Chapter VI - A Buddhist Estimate of Universals

The philosophers of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school have postulated two different types of universals or genuses (jātis), viz., (1) Existence (sattā) and (2) Substantiality and the rest. The first is the highest universal, the universal par excellence, the summum genus (parā jāti), because it only serves to bring all existents together under one category and emphasises their community of nature without any reference to their mutual differences. A universal has been defined as a unitary (ekam), eternal (nitya) principle underlying and informing a number of individual beings.^[1] Different individuals are grouped under one category by virtue of this unitary principle which inheres in them, one and all. Its supreme function is assimilation. The highest universal, viz., existence, exercises this function par excellence. The other universals, viz., the substance-universal (dravyatva), the quality-universal (guṇatva), the action-universal (karmatva), are minor universals (aparā jātis), because they not only assimilate different individuals into one class or group, but they also serve to differentiate one class and the members thereof from another class and its constituent members. Thus these universals have a double function and a double aspect, viz., assimilation and differentiation. The highest universal exercises the function of assimilation alone, which is the proper function of a universal. Hence it is called the highest and supremest of all universals.

These philosophers further maintain that these universals are objective entities and are envisaged in perceptual cognitions as much as individual objects, as the idea of universals arises on the operation of sense-object contact. And the existence of these universals can be demonstrated by a regular syllogistic inference also. Our perceptual experience is not of the particular cow, but contains a reference to another distinct principle, which is not confined to the individual concerned, but continues in other individuals in the same manner and in the same degree. Had this experience been cognisant of the particular individual alone, the reference would have been different in different individuals, as in the case of a cow and a horse. But this is not the case; there is a sameness of reference in our cognitions of different cows and this identity of reference, linguistic and psychological alike, can be accounted for only on the assumption of a universal element super-added to particulars.^[2] The existence or non-existence of an objective reality can be determined by the arbitration of experience alone and the dictum that ‘excess in knowledge pre-supposes a corresponding excess in the objective order,’^[3] should be accepted by all believers in extra-mental reality. So the particular and the universal should be accepted as equally true and equally real and there is no contradiction or logical incompatibility in these two factors coalescing in one substratum. Logic becomes a tyrant when it arrogates to itself the power of dictating terms to experience ex cathedra. You cannot dictate that the universal and the particular are mutually contradictory and so cannot be found together. After all, what constitutes incompatibility and contradiction? Well, we consider a position incompatible, which has not the sanction of valid experience, or in other words, which has not been cognised by means of any of the recognised instruments of knowledge. And we regard any two things to be mutually contradictory when we do not find them to co-exist in one substratum. When there is contradiction between two things, there can beno co-existence; on the contrary, one of them is superseded by another. Light and darkness are regarded to be contradictory, because they are not found to co-exist. But if co-existence of two things is attested by uncontradicted experience, there is no earthly reason why they should be regarded as mutually contradictory. And in the present case of the universal and the particular there is absolutely no contradiction or logical incompatibility as they are found to co-exist in perfect amity and peace. Nor can this experience be challenged, as there is no other experience to contradict its truth. The experience of silver in the mother-o’-pearl is regarded as false, as it is sublated by a subsequent experience of the mother-o’-pearl. So the co-existence of the universal and the particular is neither incompatible, as it is attested by undisputed experience; nor is it contradictory as there is no sublative experience to prove its falsity.^[4] The doctrine of universal flux, which maintains that all existents are momentary, cannot be accepted as it fails to render an adequate explanation of the class-concepts, which cannot be denied an objective foundation unless the position of extreme subjectivism is seriously maintained. The subjective idealists (Vijñānavādins), who regard the whole objective world to be a phantasmagoria conjured up by a diseased imagination, have at any rate the virtue of consistency to their credit; but the Sautrāntikas, the so-called critical realists, have not got this redeeming virtue. Their philosophy is at best a compromise between honest realism and honest idealism and like all compromises it is but a hopeless failure. They choose to deny reality to relations and class-concepts, which, according to them, are as much unreal and fictitious creations of the morbid imagination as they are in the idealist’s scheme, and yet they believe in the reality of the extra-mental world. But. this realistic concession is neither here nor there. It satisfies neither the idealist nor the realist. It is not a healthy philosophy, whatever else it might be.

 

The Sautrāntika’s Reply to the Realist’s Charge.

