4. Criticism of the Theories of Truth

The concept of validity and invalidity of knowledge are inherent is full of contradiction. As both validity and invalidity are contradictory. The presence of one indicates the absence of the other. Hence one cannot hold that both validity and invalidity are part of one and the same cognition.^[1] If one holds that both are part of two particular cognitions, one will have to face the problem about their relationship. What is their connection? What is the criterion to know that which cognition is valid and which cognition is invalid? It would be hard to make difference between valid and invalid knowledge in absence of such criterion.

The concept of validity and invalidity of knowledge are depended on external condition is also not holdable. And if one maintains that cognition neither has validity nor invalidity then it is considered as featureless (i.e. cognition without having any character). A featureless cognition cannot serve any purpose. Further, supposing that it has no feature at all, how many features can be inserted into it later? For example when a person sees a moving tree from far and tries to reach it. To confirm his cognition he goes near the tree and arrives at the conclusion that his cognition is not valid and the tree is not moving. But if one does not accept any feature in the cognition of tree, no knowledge can take place. Since validity and invalidity are individual and unique, both cannot be depended on external conditions. Either validity or invalidity must be present in cognition.

The theory that validity is extrinsic and invalidity is inherent is also impossible. A Cognition which is invalid by itself cannot consider as valid later on as it is intrinsically invalid. If validity of cognition of particular depends on external conditions, an infinite regress is unavoidable. In order to prove the validity of particular cognition other cognitions will be required and they for their validity required other cognition. This process will never end. Hence, extrinsic validity of cognition becomes impossible.^[2]

Further, Mīmāṃsakas maintain the theory that cognition is valid by itself and cognition becomes invalid only when it is denied by latter cognition. According to Kamalaśīla, when someone holds the inherent validity of cognition then only two alternative meanings of inherent validity occurs.^[3] The first meaning indicates that it is external therefore it has no cause. The second meaning shows that it is not eternal but it occurs at the same time means cognition includes its essence brought about by its causes and its validity is not depended on other causes. Now if one considers pramāṇa as eternal, then its effect should also be considered as eternal. But such view cannot consider correct as it contradicts our common experience. And the effect of any cause does not exist permanently. Therefore, in the first sense, the validity of pramāṇas cannot inherent as it will go against perception and inference. Further, if the second meaning of “inherent validity” is admitted, there is no differentiate between the Buddhist and the

Mīmāṃsakas thought. As the Buddhists and the Mīmāṃsakas believe that defect is generated by the causes of cognitions (pramāṇa) themselves and effect cannot be forced on them by other causes. Despite of this similarity, the Buddhists and the Mīmāṃsakas also have some different views. The Mīmāṃsakas hold that knowledge is intrinsically valid and it does not depend on extraneous conditions while the Buddhists maintain that knowledge is not intrinsically valid so it depends on an extrinsic condition for its validity. The Buddhists believe that the ability to produce effect cannot be depended upon a thing from outside it is impossible to consider a cognition as true and valid unless it is assured by our later experiences.

For instance in cognizance of double moon all the things of true cognizance are there i.e. the similar sense organs, similar object and the similar preceptor, still it is deceptive. If the knowledge is valid by itself it would not be possible to make difference between the valid cognitions and the invalid cognitions. So in order to ascertain whether it is able to generating the expected consequence the validity of knowledge depends on its conformity to generate the desired consequence. The Mīmāṃsakas’s argument that the validity itself would be demolished, if it were rely upon something else does not sound good. How the validity of knowledge can be demolished by its own cause. To depend on external conditions is important to bring certainty for its validity but not for its origination. The validity of knowledge is completely different from the origination of knowledge.^[4]

For Kamalaśīla, all the arguments to support the intrinsic validity of cognition can equally be applicable to the theory of extrinsic validity of knowledge. It is also argued that the invalidity of knowledge is inherent because if it did not have existence it could not be brought by anything else. The ground which validity and invalidity depend on is self-sufficiency. Just like Mīmāṃsakas maintain that “capacity for non conformity” and “certain cognition” depend on other causes, similarly for the Buddhist the “capacity for conformity” and “certain cognition” depend on other causes. Therefore, both the theories of intrinsic validity of knowledge and extrinsic validity of knowledge have same basis.

The Mīmāṃsakas urges that it is necessary to believe the self-validity of knowledge, because if we believe that validity depends on external conditions there will be an infinite regress. The Buddhist’s argument that the validity of first cognition is confirmed by the subsequent cognitions when there is conformity between the outcomes of the first and subsequent is useless. As subsequent cognitions grasp what has already been grasped and they are themselves invalid. It can be asked that if corroboration by subsequent cognition were the ground for the validity of our cognitions how can one defend the validity of the cognition of those objects which came into existence and after that immediately vanished. For instance: auditory cognitions which ones heard are never heard later. In these cases confirmation by the sight or other means of knowledge is impossible.^[5]

The Buddhist insists that if the knowledge of an object is itself valid there should be no uncertainty, no misconception, and no confusion at all. Had every knowledge be invalid in itself there would have been no misconception which one experiences. If the principle of corroboration by subsequent cognitions is not upheld there would be no knowledge which could be called definite, one will not be able to make distinction between right and wrong knowledge. Again, if all knowledge is valid by itself there should be no different opinions of the same object among the different people. But experiences reveal something different. It might be the case that for one person the validity of knowledge is always inherent and valid by itself while for another person the validity of knowledge is intrinsic in some cases and extrinsic in other cases. Further there are different opinions regarding the same object for the scholars of the same school i.e. the Mīmāṃsakas. After denying all the theories of validity of knowledge the Buddhist maintains their own theory of extrinsic validity of knowledge.

The Buddhist maintains that the validity depends on confirmation with the true state of objects and this confirmation is identified when the cognition is capable of generating effective action. For instance: fire, it is known as real fire when we see it is producing effective result burning, cooking and lighting. Kamalaśīla maintains his position by agreeing with the words of Dharmakīrti that cognition which is in confirmation with the object is called valid cognition. The cognition is always uncertain for its validity unless the cognition does not come into being in its effective form. When the cognition leads to an activity it did point to, its truth or falsity is certain. Further Kamalaśīla says that there must be three things that should be involved in the validity of cognition 1) Absence of defects in the sense organs and the intellect, 2) Free from invalid knowledge and 3) Presence of excellence.

The final position that Buddhist holds is the validity of cognition cannot be confirmed by all the four theories mentioned above. Because the validity may be proved intrinsically in some cases like mystic intuition, an experience which is repeated, and effective action etc. It also may be proved extrinsically in the case when our sense organs become defective or when the thing is not clear from the distance or when the mind is not stable. Hence, Kamalaśīla introduces a new theory that there can be no confirmed rules which can be applied to all the cases of valid knowledge.^[6]

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

Na tāvad ekasyāṃ vyaktan paraspara-parihāra-sthitalakṣaṇayoḥ prāmāṇyetara-dharmayoḥ saṃbhavaḥ virodhāt. G. Jha, The Tattvasaṃgraha of Shāntarakṣita, p.745.

[2]:

Ibid.

[3]:

E. Krishnamacarya, Tattva-saṃgraha verse 2814.

[4]:

Ibid verses 2821-2822.

[5]:

G.P. Bhatta, Epistemology of Bhāṭṭa School of Pūrva Mīmāṃsā, p. 101.

[6]:

Tattva-saṃgraha-pañjikā, p.811.