2. The Nature of Pramāṇa

The word pramāṇa has derived from the root “mā” with a prefix “Pra” and suffix “lyuṭ”. Generally, the word signifies knowledge as well as the sources of valid knowledge but in Indian Epistemology it is generally considered as the sources of valid knowledge.

Jhā explains:

“In philosophical literature, this term “Pramāṇa” has been used somewhat promiscuously: sometimes in the sense of the means of cognition, the etymology of the word being given as “Pramīyate jñānate anena”-while sometimes it is used in the sense of valid cognition itself-with the etymology “Pramīyate yatt”.^[1]

There are different of opinions with regard to the nature of pramāṇa amidst the philosophers. Gautama does not provide any definition of pramāṇa. He simply provides four means of knowledge but does not explain what the term “pramāṇa” means. It is Vātsyāyana who firstly explains the term “pramāṇa”. According to him, pramāṇa is that by which cognition caused in other words pramāṇa is the tool of valid knowledge. After Vātsyāyana, Jayanta also provides the definition of pramāṇa in a more comprehensive way. According to him, “pramāṇa is that collocation of conscious as well as unconscious factors which results in producing such an apprehension of knowable objects that is different from illusion and doubt.”^[2] For him, “pramāṇa” is the source of cognition which is free from doubt and illusion. It is a kind of cause without which effect is cannot be produced. He includes “Bodhābodhasvabhāva” in the definition of pramāṇa. He states that consciousness (Bodha) is the result of pramāṇa and not itself a pramāṇa. Here, he is against the Buddhist view of pramāṇa. He wants to prove that consciousness is not pramāṇa but it only works as an indirect source of judgement. He states that if one admits that knowledge alone is pramāṇa then objects which are unconscious like chair, sense-organs etc have to be refused from the realm of the sources of knowledge.^[3]

The Sautrāntika and the Vaibhāṣika, the two realistic schools of Buddhism state that pramāṇa is that which provides us a right knowledge of objects. Right knowledge for them is sameness between the cognition and the cognitum, but for Vijñānavāda, the idealistic school of Buddhism consciousness (vijñāna) is the source of all knowledge. Vijñānavādins define pramā as useful knowledge and pramāṇa as a source which helps in bringing such knowledge. Nāgārjuna rejects the idea of pramāṇa in his work Pramāṇa-Viddhvaṃsa while Diṅnāga gives a theory of knowledge which is opposed to Nāgārjuna’s refutation of the means of knowledge.

According to Diṅnāga, “the effect of a pramāṇa should involve self-cognition”.^[4] He observes two factors regarding to the nature of a pramāṇa and they are the cognition of an object (viṣayādhigama) and self-cognition (sva-saṃvitti).

Dharmakīrti defines pramāṇa as a cognition which is free from error:

“Valid cognition is that cognition [which is] non-deceptive [non-deceptiveness consists] in the readiness [for the object] to perform a function.”^[5]

As per this definition, pramāṇa is not the means of knowledge but itself knowledge. So, for him, valid knowledge is always free from error. According to Diṅnāga, pramāṇa basically a way of cognizing as it is mainly apprehended to include the act of cognizing, in spite of the fact that primarily it is a result.^[6]

Dharmakīrti defines pramāṇa as an experience which is not contradicted. In his work Nyāyabindu, he uses the term artha sārūpya as the essence of a pramāṇa. On the other hand, for Diṅnāga the essence of pramāṇa contains in the cognition of an object (viṣayādhigama) and self-cognition (sva-saṃvitti). Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla both try to synthesize the definition of pramāṇa given by Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti. They hold that for realists (Bāhyārthavādins), pramāṇa is the similarity between cognition and its object and pramiti is the cognition of the object. While, for idealists (Vijñānavādins) pramiti involves self-cognition and the ability to get such cognition is pramāṇa.

Buddhists do not make any difference between the resulting cognition (pramāṇa-phala) and the sources of knowledge (pramāṇa). Dharmakīrti has discussed the relation between the result of cognition and means of cognition in his works “Nyāyabindu” and “Pramāṇavārttika”. According to Buddhist scholars, such kind of a relation of a producer and produced cannot be established as all things are momentary and transitory in nature. So, it is not possible that objects being transitory come into existence in the first moment and start with causal efficacy to create the effect in the next moment. Pramā therefore cannot be true outcome produced by pramāṇa. According to Buddhist scholars, the act of cognizing completely concurs with the cognition of an object. Since knowledge is self-evident (svaprakāsha). So, there is no need to make distinction between pramāṇa and its phala i.e. result. Further, Diṅnāga in his work “Pramāṇasaṃuccaya” states that there is no difference between three things: the object (prameya), the means of knowledge (pramāṇa) and its outcome (pramāṇaphala).