Śāntarakṣita and Paṇḍita Aśoka, whose works have come down to us in their original form, have given crushing replies to the realist’s charges. The idea of a continuous identity underlying all the different individuals, by which the Naiyāyika has laid so much store, will appear on strict examination to be a pleasant illusion of the realists. There is not only not a shred of evidence in favour of the existence of such objective categories, but there is, on the other hand, incontestable proof against this supposition. The contention of the Naiyāyika that ideas of universal arise immediately on the operation of the sense-object contact is not true, because such ideas are conceptual in character and conceptual thoughts can emerge only after the name-relations are remembered. First of all, there is the sensuous presentation immediate and direct and divested of all foreign reference. Secondly, a mental energising towards the recalling of the verbal association; thirdly, the remembrance of the name. So the mind has travelled far away from the immediate datum of presentation and the idea of the class-character arises only after a series of psychical operations, which have little bearing on the immediate objective datum. To say therefore that class-ideas are sensuous presentations is to betray psychological ineptitude and uncritical reading of experience. The class-idea is formed only when there is a reference through memory to past objects and so this idea is but the result of a confusion between a past object represented by memory and the presentation of a sense-datum. The unreality of these conceptual constructions will be proved to demonstration in the chapter on perception.

It may be urged that if the class-character is not an objective entity envisaged in perception, then, how could such ideas arise at all? The particulars are absolutely distinct from one another and have nothing in common according to the Buddhist’s theory; and so the idea of community cannot be generated by them. The particulars may have efficiency in regard to their own ideas and as this efficiency varies in each individual, the idea of the universal cannot be accounted for by reference to these particular efficiencies either.^[5] But this objection has no substance. Though the particulars may be absolutely distinct and discrete, still they can generate, owing to a determinate constitutive energy inhering in each of them, a common idea, an identical concept. This fact of one uniform efficiency is found in distinct individuals. Thus, the myrobalan, the āmalakī fruit (dhātrī) and other substances are seen to cure diseases of the same sort. Now these substances are admittedly different from one another and yet they are found in experience to possess a common efficiency. It cannot be supposed that these different medicinal herbs and fruits possess a common nature, that is to say, they are informed and enlivened by a permanent universal, which exercised this common efficiency; because in that case, the efficiency would be absolutely invariable and identical in respect of time and magnitude. But this is not the case; one is seen to afford speedy relief, another to be sluggish in operation and the magnitude of efficiency also is seen to be variable in different substances. Had there been one unalterable rigid principle underlying them all, these differences in operation and efficiency could not be expected. Nor can these variations be set down to the action of other factors, e.g., difference of time and place of production of the medicinal berbs and fruits. Because, these differences cannot have any effect, either in the way of detraction or of supplementation, on an unalterable, eternal verity, which, on pain of self-destruction, must be impervious to all such external influences. Exactly on the analogy of the above cases, different individuals possessing a uniform psychological efficiency can be accepted as a reasonable hypothesis. And as regards the linguistic usage, too, there is no difficulty whatsoever. When causal efficiency in its widest and most comprehensive sense is intended to be understood, such expressions, as ‘entity’ (sat), ‘thing’ (vastu) and the like are applied to all existents. Particular expressions, horse, cow and the like, are employed to designate peculiar sets of causal efficiency, such as ploughing, carrying, milk-yielding and the like. And as has been set forth above by the analogy of the common medical action of different herbs and plants, particulars, though discrete and distinct, may produce a common psychological action. The concept of the universal is nothing but an intellectual fiction, an adumbration of the mind, Which, however, is hypostatised as an objective reality existing in its own right, independently of the thinking mind.^[6] These conceptual fictions have a pragmatic value no doubt; but this pragmatic utility is due to the particular objective reality, of which the universal is a remote derivative.^[7]

