Verse 1359-1361

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

किन्तु बाह्यार्थसद्भाववादे सारूप्यसम्भवः ।
ध्रुवमभ्युपगन्तव्य इत्यर्थं स प्रकाशितः ॥ १३५९ ॥
निर्भासिज्ञानपक्षे हि ग्राह्याद्भेदेऽपि चेतसः ।
प्रतिबिम्बस्य ताद्रूप्याद्भाक्तं स्यादपि वेदनम् ॥ १३६० ॥
येन त्विष्टं न विज्ञानमर्थासारूप्यभाजनम् ।
तस्यायमपि नैवास्ति प्रकारो बाह्यवेदने ॥ १३६१ ॥

kintu bāhyārthasadbhāvavāde sārūpyasambhavaḥ |
dhruvamabhyupagantavya ityarthaṃ sa prakāśitaḥ || 1359 ||
nirbhāsijñānapakṣe hi grāhyādbhede'pi cetasaḥ |
pratibimbasya tādrūpyādbhāktaṃ syādapi vedanam || 1360 ||
yena tviṣṭaṃ na vijñānamarthāsārūpyabhājanam |
tasyāyamapi naivāsti prakāro bāhyavedane || 1361 ||

But under the doctrine of the reality of the external world,, the possibility of the sameness of form has to be accepted; that is why it has been mentioned.—Under the doctrine, however, of cognition being a mere reflected image,—even if the cognition differs from the cognised object, the sameness of form belongs to the reflection; and the cognition can be only figurative.—Lastly, for one who does not admit the cognition to be the receptacle of the semblance of the object,—there is not even the said method possible for the cognising of the external object.—(1359-1361)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

‘It has, etc.’.—‘It’ stands for ‘the possibility of the sameness of form’, or the ‘form’ itself.

‘Nirbhāsi’, ‘Reflected Image’:—‘Nirbhāsa’, ‘Reflection’, is sameness of form with the object; and that which has this sameness of form, is the ‘Reflected linage’.

‘From the cognised object’,—i.e. from the external object.

‘Belongs to the Reflection’,—i.e. to the Reflection in the form of the Cognition.

‘Sameness of form’,—with the object.

‘Figurative’,—Indirect, Secondary.

‘Cognition’—i.e. of the object.

‘Receptacle’—substratum.

As regards the divergence of opinion regarding the object of Cognition, the Universal as a real entity has been already rejected; hence for Perception which has been regarded as having an entity for its object, there can be no other object except the Specific Individuality, and this having been already pointed out as being got at by implication, no special effort has been made for setting aside the said divergence of opinion.

Some people have argued as follows (against the Buddhist’s definition of Sense-perception)’,—“The definition suggested is not a proper one; the definition put forward is that of the Means of Cognition, with the view that other people may, through that definition, come to understand what the Means of Cognition is, and then regulate their action accordingly; and it is not put forward only for satisfying a whim. And (in so far as the proposed definition is concerned) the knowledge that Sense-perception is ‘free from Conceptual Content’ and all that cannot, in ordinary life, either prompt a man to activity, or make him desist from it.”

This is not right. The nature of things cannot be made or determined according to one’s wish; by virtue of which one could frame a definition accordingly; what, has to be done, however, is to take the thing as it stands, and to put forward a definition embodying that particular aspect of the thing which one wishes to bring out. For example, one points out ‘roughness’ as a characteristic of the Earth. If it were not thus, then the definition put forward might be open to the charge of being an ‘impossible’ one.

As regards Sense-perception, there is nothing else to indicate its character, -except ‘freedom from Conceptual Content’ and ‘freedom from error’,—For instance, it must be ‘free from error’, because it is a valid means of Cognition; and it must be ‘free from Conceptual Content’, because it directly apprehends the Specific Individuality of things; and it has been proved that the Specific Individuality is something in regard to which no Convention can be made, and hence its cognition must be free from association with words.—It is for tins reason that all intelligent persons regard this definition as entirely in accordance with reason.

