6. Nature of Illusion

For Dharmottara, “illusion” is the factor of knowledge which includes contradiction in the essence of reality which possesses efficiency.^[1] Vinita Dev and Kamalaśīla understand the term “illusion” as inconsistency. According to Yogācāra followers” illusion is subjective hallucination. For instance: in the silver shell error the subjective idea of silver-form of cognition emerges as the part of an external thing. Here the question can arise with regard to the nature of illusion; whether illusions are purely mental or not? According to Diṅnāga, “illusions” are in our mind. They occupy space in understanding. Their origination is not in the sense perception. Perception does not include any judgement because it is non conceptual While illusions involve wrong judgements about reality. Therefore, illusions must be mental. He says just like there are fallacies of inference similarly there are fallacies of perception. The fallacies are not perceptions. They seem to be like perceptions. The fallacies are generated by the misconception of the mind.

Dharmakīrti agrees with the view of Diṅnāga but he also adds some points to the explanation of illusions. According to him, there are illusions which are other than mental. They are due to eye diseases, quick movement, journeying by ship and disturbance in body. For instance: a man who is suffering from liver disorder (especially bile) sees every white thing as yellow.^[2] Here, he makes distinction between both the illusions of senses and mind. Some illusions which are purely mental vanish when mental defect vanishes. For instance: when one comes to know that it is rope but not snake. Here when the mental error ceases then at the same moment illusion also ceases. Again, there are some kinds of illusions which never vanish even though there is no mental defect like the vision of double moon.

Dharmottara explains the view of Dharmakīrti by classifying the causes of illusion into four types:

1. Some illusions are because of defect in the sense organs e.g. seeing pink colour as red. It is because of eye-disease i.e. colour blindness.

2. Secondly, some illusions are because of object of perception. For instance: illusion of fiery circle.

3. Thirdly, some illusions are due to place where a person is stayed. For instance: when a man is travelling by train he sees things like trees, building as moving.

4. Lastly, some illusions are due to the disturbance of the mental conditions of a man. For instance: deceitful images such as flaming post occur if the gaseous principle in the body is disturbed.

Dharmottara explains illusion in extreme sense and says that all illusions which are due to defective sense-organ, defective object, and are either internal or external that directly or indirectly affect the sense organ. When the sense organs are free from any defect and are normal there can be no illusory sensation take place.^[3]

Śāntarakṣita supports the view of Dharmottara and holds that illusions are born by senses. Illusion exists when the sense-organ is involved and vanishes when the senseorgan is eradicated. After him, Kamalaśīla also gives a comprehensive view of illusion. According to him, place, time, man and situation are four cases of illusion. When the thing of perception is far from the place, it is subject to be misunderstood. The illusion of water is due to misapprehension of sands which were at distant in desert. Time factor is the second reason for some illusions. For instance: at night when we see a snake in piece of rope and are feared. Sometimes the illusion caused by the peculiarity in the individual person. For instance: perceiving yellow conch shell is due to defect in senseorgan. Lastly, it is derangement of perceptive organs, which are due to love, anger, hunger, hatred, and other similar situation.

These reasons of illusion show that illusion is connected with perception. According to professor Stcherbatsky, our senses neither judge nor contain any judgement at all. But when the senses are not in normal condition they can affect our judgement and lead us in the wrong direction.^[4]

Here, the question arises that when we perceive yellow conch shell what kind of knowledge it produces is right knowledge or wrong?

Some followers of Diṅnāga hold that the perception of yellow conch shell is illusory but it is a kind of right knowledge. As the cognition of yellow conch shell produces from senses and so it cannot be considered as inference and it agrees with reality so it cannot be inconsistent but consistent knowledge. Although it is illusory but it is a right knowledge that is why Diṅnāga did not include the term “non-illusive” in his definition of perception. For Diṅnāga, the illusion, error and defects all these have appearance of perception. So, it can be said that right knowledge is without conception and non-compatible knowledge.

The next question here comes is this knowledge valid or invalid? If someone goes further on the basis of this cognition, will our activities be successful? Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla don”t agree with this statement. Kamalaśīla maintains that there are two types of validity of cognition (i) it should compatible with appearance (ii) and also it should compatible with the apprehension. In the yellow conch shell case it is not compatible with the appearance because what seems is yellow conch shell whereas in actuality it is not yellow but white. Similarly, it is not compatible with the apprehension too because the thing is yellow in itself that is grasped as capable of a particular fruitful activity, but no such activity is found in reality.^[5]

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

Abhrāntam artha-kriyā-kṣame vasturūpe” viparyas tam accyate. Artha-kriyā-kṣamaṃ ca vasturūpaṃ sanniveśopādhi-dharmātmakam. Tatra yan na bhrāmyati tadabhrātam. Nyāyabinduṭīkā, p.9.

[2]:

Timirāśubhramaṇa-nauyāna. Saṃkṣobhādyanāhita-vibhramaṃ jñānaṃ pratyaksam. Nyāyabindu 1.6. C.L. Tripathi, op.cit., p.58.

[3]:

Nyāyabinduṭīkā, P.12.

[4]:

Th. Stcherbatsky, op.cit., vol. I, p. 160.

[5]:

C.L. Tripathi, op.cit, p.59.