The contention of the realist that our perceptual cognitions contain a distinct reference to the universal apart from the form and configuration of the individual is a hollow assertion unsupported by experience. The underlying universal is described by you to be an entity devoid of form, colour and verbal association; but our cognitions have invariably these attributes as their contents. A universal, amorphous and colourless, is never envisaged in perceptual cognitions. Śaṅkarasvāmin,^[8] however, opines that the universals are not amorphous entities, but they have the same perceptible qualities, form and colour, etc., as the individuals. The universal of ‘blue’ has the features of the individual ‘blue’ and so the different individuals are referable to one category. But this view is equally untenable and makes no improvement. If the universal is believed to have the same characteristics with the individual, there is left no means of distinguishing it from the individual in question. And if the two are supposed to be presented as an undistinguishable whole, with its contents lumped together, then, how could there arise the distinct verbal and psychical references, on which the Naiyāyika laid so much stress? The entire argument of the realists is pivoted on the supposition that class concepts and identity of nomenclature will be unaccountable if the objective existence of universals is not admitted and this supposition is a necessary corollary of the more fundamental assumption that all our knowledge is derived from sense-data presented in perception.^[9] Our consciousness is but a receptive medium without any constructive faculty or power to conjure up an idea, winch is not ultimately derived from objective experience. In fact, this is a fundamental attitude of mind and has divided philosophers into rival schools. So there is no reason to be optimistic that one day all philosophers will sink their differences and profess one philosophy. Philosophy is not so much a question of conviction or carrying conviction as it is a question of mental attitude and outlook of thought and habit of thinking. It will be therefore better and more consonant with truth to say that the task of philosophers is. rather conversion than logical conviction. The phenomenon of rival schools of thought holding contradictory views and constantly fighting with one another, however unphilosophical it may appear, will not be a thing of past history, because the fundamental attitudes of mind, the bias of our thought-movement, cannot be changed or destroyed. But ratiocination is the accredited instrument of all philosophy and there is a common modicum of rationality in all human beings and so the proselytising activity in philosophical circles will never come to an end, the failures of the past notwithstanding. So we must try to clinch the issue on logical grounds.

Even granting that class-concepts are grounded in objective reality still it cannot be proved that there is an eternal, undying universal running through the discrete individuals, because in that case its cognition would not be contingent on the cognition of particulars, which are admittedly impermanent. But this objective foundation is purely a figment of the imagination. What objective foundation can be trotted out for such concepts as ‘thing’ or ‘entity’? You cannot postulate the existence of a higher universal, to wit, thingness, because that only shifts the difficulty to ‘thingness’ itself. The concept of thingness would require another universal and that again another and so on to infinity. To avoid this vicious infinite series the Naiyāyika has to assume that universals are a class of sui generis categories and that they do not participate in other universals. The sameness of verbal and psychological reference, i. e., the identity of expression and idea in the case of universals, is not sought to be explained by reference to another universal, but is believed to be self-contained. Even the Naiyāyika has to concede that there is no ontological foundation for these concepts. Such concepts as ‘cook’ (pācaka), ‘non-being,’ etc., are without any factual basis. There is no such universal as ‘cookhood’ or ‘non-beingness,’ yet there is no difficulty in the matter of referring to different individuals by a common name and a common concept. In the case of ‘non-being,’ there are four cases of such, viz., previous non-being (prāgabhāva), posterior non-being (pradhvaṃsābhāva), reciprocal non-being (anyonyābhāva) and lastly, absolute non-being (atyantābhāva),^[10] and.all these cases are referred to by the generic name of ‘non-being.’ But there is no universal of non-being, as universals are believed lo be entitative in character. And such fictitious appearances as cloud-mansions in the horizon and illusory silver perceived on the mother-o’-pearl are even referred to by the common name and concept of house or silver. But this nomenclature and conceptual thought cannot be. made the ground of supposing the existence of an objective universal in these fictions. Cooks and tailors may form a professional class by themselves and thus may be referred to by a common name and concept. But nobody, possessing even a modicum of sense and sanity, would think of according an objective universal to these professional interests. Action cannot be supposed to be the ground of this conceptual thought, the uniting bond of the stray, discrete particulars, inasmuch as action varies with each individual. The action of one is not the self-identical action of another and as continuity and identity are the characteristic features of the supposed universals, action cannot be a universal. And if action, though variable and inconstant, be believed to be the cause and ground of the conceptual thought, there is no reason why the individuals should be denied this efficiency. Moreover, action, say for example, ‘cooking’ being an accidental fact and so being discontinuous, a person would not be called a cook, w'hen he does not actually perform the cooking operations. Neither can the past nor the future action be responsible for this conceptual thought, as they are simply non-existent. So no objective basis can be discovered for this conceptual thought and permanent nomenclature. But the Naiyāyikas as a class are noted for their tenacity and Saūkarasvāmin has found an objective living universal in cooks and tailors and thus holds out a hope for the perennial preservation of amenities of civilized life—no doubt a consolation for legislators and social workers! He avers that the individual actions may be variable, but the universal of action (kriyātvajāti) is imperishable and this becomes the ground of the class-concept. This argument reminds us of the drowning man catching at the straw. How could the universal remain when its medium of expression, viz., the individual action, has ceased to exist? And even if it did exist, how could it be perceived, as universals on your own hypothesis reveal their existence in and through the individuals alone ? Nor can its apprehension in the past in any locus be the reason for the continuation of the notion in futurity. The idea of staff-bearer does not continue when the man in question does not carry the staff. Your argument, however, assures the continuity of the idea, but this is falsified by experience. And if you posit a distinct universal, say for example, cookhood and the like, a cook should have been recognised as a cook even when he was born, as the universal is there for all time. But if for some inscrutable drawback the universal and the child fail to be united, the union will never take place, as neither of them, permanent entities as they are, will depart from their original state. So the concept of cookhood should never arise at all. And if the individual may possibly transcend this drawback, being subject to change, no such contingency however can be supposed to happen to the universal, which is immutable by its very nature.. Uddyotakara however realised the absurdity of the above position and so came forward with a more plausible explanation. He asserts that universals are no doubt the cause and ground of class-conceptionś, but the converse of the proposition is not true. There may be class-conceptions even without an objective universal, as, for instance, in the case of cooks as a class, since, there is no such universal as cookhood. The connotation of cook is the chief agency of the act of cooking and as this agency is found to continue in other individual cooks, the class-notion is not ungrounded. But this only smacks of prevarication. What this chief agency exactly connotes is not explained. If it means efficiency (śakti), it does not avail in the least, as efficiency is peculiar to each individual and does not continue. If it means the individuality (svabhāva) of the substance, or of the attribute or of action, it leaves the matter where it was, as individuality is peculiarly individualistic and never functions as a unitive principle.