Nor is it true that this definition cannot bring about either activity, or desisting from activity, on the part of intelligent persons. For instance, in connection with such cognitions as—(a) the Idea of the Jar, the action of Throwing up, the Universal, the Number and so forth, (b) the idea of Recognition, and (c) the idea of the ‘yellow conch-shell’,—some persons have been led to regard all these as ‘Sense-perception’, in accordance with the definition provided by other parties,—and then they find that all these are either Conceptual or Erroneous, and then,—in accordance with the definition provided by us,—they conclude that these cannot be ‘Sense-perception’; thereupon they desist from (give up) the notion that Number and the rest are real entities;—and they also conclude that what is an entity is only that Specific Individuality—of the ‘Blue’ for instance,—which is inexpressible by words, and hence they betake themselves to activity towards that.—How even the non-conceptual Cognition can lead to activity has been already explained before.

Says the Opponent;—“If this is so, then let there be a single item in the definition—‘free from Conceptual Content’, and ‘free from error’ need not be added. Because that fact alone which is already known prior to the intended activity, should be put forward as a definition for the benefit of persons desirous of undertaking activity in accordance with that definition; and no unknown thing; as the latter is as good as non-existent. And as a matter of fact, any certainty regarding ‘freedom from error’ cannot be there until it has been found to be compatible with the fruitful activity undertaken; in fact people with limited powers of perception are not able to ascertain the truthful character of a cognition, except through the perception of its practical effect; because for such persons the capacity of things can only be inferred from its effects; it has been shown above that ‘truthfulness’—i.e. conformity with the real state of things—of the Cognition consists only in its capacity to make people actually get at the thing cognised. So that if this conformity were learnt only subsequently, it would serve no useful purpose; as after that, there is no further activity.”

Answer:—There is no force in this objection. It has been already explained that it is necessary to add the qualification ‘free from error’, in order to save the definition from the defect of being ‘too wide’ by reason of the possibility, under the definition, of notions like those of the ‘Hair -tuft’, etc. being regarded as valid cognition.—As regards the argument that before the activity has actually taken place, people with limited powers of vision have no means of ascertaining the truth of the cognition,—this also is Inconclusive. Where is there any such hard and fast rule that people with limited vision cannot ascertain the capacity of anything? If that were so, then, they would be unable to be certain of anything; which would mean that they are unconscious beings; because even animals and infants, through repeated experience, come to have their impressions aroused, are able to feel certain that ‘this thing brings pleasure’, ‘that other brings pain’, and are found to act accordingly,—even before their present activity,—and then avoid the precipice and take to the mother’s breasts. Also in the case of people who are constantly thinking of something that has never existed before, and have their mind disturbed by excessive desire, grief, fear and so forth,—even without remembering any points of similarity, etc.—it is found that the mere repetition of the vivid idea has the capacity to bring about the cognition. In a case where there is no repetition, there alone,—not everywhere—is the potency to be only inferred from its practical effects.

This same explanation applies to the certainty attaching to the perception of Inferential Indicatives, like Smoke; as here also, the effect, in the shape of Smoke, is, by its very nature, something entirely different (from the Fire), and the certainty regarding its difference is due to repeated observation, whereby the idea of the Inferential Indicative also becomes possible, and consequently there is no rejection of Inference.

Says the Opponent:—“The repetition would be there only after the first activity has taken place; it has to be explained how that first activity comes about

Answer:—That activity proceeds from the doubtful cognition.

Question:—“How can the Perception which gives rise to Doubt have any validity?”

Answer:—How can there be validity in the Perception that brings about certainty?

“It is due to the fact that this Perception brings about a definite Cognition and the man seeking for it takes up his activity.”

This same may be said also with regard to Perception leading to Doubt.

Even though in this case, the cognition is contrary to the form of what is sought after, yet it is not in that form that the Perception leads to activity, because what is so cognised is not what is wanted; nor does it lead to desisting from activity; because it is only when there is cognition of the thing as desired that there can be any activity on the part of the man. Otherwise, from Perception leading to Doubt, no one could act or desist from acting. But this does not so happen; on the contrary, it so happens that that activity is all the more powerful which proceeds on the part of persons who do not apprehend any evil consequences from the activity in question. So far as this aspect is concerned, there is no difference between the Perception leading to Doubt and that leading to Certainty. It is only where the Perception brings about a cognition entirely contrary to the thing cognised,—or where it brings about no cognition at all,—that there is no activity on the part of the man seeking for something; and hence it is only this Perception that is invalid,—not any other.—(1359-1361)

End of the Chapter on Sense-perception.