho niyamārthaḥ. Nyāyavārtīkatātparyaṭīkā , on Nyāyasūtra , 1.1.4.

[5]:

S. Ranganath, Contribution of Vācaspati Miśra to Indian Philosophy, p.17.

[6]:

Nyāyasūtra , 1.1.3.