According to him:

“Whatever the form in which it [viz., a cognition] appears, that [form] is [recognised as] the object of cognition (Prameya). The means of cognition (Pramāṇa) and [the cognition which is] its result (Phala) are respectively the form of subject [in the cognition] and the cognition cognizing itself. Therefore, these three [factors of cognition] are not separate from one another.”^[7]

For Diṅnāga, the object of knowledge, the means of knowledge and its result all are one and similar. The identity between these three is discussed by him in his concept of selfcognition. For asserting the similarity between pramāṇa-phala and pramāṇa, he introduces the theory of Sākara-jñana-vāda. According to it, cognition owns the form (ākāra) of the object within itself. The cognition as result is the apprehension of an object (viṣayādhigati). While the Nirākāra-jñāna-vādins, maintain that the cognition is formless (nirākāra) while the object has form (ākāra), then the cognition itself (anubhava-mātra) being different from the object, would stay similar whether it perceived blue object or yellow object or any other object. So for Diṅnāga, cognition being the apprehension of an object must be accepted as sākāra which is said to possess the function of assuming the form of an object. So, cognition being sākāra is thus understood to possess the function of assuming the form of an object. Because of this thought, Diṅnāga understands sākāra cognition as pramāṇa, though above all it is phala which is the apprehension of an object.^[8] The theory of cognition as sākāra is accepted by the Sautrāntika and some Yogācāras.^[9] Kumārila in his Ślōkavārttika IV 74-75, refuses the theory of non distinction between pramāṇa and its phala. He gives the example of cutting a tree with the help of an axe. The instrument, axe is different from the result i.e. tree. The difference between the instrument and its result is universal.^[10] Similarly, Kumārila says, pramāṇa, the source of knowledge, must be different from the knowledge generated by means of it.

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa also objects to the theory given by Diṅnāga. According to him when a man perceives a table with the help of his eyes, the subject, the object and the instrument are presented to his consciousness is different from the action itself. Sometimes the term “pramāṇa” takes in the sense of “pramā” and “karaṇa” in the sense of “kṛti”. Although, it is not acceptable to consider “pramāṇa” as “pramā” and “karaṇa” as “kṛti” as same thing: the instrument and the result reside always in different loci (adhikaraṇa). The Buddhists answer the objections as follows: all entities are immediate, so the relation of the producer and the produced cannot be formed between two entities. The relation of pramāṇa and its phala is like the relation of the determiner and the determined. When one has an apprehension of something blue, this apprehension is identified as being determined i.e. the cognition of something blue and not of something red and this determination is produced by the appearance (ākāra) of something blue in the cognition itself.

Further, according to Buddhist all phenomena are ultimately free from function (vyāpāra), because they are in a state of change. Hence the cognition is nirvyāpāra in its nature. Secondly, when the cognition arises in the form of an object, it takes that form and discards another form. It is with the help of this function that cognition is considered as cognition of something blue and not of something red. Thus, according to Diṅnāga’s statement the result is metaphorically called means as it looks as if it had a function; however it is free from function in its real nature.

So, for Buddhists pramāṇa and pramiti are not different because they are somehow same entities. It is cleared that the difference between Buddhist view of pramāṇa and Nyāya is mainly based upon their pramāṇa-pramiti relationship.

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

G.B.J. Dreyfus, Recognizing Reality: Dharmakīrti’s Philosophy and Its Tibetan Interpretations, p.289.

[2]:

C.D. Bijalwan, op.cit, p.49.

[3]:

Ibid, p.52.

[4]:

C.D. Bijalwan, op.cit., p. 42.

[5]:

B.J. Dreyfus, op, cit. p. 289.

[6]:

M. Hattori, Dignāga on Perception being the Pratyaksaparriccheda of Dignāga’s Pramāṇasaṃuccaya, p. 28.

[7]:

Ibid., p. 29.

[8]:

Ibid., p. 98.

[9]:

The Sautrāntikas admit the existence of an object and consider the specific cognition of an object as pramāṇaphala. They assume the correspondence of the forms of the cognition and the object as its pramāṇa. The Yogācāras, however, consider the object as merely the appearance of an object in the cognition. The object is, according to the Yogācāras, is actually the cognition of the cognition itself. This ability of the cognition which can cognize itself is considered as pramāṇa of the resulting self-cognition because it is the predominant cause of the latter.

[10]:

Ibid., p. 99.