Thus all attempts at. finding an objective basis for the class-ideas having failed in the aforesaid instances, it must be supposed that the ideas of these universals are conceptual constructions from their exclusiveness of the opposite entities. The idea of the cook-universal arises from the fact that cooks, individual by individual, are sharply distinguished from all that are not cooks. So the cook-universal as a concept is ultimately resolvable into exclusion of non-cooks and so can be logically equated. with the idea of ‘not-not-cook.’ The use of nomenclature too is purely a matter of convention, ultimately referable to this negative idea. So for the explanation of conceptual thought and linguistic usage it is not at all necessary to postulate the existence of objective universals. These universals are thus subjective fictions, fondly hypostatised by the habitual tendency of the mind to localise ideas in external reality—the realistic bias of thought, which is the bane and- obsession of the Naiyāyika. It is proved therefore that class-concepts and class-names are not necessarily grounded in an objective universal. They are purely subjective constructions and have no reference to an objective, continuous principle, in other words, to a universal. Such at any rate is the case with ideas of negation (abhāvavijñāna). A negation cannot have a universal attached to it, as a universal can exist only in positive entities.

Śaṅkarasvāmin, however, seeks to explain the concept of negation by reference to the universal of the object of negation. A negation is always understood as negation of, this or that, of the jar or cloth or table and the like. So though negation may not have a universal, the universal of the object negated will be the cause of the conceptual thought. But this only seeks to confound the real issue. We can understand the position of the realist when he seeks to explain the concept of jar by reference to the universal of jar. But how can the universal of one have a bearing on the concept of another, passes our understanding. The concept of negation is entirely a distinct concept having no relation, direct or indirect, to the jar universal, which exists only in the individual jars. If the mere existence of a particular universal can give rise to various concepts, as it is imagined in the case of jar, which not only originates the concept of the jar but also of the negation of the jar, then, there will be no necessity to postulate different universals, as one universal will have the power to give rise to all possible concepts. Bhāvivikta however thinks that there is no difficulty in the fact that the universal of one gives rise to the concept of a different sort. There is no such restriction that our ideas should always conform to the nature of the object, that idea and object should be commensurate in all respects. Thus the idea of an army, which is the idea of a unit, or the idea of a forest is not generated by any unitary principle, but by another thing, the plurality of the individual soldiers or trees. The idea of one beverage is not due to any unitary principle either; it is generated by the admixture of various ingredients. If our ideas had to conform, as a matter of necessity, to the nature of the objective reality, these ideas would be ideas of distinct units conjoined together and not unitary in reference. We, Buddhists, fully endorse the above position that ideas and objects are not always commensurate, and precisely for this reason we think that there is no logical or metaphysical necessity to suppose that our ideas of universals should be affiliated to corresponding objective principles. These ideas can be supposed to have been generated by the particulars, distinct and discrete though they are. By the way, the universals were postulated on the hypothesis that our ideas should have corresponding objective realities as their cause. But when idea and reality are admitted to be at variance, in some cases at any rate, it is better and more reasonable to accept our theory. We, Buddhists, do not admit any objective universal over and above the particulars. And if we analyse the psychological process of conceptual thought, we shall find nothing beyond the particulars. Thus a particular is first experienced and then it is at once assimilated to other particulars under the impetus of the law of association and thus a generic idea is formed to which a symbolic expression, a name, is attached by a pure caprice of will; and this name becomes a conventional symbol of the generic concept and a convenient medium of communication of ideas, which, though purely subjective constructions, have a pragmatic value, as these ideas are remotely related to objective facts, being ultimately derived from them.^[11]

It has been urged that though some conceptual thoughts are seen to arise without an objective universal, that is no reason that all conceptual thoughts should be unfounded illusions. The concept of negation is a case in point. It is said to be a subjective construction, because negation cannot have a universal attached to it. But there is no such logical bar in the case of other concepts and so to lump them together with these admittedly subjective creations is not logically tenable. You could with equal logic deny validity to all our experience, because some particular experiences were found to be wrong. We admit the plausibility of the argument of the realist. But our contention is that we do not repudiate the objectivity conceptual thoughts on the analogy of concepts which are admittedly false. We only emphasised that the realist’s position that all our knowledge must be derived from objective experience was not invulnerable. This is a positive gain on our behalf. Now we deny the existence of universals because there is no proof in their favour. Universals are posited to account for conceptual thoughts. But no causal relation can-be discovered between concepts and universals. Causal relation is understood by means of the Joint Method of Agreement and Difference. But universals being eternal verities and conceptual thoughts being occasional events, there can be no causal relation between them. The non-emergence of a particular concept can not be due to the absence of the universal concerned, as universals without exception are present always. Nor can the occasional emergence of a conceptual thought be causally affiliated to a universal, because the universal is ever present and if it had any such efficiency, it would generate the idea always. So nothing is gained by postulating universals. If, however, the cognition of universals is supposed to be contingent on the cognition of the particulars in question, we do not see what these effete universals will avail. Our conceptual thoughts are seen to arise even without them.

The concepts of negation have been proved to be unfounded in objective universals. Kumārila however contends that even in negation there is an objective universal, as negation is nothing but a positive entity, bereft of a particular determination. Thus, the prior negation of curd is nothing but the milk existing in its pure state.^[12] This contention may hold good in case of negation of objective realities, but it has no force in negation of fictions of imagination. The position of the realist that negation presupposes prior existence of the thing negated is only a hollow assertion. When we say that there was no such person as Kapiñjala^[13] or Hamlet in reality, we do not see how can the concept of negation be affiliated to an objective universal even of the object of negation. The plea of Kumārila that negation always refers to a positive entity divested of a particular determination falls to the ground in these negations of fictitious persons and things. Hamlet or Kapiñjala is not a real entity under any circumstance. And what about the negation of doctrines or of categories maintained by the rival school of philosophers? Kumārila would say that there is no such thing as Pratisaṅkhyānirodha. But does this negation imply a positive fact in any wise? If not, how could the concept of negation arise at all in these cases, as in these cases there is no positive entity, far less a universal attaching to it. If you answer that negation in these cases relates to a subjective concept, which has no objective reality, then, for the sake of consistency at least you should admit that our concepts and expressions without exception are alike devoid of objective reference; in other words, they are subjective fictions, pure and simple, their pragmatic value notwithstanding.^[14]

Furthermore, even granted that these universals are objective categories existing in their own right, it cannot be conceived how they are related to particulars. The universal and the particular cannot be distinguished by perception, as they are not distinctly perceived. But distinct things are perceived as distinct from one another. The universal is supposed to exist in a number of particulars in the same fashion and in the same form. But they are not felt as such. You might say that the universal is not perceived independently of the particulars, as it exists in them; but its mode of existence cannot be logically conceived. Existence is ordinarily understood to be non-forfeiture of one’s nature. A thing is said to exist when it does not lapse from its own nature, or in other words, when it maintains itself intact. But for this self-maintenance or self-assertion a thing must rely on its own independent resources and must not be dependent on extraneous help or favour. And if the universal is an independent entity, it must exist by its own nature and for this a medium is useless. If, on the other hand, it does not possess such powers of maintaining or asserting its existence, a medium cannot be of any help to it. A medium is seen to be necessary to prevent a thing from falling down, as for instance a basket is needed for the holding together of fruits and vegetables. But the universal is not a gravitating body; it is on your own assumption a passive entity devoid of locomotion and gravitating tendency. If, however, the universal is supposed to exist in the particular mediums by the relation of co-inherence (samavāya), it does not make any improvement on the situation; on the contrary, it further complicates the issue. The universal is a bold assumption in itself and to justify this you are making another assumption which is equally absurd. One absurdity necessitates another absurdity, just as one lie requires an infinite number of lies for its justification, but all this to no purpose. Co-inherence is a relation, but unlike other relations it does not bring together two terms existing independently of one another. It obtains between two things, which are never found to be dissociated in nature. But this is a case of plain self-contradiction. A relation between terms which are conjoined by their very nature is absolutely unavailing. If there is a relation, the terms must be supposed to have existed separately and if they were never separate, no relation can be necessary or possible. So the relation of co-inherence cannot be accepted as a satisfactory explanation of the relation of the universal and the particular. The position taken up by the realist that there is no contradiction in experience, unless it is shown to be contradicted by another experience, is not a logically sound position. When there is a divergence in the interpretation of experience itself, the issue can be decided by an appeal to logic only. The present dispute affords a case in point. Our perceptual experience is believed by the Naiyāyikas and the Mīmāṃsakas to be cognisant of the particular and the universal both at one sweep. But the Buddhist does not think that the idea of one continuous principle is directly derived from perceptual data.^[15] So the strength and validity of experience cannot be determined otherwise than by a logical examination. The falsity or invalidity of an experience is determined by a contradictory experience no doubt; but that is not the only means. Those who are possessed of a philosophic insight do not rest satisfied with the prima facie verdict of experience, but seek to test it by logical canons. Experience, no doubt, is the final arbiter, but it must be attested and approved by logic. The disregard of this procedure will only land us in rank empiricism.^[16] Co-inherence as formulated by the Nyāya - Vāiśeṣika school thus fails to render an explanation of the relation of the universal and the particular. Kumārila maintains that the relation of the universal and the particular is one of identity in difference. A reality is a concrete whole of which the universal and the particular are two aspects. So a cow is both identical with and different from another cow. It is identical in respect of the universal, but different in respect of the particular variation. But this is an absurd position and does not even deserve a refutation. How can one thing be one and many, eternal and non-eternal? It is a contradiction in terms. Kumārila however would turn round and say that there is no contradiction in it, as it is found to be so in uncontradicted experience. But this appeal to experience is an argument of despair and we have just proved the hollowness of this position.

It may be supposed that the relation is one of revealer and revealed. The universal is revealed in the particular and it is for this reason that they are found together. But this too does not take us nearer the solution. If the universal is possessed of the efficiency to generate a cognition of itself, the revealing medium will have no function in this respect. And if the universal does not possess this efficiency, then, too, the medium will be useless, as an eternal verity cannot be supposed to change its nature. If the universal is supposed to develop this efficiency in association with the particular media, the universal must be supposed to be fluxional, as the existence of contradictory attributes in one substratum is impossible unless the supposed integer is split up into diverse entities. But this amounts to the negation of the universal.

Again, let the relation of the universal and particulars be one of co-inherence. But does the universal exist in its entirety in each of the particulars or in its partial extension in them? If the universal exists in a particular in its entire extension, it will be exhausted in one such particular and so cannot exist in other particulars. But universals are ex hypothesi supposed to exist in all its particulars in the same fashion and in the same degree. And if a universal is supposed to exist in each of the particulars in its partial extension, the universal will exist in none of them in its totality and so the idea of the universal cannot be supposed to relate to any one of these particulars. Moreover, the universal is supposed to be an impartite whole and so we cannot conceive that the universal exists part by part in the particulars just as in a garland the connecting thread exists part; by part in the individual flowers.^[17] Again, the question arises whether universals are ubiquitous like space or soul of the Naiyāyika or they exist only in the particular individuals belonging to them. If they are supposed to be ubiquitous, all universals will exist together and the horse-universal will be cognised in the cow and the cow-universal in the horse and so with regard to all other universals. Thus there will be confusion and no determinate concept can arise. Nor can it be legitimately supposed that the individual members of a class will exercise a regulative influence and so the cow-universal alone will be revealed in the individual cows and not the horse-universal or other universals, because such supposition could be possible if universals were not thought to be impartite entities. So a universal once revealed will be revealed in its entirety and thus should be cognised to be ubiquitous. The individual is supposed to reveal the existence of the universal like light; but as light does not reveal its own self alone or its qualities alone, the individual should reveal the universal not only as it exists in it, but as it is by its nature, that is to say, the universal should be revealed as ubiquitous and all-pervading. But this is not our experience and we do not see how such universals can be of any help, the question of logical propriety apart.

Of course, none of these difficulties arises if we suppose like Praśastapāda that a universal exists in its own particular members only and not also in the intervening spaces. But Praśastapāda’s theory is open to equally damaging objections. If the universal exists only in its proper individuals, we cannot conceive how the universal can attach itself to a thing which is not born as yet. The cow-universal existing in the living cows cannot be supposed to unite itself to the cow that is just born, because it is inactive and stationary. If it is supposed to move from one subject to another, it will cease to be a universal, because only a substance (dravya) can have activity. And even supposing that universals are active principles, we cannot conceive how it can move forward without deserting its former locus and if it is supposed to leave its previous loci, the latter will be lifeless entities bereft of the universal. Furthermore, the relation of the universal and the particular is peculiarly embarrassing. The universal pervades the particular from top to bottom, inside and outside, in a complete and thoroughgoing fashion, but it does not touch the ground whereupon the individual rests. This is certainly a very strange position. The universal does not move forward to join the individual which is just born; it was not there before, because the individual was not in existence; but it is found to exist in the individual after the latter has come into existence.^[18] The Realist makes these absurd assumptions one after another with a sangfroid which befits a bravado and calls upon us to accept his position without scruple or questions. And if we refuse to take him at his word, he accuses us of infidelity to experience and ultra-rationalism. But there are limits to human credulity and each man has his own experience and his own interpretation to rely upon. When there is a divergence about the interpretation of experience itself, the dispute can be terminated by an appeal to logic only. But logic is not a thing which finds favour with the realist.

To sum up: we have seen that the universals are but subjective constructions, pure and simple. The fault of the realist lies in his believing these subjective fictions to be ontological realities existing in perfect independence of thinking minds. The absurdity of the realist’s position has been thoroughly exposed and further argument is useless and unnecessary, as argumentation is nothing but a waste of energy when a person is determined not to understand.

 

Reference:

1. Tattvasaṅgraha, śls 708-812.
2. Sāmānyadūṣaṇa in the Six Biddhist Nyāya Tracts.
3. Ślokavārtika, pp. 545-65.
4. Sarvadarśanasaṅgraha, Bauddhadarśana.
5. Nyāyavārtika, pp. 314-34.
6. Do. Tātparyaṭīkā, pp. 477-95.
7. Nyāvamañjarī, pp. 297-317.

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

nityam ekam anekānugataṃ sāmānyam. The words, samānya and jāti, are synonymous.

[2]:

tasmād ekasya bhinneṣu yā vṛttis tannibandhanaḥ |
sāmānyaśabdaḥ sattādāv ekadhīkaraṇena vā | 
      S. V., Ākṛtivāda.

[3]:

viṣayātiśayam antareṇa pratyayātiśayānupapatteḥ.
      N. M., p. 314.

[4]:

yad apy abhihitam itaretaraviruddharūpasamāveśa ekatra vastuni no’papadyata iti tad api na samyak,

parasparavirodho’pi nāstī’ha tadavedanāt |
ekabādhena nā’nyatra dhīḥ śuktirajatādivat |

yatra hi virodho bhavati tatrai’katararūpopamardena rupāntaram upalabhyate, prakṛte tu nai’vara iti ko virodhārthaḥ. chāyātapāv api yady ekatra dṛśyete, kiṃ kena viruddham abhidhīyate, adarśanāt tu tad viruddham uktam, na cai’vam ihā’darśanam ity avirodhaḥ.
      N. M., p. 311.

Also, ‘anupapannam iti naḥ kva sampratyayo yan na pramāṇenā’vagatam, viruddham api tad budhyāmahe, yad ekatra niviśamānaṃ na paśyāmaḥ,’
      —Ibid, p. 547.

[5]:

Vide Ś. V., śls. 15-17, Chapter on Ākṛtivāda.

[6]:

antarmātrāsamārūḍhaṃ sāṃvṛtam avalambya te |
bahīrūpādhyavasitaṃ pravarttante’ṅkuśādikam |
      Ibid., śl. 735.

antarmātrā—buddhiḥ. T. S. P., ad ibid.

[7]:

T. S., śls. 723-29.

[8]:

Śaṇkarasvāmī tv āha—sāmānyam api nīlatvādi ṇīlādyākāram eva, anyathā hi nīla ity evam anuvṛttipratyayo na syāt.
      T.S.P., pp. 243-44.

Vide also śls. 740-42, T.S.

[9]:

Cf. Essays in Radical Empiricism, p. 42. The same tendency is seen to be at work in the Empiricism of James, though the conclusions which he deduces from this fundamental postulate are widely at variance from those reached by the Naiyāyika realist.

[10]:

The non-existence of the cloth before its production is a case of previous non-being. This type of non-existence is without beginning and continues until the clobh is produced. The destruction of the cloth constitutes a case of posterior non-being, which takes place as an event at a definite point of time. It has a definite beginning unlike the former and thus has a previous limit, but it continues as such through all the time and thus has no end or lower limit. The difference of one thing from another is a case of reciprocal non-being. A table is not a chair and vice versa. The last type of non-being, viz. absolute non-being, is one that is timeless. It has neither previous nor subsequent history, but continues uniform and unaffected. The non-existence of such fictions as a barren woman’s son or a horned horse is absolute without any reference to time-limitation. ‘The non-existence is not relative to a particular division of time or of space, and is not contingent on any extraneous condition, Hence it is called absolute and unconditional non-being (atyantābhāva).

[11]:

bhedajñāne satī’cchā hi saṅketakaraṇe tataḥ |
tatkṛtis tacchrutiś cā’syā ābhogas tanmutis tataḥ |
anvayavyalirekābhyām idam eva viniścitam |
samarthaṃ kāraṇaṃ tasyām anyeṣam anāvasthitiḥ |
      T. S., 778-74.

[12]:

nanu ca prāgabbāvādau sāmānyaṃ vastu ne’ṣyate |
sattai’va hy atra sāmānyam anutpattyādirūṣitā ||
      S. V., Apoha, śl. 11.

[13]:

A minor hero in the Kādambarī, a romantic novel by Bāṇa Bhaṭṭa, a protégé of Emperor Harsavardhana of Northern India, who was the patron of the celebrated Chinese pilgrim, Hiuen Tsang.

[14]:

T. S. P., p. 255, under śl. 788.

[15]:

dṛṣṭatvān na virodhaś cen na tathā tadavedanāt |
uktaṃ hi nā ‘nuvṛttārthagrūhiṇī netradhīr iti ||
      N. M., p. 301.

[16]:

dṛḍhādṛḍhatvam akṣuṇṇam aparīkṣyai’va saṃvidām |
na ne’ti pratyayād eva mithyātvaṃ kevalaṃ dhiyām |
kiṃ tu yuktiparikṣā, pi kartavyā sūkṣmadarśibhiḥ ||
      Op. cit., p. 301.

[17]:

piṇḍe sāmānyam anyatra yadi kārtsnyena vartate |
tatrai’vā’sya samāptatvān na syāt piṇḍāntare grahaḥ |
ekadeśena vṛttau tu gotvajātir na kutracit |
samagrā’sti’ti gobuddhiḥ prabipiṇḍam kathaṃ bhavet ||
      N. M., p. 298.

[18]:

anyatra vartamānasya tato’nyasthānajanmani |
tasmād acalataḥ sthānād vṛttir ity atiyuktatā |
yatrā’sau vartate bhāvas tena sambadhyate natu |
taddeśinaṃ ca vyāpnoti kim apy etan mahādhutam |
na yāti na ca tatrā’sīd asti paścān na cā’ṃśavat |
jahāti pūrvaṃ nā’dhāram aho vyasanasantatiḥ |
      S. D. S., p. 27.